Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean, Volume VIII

760.00/3–2752

No. 66
Memorandum by the Deputy Chief of the Joint Subsidiary Plans Division, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Hopkins), to the Psychological Strategy Board¹

top secret
SPDM–93–52

[Washington,] March 17, 1952.

Program for Exploitation and Utilization of Escapees

1. The preliminary plan provides for the formation of military elements in implementation of the so-called “Kersten Amendment”.² The plan is concerned with the formation of selected persons from Soviet Bloc countries and regions into military elements in support of U.S. military forces which are affiliated with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It sets forth a phased program to recruit, organize, train and utilize escapees, and establishes basic guidance for these activities over the first three years of a program, beginning 1 July 1952. Certain preliminary activities required for its detailed implementation are reflected by the plan.

2. a. Initial reception, subsequent care and ultimate provision for refugees in Europe are activities of private organizations operating under the aegis of the State Department, and this is established as a pattern of U.S. activity by PSB D–18/a.³ The preliminary plan envisages a military program, in cooperation with the basic effort undertaken by such private organizations, whereby military recruitment may be publicized, volunteers removed, and, as required, returned to those organizations when not selected for service in the military program.

b. All volunteers selected for military service, except for those individuals who are otherwise suitably qualified, will complete six months’ basic training. For this purpose, volunteers will be organized in light infantry regiments. Such units will be formed as phased personnel increments. Under the program, one new regiment is envisaged to begin basic training each month during the first six months of activity, starting 1 July 1952. Beginning 1 January 1953, it is envisaged one new training regiment will be activated each three weeks through the duration of the program, so that the final regiment will begin training on 30 June 1955. At that time the plan envisages that approximately 60,000 escapee-volunteers will have been entered in the program.

c. Upon completion of basic training, volunteers will be assigned to the commands in Europe under the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other U.S. agencies in Europe, either for further training and organization or for immediate employment. As a result of basic training it is considered that such units will have a capability as labor or service units, with only limited capability as combat forces. It is envisaged that military units to be formed and organized after basic individual training is completed possibly may be developed into diverse, combat worthy elements. Thus, being considered are:

(1) Air Force—National squadrons and wings

(2) Navy—Minesweeper or other small craft units

(3) Army—Regimental combat teams and combat and service support units, including engineer and signal units

. . . . . . .

d. Type of organization and scope of extended training subsequent to completion of basic training will be conditioned by the nature of employment for which the units are destined, and this in turn will be determined by the objectives to be attained by the program. Employment of the military elements to be formed either as combat or combat support type units will require advanced training. Similarly, specialized training will be required to permit utilization of such personnel for other distinctive roles and missions. It is estimated that six months of such training will produce qualified individuals and units for many important and useful tasks. It is considered that specific needs and objectives of the military Services will determine the training, organization and employment of the basically-trained personnel allocated to them. Regardless of the nature of the organization it appears that the troop ceilings of commands in Europe under the Joint Chiefs of Staff would have to be increased. If the activities envisaged by the plan are undertaken without appropriate increase in troop ceilings, there will be established requirements which can be met only at the expense of existing programs and commitments. Accordingly, appropriate increases in the ceilings of the military services may have to be authorized.

e. Build-up of commands in Europe under the Joint Chiefs of Staff with appropriate U.S. elements is proposed, as may be required to enable employment of escapee-volunteer units. Such augmentation will be conditioned by requirements for support of the military elements to be formed and in consideration of current U.S. capabilities for such support.

3. a. Estimated direct costs of the program proposed by the plan include:

	FY 1952	FY 1953
Total	$6,431,020	$41,951,420

4. It is important to note that none of the matériel requirements reflected by this plan have been programmed and that no funds have been reported or allocated in this matter. It is considered likely that, if approved, implementation of the plan would require supplemental funds during FY 1953. This consideration is dictated by a possible measure of success of the program, entailing an acceleration of U.S. efforts in its development and exploitation.

[Tab A]

Memorandum by the Deputy Chief of the Joint Subsidiary Plans Division, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Hopkins), to the Psychological Strategy Board

1. Among the policy questions involved in implementation of the program are the following:

a. Prior to adoption of the program, consideration must be given to its implications regarding present U.S. foreign policy; reactions of Allied governments to a recruiting and training program conducted within their jurisdiction; and similarly, reaction of German and Austrian governments in this regard; and eventual relations of the military elements to be formed to SHAPE and to the European Defense Forces.

b. Possible development of psychological association between the program and any particular émigré group(s) warrants attention and appropriate determination.

c. Type of organization and scope of extended training should be conditioned by the nature of employment for which the units are destined, and this in turn will be determined by the objectives to be attained by the program. Decisions must be reached regarding the role of the units in the over-all U.S. military effort in Europe; the possible extension of the program beyond a three year period; the effect of an extended program on U.S. troop commitments in Europe; and the eventual disposition of volunteers released from service under U.S. auspices.

d. Employment of the military elements to be formed either as combat or combat support type units will require advanced training. Similarly, specialized training will be required to permit utilization of such personnel for [illegible] and missions. It is estimated that six months of such training would produce qualified individuals and units for many important and useful tasks. Specific needs and objectives of the military Services will determine the training, organization and employment of the basically-trained personnel allocated to them. Decisions regarding the type units to be organized and their physical location necessarily must be conditioned by current U.S. military capabilities to support those units. Regardless of the nature of organization(s) to be developed, it appears that the troop ceilings of JCS commands in Europe would have to be increased. Such an increase should be authorized as applicable to the ceilings of the military Services, insofar as any one Service may be affected or concerned. If the activities envisaged by the plan are undertaken without appropriate increase in troop ceilings, there will be established requirements which can be met only at the expense of existing programs and commitments.

e. While the intent of the Congress to serve U.S. interests and security is clearly evident, the impact of such a program, competing with other projects for military end-items, can be of considerable consequence.

f. Formation of national units may be desirable, but if such units are formed, consideration must be given to intra-units personnel relations. The views of governments concerned regarding the presence of foreign national units within their territories, and the advisability of stationing such units in areas contiguous to their native lands, are additional matters requiring policy deliberation.

2. In essence, policy matters which are mentioned above are closely related to certain basic international political considerations. These include:

a. Implications of the program regarding present U.S. foreign policy.

(1) With respect to USSR—

(a) Possibly deemed aggressive act.

(b) Provocation for extensive Soviet countermeasures.

(2) With respect to Allied and other European nations—

(a) Deemed precipitous act.

(b) At variance with avowed desire for “peace”.

(c) Development of pressures which will affect:

1. Government stability.

2. Status of existing pacts and agreements.

(3) With respect to neutral nations, primarily “third force” powers such as India and Iran—

(a) Deemed precipitous act.

(b) Attitude toward U.S. affected by fear of Soviet countermeasures leading to war.

(4) With respect to basic current U.S. policy—

(a) Abandons containment, or at least,

(b) Intensifies, accelerates and extends apparent trend toward ultimate liberation of Soviet Bloc peoples.

b. Reactions of Allied and German and Austrian Governments to such a program conducted within their jurisdiction.

(1) Sovereignty compromise; consequent possible Soviet exploitation of public opinion.

(2) Traditional antipathies toward peoples concerned.

(3) Pay and standard of living differentials.

(4) Competition with their own recruiting program.

(5) Effects on local economies.

c. Eventual relations to SHAPE and to EDF.

(1) National status of such personnel and units.

(2) Political representation at policy level.

(3) Ultimate fiscal, administrative and logistical support responsibility.

d. Association with particular émigré group(s).

(1) Effect on Allied and neutral opinion.

(2) Effect on success of the basic program, including recruiting.

(3) Effect on Soviets.

3. Additionally, there are other policy matters mentioned above which bear on military decisions. These include:

a. Role of units in over-all U.S. military effort in Europe.

(1) Their status; as affiliates with U.S. forces, and ultimately to NATO.

(2) Overall organizational structure.

(3) Possible replacement for U.S. troops.

b. Effect of extended program on U.S. troop commitments.

(1) Require increase in troop ceilings.

(2) Tax other regional or area requirements.

(3) Provide additional forces.

(4) Possibly replace U.S. forces in Europe.

c. U.S. capabilities to support these units.

(1) Administrative and logistical; present and likely future; feasibility and advisability.

(2) Competing with NATO and other MDAP commitments.

(3) Competing with U.S. training establishment, general reserve, and operational forces, otherwise deployed.

d. Eventual disposition of volunteers.

(1) Ultimate resettlement.

(2) Disciplinary cases within span of service.

(3) To national governments claiming such personnel.

4. It is evident that the implications inherent in policy matters reflected above touch on ramified U.S. interests and concern in such an endeavor. The basic relationship of any such program to the broad field of foreign policy is obvious, and likewise, military aspects of the problem can be readily recognized. However, there is another fundamental consideration in this matter, bearing on each of those broad fields, and this must be carefully assessed. U.S. domestic policy is that fundamental consideration. In this regard, its two principal facts appear to be: (1) humanitarian and (2) political. These will condition any action in the matter.

1. Attached to a memorandum from Hopkins to Godel (PSB) which noted that the paper had not been coordinated with Hopkins’ military colleagues due to the urgency of its consideration by the PSB Panel.
2. Reference is to Section 101(a)(1) of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, P.L. 82–165 (65 Stat. 373), Oct. 10, 1951.
3. Document 63.