Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean, Volume VIII

768.00/6–2354

No. 694
The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Riddleberger) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant)

top secret

Belgrade, June 23, 1954.

Dear Livie: With reference to our telegram No. 1343 of June 23,¹ I am sending you an account of my second intervention with Vladimir Popovic following the Department’s instructions on the Bishops’ relief shipments² which developed into a discussion of far wider scope.

Popovic said he had now been back in Yugoslavia for several months, had reestablished contact with Yugoslav high officials, with parliamentary opinion and with public opinion as a result of having made addresses throughout the country. He said he had encountered various trends which had disturbed him; and although he could not now give me a favorable reply on the Bishops’ shipments, he welcomed this opportunity to discuss with me a number of matters which he would do with frankness. He said that as an ex-Ambassador to Washington he well recognized the complex and difficult problems which faced the Eisenhower Administration, and in what he was to say there was no lack of understanding. He thought, however, that Yugoslavia had a number of problems that were not perhaps fully comprehended in Washington and on these he would give me his candid opinion.

As he traveled throughout Yugoslavia he encountered a certain nervousness about American policy, particularly the course of events at Geneva. He said the impression was growing that U.S. policy was somewhat reckless and enhanced the danger of war. I said that in face of the repeated examples of Soviet imperialism that this belief was wholly unwarranted and that our basic policy was one of defense for the free world. We could not pretend that the aggression in Southeast Asia was imaginary, and certainly there was every indication that our policy was one of consultation and not of go-it-alone irrespective of our allies. He did not press it further; and I think this was merely an introduction for what was to come.

Popovic then stated he had some remarks on US-Yugoslav relations and with renewed apologies for frank speaking said that amongst the top Yugoslav leaders there was real concern and increasing discussion on U.S. reaction to Yugoslav policy. He had two points particularly in mind: (a) press and public reaction to Balkan military alliance and (b) the Secretary’s highly negative reply to the correspondents’ query on the possibility of a Tito visit to the U.S.³

On the military alliance, Yugoslav leaders found our attitude hard to understand. Yugoslavia, it seemed to them, was doing what the U.S. had urged many European states to do, i.e., make heavy sacrifices for the common defense. The U.S. endured no end of delay on such matters as the E.D.C., had pleasant words even for those who were most reluctant (probably an allusion to our messages to the French Government⁴), took account of Italian susceptibilities, but could find nothing good to say for a country like Yugoslavia which was now trying to formalize defense arrangements in Southeastern Europe. The Balkan military alliance was for the common good, the Yugoslav people made heavy sacrifices to maintain military strength, the Yugoslav Government had to all intents and purposes accepted the October 8 decision⁵ in the common interest and had come to an agreement with the U.S.–U.K., but the general refrain from the U.S. was critical and questioning for Yugoslav defense policy that should receive warm endorsement from the U.S.

With some circumlocution but unmistakably, Popovic made it clear that Yugoslav sensibilities had been severely wounded by the Secretary’s reply on the question of the Tito visit. He said the flat negative tone had led to a painful reaction among Yugoslav leaders who compared it to his consideration for Italy (no doubt an allusion to the Secretary’s trip to Milan⁶). The Yugoslav leaders felt that their country deserved some consideration also, but the U.S. attitude seemed to be one of avoidance. No American personality of political stature had visited Yugoslavia in spite of the flow of high American officials to Europe, and there seemed to be no desire to see high Yugoslav officials in the U.S.

The Trieste dispute, Popovic continued, had had far-reaching and unfortunate effects in spite of the Yugoslav decision to accept the October 8 decision as the basis for a settlement. The military conversations in Washington⁷ had not been followed up and there was no indication that anything was planned. At the very time when there should be the closest consultation between our governments, the U.S. has shown a chilly and critical attitude toward Yugoslav policies which seem to accord with basic U.S. policies and desires. Whether justified or not, this reaction has taken place amongst Yugoslav leadership and led to a debate on future Yugoslav policy.

This debate, said Popovic, was assuming forms which worried him considerably. Some leaders had begun to doubt the basic American attitude toward Yugoslavia, to fear that U.S. support was wavering, that there was no hope of an equitable settlement for Trieste on the basis of the U.S.-U.K.-Yugo agreement, that Yugoslav military policy does not seem to be fully understood or its sacrifices appreciated by the U.S., that future economic and military support seems unclear, and finally that perhaps Yugoslavia must re-assess its policy to take account of the lack of U.S. support, material and moral. This would not imply any lessened determination to defend itself, but if adopted would lead to many changes within Yugoslavia.

At this point Popovic said that after his return to his native land, he had been impressed anew by the strong Yugoslav feeling of independence and belief amongst the people that they could somehow survive. He said perhaps this is difficult to understand in the U.S., particularly in view of the grave economic difficulties facing his country. Nonetheless, many Yugoslav leaders believe that Yugoslavia can exist without U.S. help, although he was the first to pay tribute to what the U.S. had done for Yugoslavia. This help could never be underestimated and all Yugoslav leaders recognized it. He would ask us to remember that a state of mind existed which thought that by tightening the belt and reducing the standard of living, Yugoslavia could become less dependent on the U.S.

Popovic concluded with a plea for more understanding and more contact. He hoped that U.S. could be most forthcoming in discussing common questions with Yugoslav officials. At this point he asked me suddenly where I would be in July. When I said I would be in Belgrade he was obviously relieved and said he had been on the point of making the suggestion that I remain here. He hoped that I would be authorized to have discussions of common problems with the high Yugoslav officials and that these should not be delayed. There should be a more intimate contact in which the U.S. could show its understanding of Yugoslav problems and indicate where it could give support to a foreign policy which essentially corresponded to that of the U.S.

I gave appropriate replies to the foregoing explaining how great had been U.S. material support and citing the various reassurances which I had been authorized to make since my arrival. I said that in the case of Trieste, the U.S. Government certainly recognized how far Yugoslavia had gone in making a settlement possible. I said that the U.S.–U.K. and Yugoslavia had come to an agreement on what would be an equitable settlement and that surely his Government would grant us time to negotiate with the Italians. We were just as desirous as the Yugoslavs to reach a settlement and the latter should not be too upset about what appeared in the Italian press. I then reviewed the whole economic aid picture for FY ’54, including the off-shore contracts which are being or have been signed this week, and emphasized that all this certainly represented an understanding of Yugoslav needs. On the question of visits, I said that top-level visits always presented certain difficulties and problems of timing, but that I would recommend to Washington that, when possible, some high American officials visit Belgrade. I said I thought that the conclusion of the Balkan military alliance would inevitably result in closer ties, and perhaps more extensive relationships than some of his own colleagues yet realized. Once the incubus of Trieste were removed, I foresaw the development of a closer relationship in many fields. I concluded by referring to the long-term interest of the U.S. in building up the defenses of the free world and what sacrifices we had made and would continue to make to this end. I assured him that, pursuant to this aim, he would find that our attitude on the Balkan military alliance would not be disappointing to Yugoslavia. Certain problems of timing and NATO arose in this connection, but my démarche to Koca Popovic⁸ had not meant that they were insoluble. Patience and tolerance both on Trieste and Balkan military arrangements would benefit us both in the end. I concluded by saying that I would do my best to further discussion of common problems with frankness and I was certain that the Department would approve. He then suggested several high Yugoslav officials whom I should see more often including, somewhat to my surprise, Rankovic.

In reflecting upon this conversation, which was obviously planned and cleared in advance, I do not believe for a moment that Tito is planning any basic change of policy. But I am equally sure that on the top-level the Yugoslavs are aggrieved. They are beset with economic difficulties and are again appealing to us for support. (See Tempo–Killen conversation reported separately⁹). Because of our concentration on Trieste, our démarche on the Balkan military alliance, the long wrangles on aid, the Yugoslavs have had cold comfort from the Embassy since my arrival here last November. It is true that in these eight months, and because of the fact that we had to get a Trieste solution approximating the October 8 decision, my interviews have been hard, tough arguments in which kind and sympathetic words have not been the rule. This has been necessary for obvious reasons, and I believe our tactics have been successful. It has left some scars, and perhaps the time has come to apply some balm.

I shall, therefore, make the effort here to establish a relationship of greater reciprocal confidence, where all high level contact is not confined to biting argumentation. I hope that the final stages of the Trieste business will not be too bitter, but I am looking farther ahead. The Balkan Alliance will be signed whether Trieste is settled or not, and this will be an important step in the integration of Yugoslavia into the Western collective defense machinery. If Trieste is also settled, the machinery through which this integration will take place will no doubt be NATO machinery. In a thousand ways, both pleasant and unpleasant to the Yugoslavs, contacts and relations on both military and political planes will be closer. I believe that we should begin to anticipate this closer relationship. In Washington, I should recommend that we be more careful not to offend Yugoslav sensibilities in our statements and that we balance our encouragement to Italy with appropriate gestures here which need not always be public. I recommend once Trieste is settled, that some high State Department official should make a visit and we should consider what high Yugoslav official could be invited to the U.S. I realize fully this presents difficult problems this year, but perhaps it is not too early to consider it. Occasional messages from the Secretary showing sympathetic interest would also help and, of course, from the President.

The Tito visit is a separate thing. Tito wants more than anything to be invited to the U.S. This, of course, would round out and crown his return to international society and label him as a fully accepted member of the club. Its importance to him makes it important to us, too. I think that we should accept the fact that it is desirable in the not too far distant future and start to think about its timing. I know the complications and dangers of such a visit and I doubt that it should take place before, say, next March, which would place it exactly two years after Tito’s state visit to England. On the other hand, I wonder if it would be wise to defer the planning date beyond this span. In the meantime we can do some exchange of lesser visits and, at an appropriate time, hint that the Tito visit is not too far in the future.

I should like to hear your views on all this.¹⁰ I am afraid I have gone into greater length than I intended.

I am sending a copy of this to Bob Murphy.

With best regards,

Sincerely yours,

James W. Riddleberger

1. Supra.
2. These instructions were contained in telegram 1362 to Belgrade, summarized in footnote 1, supra.
3. At his press conference on June 8, Dulles was asked whether he knew of any plans to invite Tito to the United States and he replied, “No, I don’t.” A copy of this verbatim excerpt from the press conference is attached to a memorandum of July 30 from Barbour to Murphy, in which Barbour said that EE had noted at the time of the press conference that the major newspapers in the United States failed to pick up the comment. Barbour concluded that the Yugoslav reaction had been prompted by the report which must have been sent to Yugoslavia by a Yugoslav press correspondent. (EUR files, lot 59 D 233, “Yugoslavia”)
4. For documentation concerning the U.S. assurances to the French Government in connection with EDC, see vol. V, Part 1, pp. 571 ff.
5. Regarding the announcement by the United Kingdom and the United States on Oct. 8, 1953, of their intention to transfer control of Zone A of the Free Territory of Trieste to Italy, see Documents 93 ff.
6. For a description of Secretary Dulles’ conversation with Prime Minister Scelba in Milan, May 3, see Document 189.
7. A summary report concerning these conversations, which took place Aug. 24–28, 1953, is in file 611.68/8–2453.
8. Reference is to the démarche Riddleberger made to Popović on May 22; see footnote 2, Document 192.
9. This conversation, June 18, is described in despatch 864 from Belgrade, June 24. (868.00/6–2454)
10. No record of a response has been found in Department of State files.