768.00/8–1854
No. 700
Memorandum by the Chairman of the
Operations Coordinating Board Working Group on Yugoslavia (Thurston) to the Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Elbrick)1
secret
[Washington,] August 18, 1954.
Subject:
- OCB Working Group recommendations
for action vis-à-vis Yugoslavia.
Pursuant to urgent instructions of the OCB, the OCB Working Group
on Yugoslavia has prepared the attached recommendations for action
vis-à-vis Yugoslavia. A preliminary outline of a background study of
this subject was circulated a short while ago.2 The
Working Group, after making amendments to that outline in line with
suggestions from the Department and from the other agencies concerned,
decided that in view of the urgent nature of the OCB requirement it would be preferable to submit
recommendations which it believes are self-supporting, without producing
a formal background statement to be attached thereto.
The attached recommendations are the product of the OCB Working Group, and are being circulated
at this time by the various members within their agencies for comment
and/or approval. When comments have been received, in the present
instance by the State Department member, the Working Group will compile
a revised paper to incorporate the views of all the agencies involved
which will then be submitted upward in the OCB organization.
It is requested that the addressees comments be communicated on an urgent
basis to Mr. Nickels, who is assuming the
Chairmanship of the OCB Working Group
Yugoslavia.
[Page 1400]
[Attachment]
Paper Prepared by the Operations Coordinating
Board Working Group on Yugoslavia3
secret
[Washington,] August 13,
1954.
problem
To reaffirm and reinforce lagging Yugoslav confidence that the West
(specifically the US) is dealing fairly with Yugoslavia/Tito, appreciates the actual and
potential contribution Yugoslavia is making and can make to the
attainment of those objectives we have in common and—within that
frame of reference—is not discriminating against Yugoslavia because
of our political differences, preconceived predilections for other
nations, or a “colonial” approach derivative from Yugoslavia’s
relative backwardness or dependence on the United States.
Recommendation
The following actions are believed feasible and their immediate
implementation is recommended.
On the Part of the Department of Defense
- 1.
- Initiate planning on an urgent basis, initially within the
United States Government and later if found to be desirable
together with the UK and France, for the early resumption of
military planning talks with the Yugoslavs with regard to . . .
.
- A.
- Once agreement in principle as to the scope and timing
of the discussions with the Yugoslavs has been achieved
so inform State, which will then inform the Yugoslavs in
an appropriate manner that planning is actively going
forward with reference to a resumption of talks.
- 2.
- Plan a formal naval courtesy visit to an appropriate Yugoslav
port at the earliest possible moment.
- 3.
- Initiate planning for visits of high ranking US military
personnel to Yugoslavia. Explore, in conjunction with
developments vis-à-vis the Balkan Alliance, the possibility of a
visit by General Gruenther in his NATO capacity on the pretext of exploring and
developing the necessary relationship between the Balkan
Alliance and NATO.
- 4.
- Continue and further the current JCS study4 of the possibility of extending the
Facilities Assistance Program to Yugoslavia.
[Page 1401]
On the Part of the Foreign Operations
Administration
- 1.
- Perfect plans for Mr. Stassen to visit
Yugoslavia this fall (October now understood to be
contemplated), and so inform the Yugoslavs at the earliest
possible moment.
- 2.
- More actively encourage, particularly with our allies as
necessary and appropriate, Yugoslav participation in such
European organizations as EPA and ultimately OEEC.
- 3.
- As soon as administrative details permit, work out with the
Yugoslavs procedure for Yugoslav participation under the ATDA Act to cover at least a three
year period.
- 4.
- Actively proceed with negotiations looking towards the high
level economic conversations requested by the Yugoslavs, to be
held preferably in Belgrade with the participation on the US
side of an individual of both economic and political stature
(should these discussions coincide with Mr.
Stassen’s visit, consideration should
be given to having him participate in at least some of the
sessions).
- 6.
- [sic] Develop, within present budget
limitations, such long range programs as that currently being
negotiated between FOA and the
University of Kentucky for the exchanges of persons.
On the Part of the United States Information
Agency
- 1.
- Seek appropriate occasion to make public acknowledgment of
Yugoslav contributions to our common objectives.
- 2.
- Exploit, with due regard to other essential factors, occasions
to emphasize the aggressive character of international communism
and Yugoslav actions in opposition thereto.
On the Part of the Department of State
- 1.
- Actively plan a visit by the Under Secretary of State, or by
his Deputy, to Yugoslavia this fall in order to have an
immediate impact on the current Yugoslav attitudes which we are
endeavoring to correct, to allay the immediacy of Tito’s desire to visit the US,
and to lay the necessary groundwork amongst American public
opinion for an eventual visit by Marshal Tito to this country.
- 2.
- Inform the Yugoslavs, as soon as the necessary clearance in
principle has been obtained within this Government, that we are
actively working on plans for the resumption of military
conversations.
- 3.
- Work closely with Defense in preparing, and later in arranging
the terms of, the resumption of the military conversations,
including exploration of the possibility of bringing Italy in at
this juncture.
- 4.
- Prepare, for transmission at the time the Trieste settlement
is achieved and announced, messages from the President to
Scelba and Tito capitalizing on the
Trieste solution to encourage full cooperation between
Yugoslavia and Italy in defense matters.
- 5.
- Explore with AEC and such
other Governmental authorities as may be involved, the
possibility of including Yugoslavia amongst those nations to
cooperate in the President’s proposed organization to exploit
the peaceful uses of atomic energy.
- 6.
- Include Belgrade in the Secretary’s itinerary on the next
appropriate occasion.5
