Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1

780.5/10–2452: Telegram

No. 101
The Ambassador in Turkey (McGhee) to the Department of State¹

secret

Ankara, October 24, 1952—9 p.m.

542. Section one of two. Re Deptels circ 449² and 539,³ Oct 17, and London’s 46, Oct 20⁴ to Ankara. FonMin on Oct 23 gave Amb extensive account London meeting including MEDO discussion which are reported this tel. Other subjects being reported separate tels and entire conversation by desp.

1. FonMin said both Turks and Brit reaffirmed agreement organize ME defense as soon as possible, and that if, despite all efforts to gain their participation, Arab States were still reluctant to join, efforts shld be made to continue organization without them. FonMin emphasized in latter connection that agreement with Brit was that sponsoring powers shld proceed to carry out organ in some way, although he believes there is no necessity for deciding now just how this is to be done if proposal is rejected by Arab States.

2. British agreed with Turk viewpoint that every effort shld be made to get Arabs into MEDO from beginning. British abandoned their idea of proceeding without Arabs in hope of their joining later—the setting up shop and waiting for customers approach. FonMin considered this significant step forward in understanding between Turks and US on one hand and Brits on other.

3. Brits agreed to abandon idea that first invitation shld be written, and accepted Turk proposal that each Arab State be sounded out orally. Decision could be made later, in light Arab State’s reaction, as to whether or not written invitation shld be extended. FonMin stated principal objective of tactics in approach on MEDO shld be to avoid consideration of question by Arab League. Turks feel that written invitation wld inevitably result in this.

4. FonMin told me in strict confidence of conversation which Turk Amb Cairo had with Naguib upon possibility Egypt joining MEDO (reported separately by Embtel 543, Oct 24),⁵ results of which indicated Egypt not likely join under any circumstances until Canal Zone evacuated. On other hand, from PriMin and FonMin’s conversation in London with Iraqi Regent (reported London’s reftel) he thinks there is good chance that Iraq wld be prepared to join. Regent had inquired re results of FonMin meetings with British and said he was looking to Turkey to protect Iraqi interests in meetings. Commented that if Turkey alone had made MEC proposals last year they wld have been much more effective. Regent wished to have further talks with FonMin after elections in Iraq in about two months. FonMin informed Brits of this conversation, asking them not to mention it to French.

Section two of two.

5. FonMin felt situations in Egypt and Iraq as reported above support validity Turk view that sounding out orally by friendly countries was preferble method of proceeding enlist support for MEDO. FonMin proposed to Eden that first démarche to Arab State be made by Turkey to Iraq, which because of border with Iran FonMin considers Arab State most exposed to possible Russian aggression. Eden agreed despite Brit treaty with that country. Brits wld at same time advise Iraqi they were aware of Turk approach and supported move. Eden also agreed Turk suggestion that US similarly advise Iraqi.

6. FonMin believes decision re further approaches shld depend in some measure on Iraqi response. Perhaps Iraqi themselves might suggest next step. FonMin’s present views are that Jordan shld be next country and shld be approached by UK, followed by Saudi Arabia with US taking lead, and Lebanon with approach by Turkey. If there are other acceptances Syria might join without approach. If approach necessary shld be made by Turkey or US. In response to my query re French attitude toward allowing another country to make approach in Lebanon and Syria, FonMin stated he recognized this problem, which was, however, not discussed in London. FonMin felt, if necessary, matter shld be put up to Fr frankly with fact of Brit foregoing first contact with Iraq as example most desirable arrangement whereby national and prestige interests subordinated to general good. FonMin advised that Eden was seeing Schuman in Paris in few days and wld present to latter conclusions reached on approach to Arab States in very general terms only, since French particularly sensitive to prestige considerations involved in approach to Arab States. Eden promised to send FonMin minutes of these conversations with French.

7. Reverting to Egypt, I pointed out US thinking has been that, because of Egypt’s position in Arab world and fact it had originally been invited to be sponsoring power, it shall be approached first. I inquired re Turk estimate Egyptian reaction to proposed initial approach to Iraq. FonMin replied that in his judgment Gen Naguib cld not accept MEDO proposal in absence Brit evacuation, which was not discussed in London. He thought best course wld be to tell Egyptians frankly that we were willing to discuss MEDO proposal with them at any time Egypt wished; however, that we proposed proceed with discussions with Iraq, which was most vulnerable Arab country.

8. FonMin stated it was agreed in London to report conversations to US, both through London and Ankara Embassies, and to urge US to agree to conclusions reached.

Altho foregoing report of Turk-Brit conversation injected new elements into situation, I outlined to FonMin substance Depcirtel 449, Oct 17.² I pointed out agreements reached in London had raised two points of difference with views set forth by Dept, namely (a) that original approach shld be a sounding out rather than a written proposal and (b) that first approach shld be to Iraq rather than to Egypt. I told him I wld report fully to Dept what FonMin had told me and wld advise him of our reaction, which was probably already being formulated on basis Brit report on London meeting. I emphasized that we wished await Arab reactions before deciding how to proceed further. In event strong adverse reaction we might prefer proceeding with mil planning by sponsoring powers without fanfare. FonMin said this not inconsistent Turk view and what he considered to be agreement in London.

Re proposed Brit note, which FonMin saw in London, he stated in early part of conversation before learning of UO [US?] views that he considered text adequate as first draft and had no particular desire to suggest changes at this time. He commented favorably on ref to Paris statement of principles. He, of course, emphasized that present Turk-Brit proposal wld involve no written communication in initial contacts.

Assuming necessity for written communication at some time in negots, Emb believes that modifications suggested by Dept wld greatly improve text. Emb wld recommend elaborating upon those aspects of principles which wld be attractive to Arabs. Agree that effort shld be made where appropriate to utilize wording of Arab security pact, avoiding any written mention of pact itself.

McGhee

1. Transmitted in two sections; repeated to Amman, London, Paris, Cairo, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, and Jidda.
2. Document 95.
3. Presumably this refers to circular telegram 450, Document 96.
4. Printed as telegram 2304 from London, Document 97.
5. Infra.
2. Document 95.