Office of the Historian

780.5/11–1052

No. 106
Memorandum of Conversation, by Frank Ortiz of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs1

secret
[Washington,] November 10, 1952.

Subject:

  • Interim British Reply to U.S. Views on MEDO Approach to Iraq

Participants:

  • Mr. B. A. B. Burrows, Counselor of the British Embassy
  • NEA—Mr. Jernegan
  • NE—Mr. Ortiz

Mr. Burrows, Counselor of the British Embassy, called at his request to report on the interim British reaction to our memorandum of November 52 giving our views on the advisability of an approach to Iraq to join the MEDO. Mr. Burrows gave the Department’s representatives the following extract from a Foreign Office telegram of November 8 which was indicative of the British reaction to our November 5 note:

“As far as Turkish soundings in Iraq are concerned, the Turkish Government have told us that they have now decided to defer any specific approach until after the Iraqi elections.

“We agree with the State Department that the Egyptian attitude is the key factor and that an approach to Egypt regarding M.E.D.O. is unlikely to produce any positive result unless it is accompanied by proposals for a settlement of the Suez Canal question. We welcome the United States expression of interest in negotiations with Egypt with a view to facilitating an Anglo-Egyptian agreement and we will produce proposals for a settlement for discussion with the Americans as soon as possible.

“As regards the suggestion of a programme of military and economic assistance we consider that such an offer should be linked with acceptance by Egypt of the principle of joint defense and preferably worked out through M.E.D.O. It will be our main inducement to Egypt to co-operate in Middle East defense.

“In the meantime, we propose to continue to try to reach firm agreement with the other Sponsor Powers on the functions and form of M.E.D.O.”

Mr. Jernegan, while acknowledging the interim nature of the British reply, pointed out that with respect to the third paragraph of the reply it would not be possible for either the U.K. or the U.S. [Page 315] to take a firm position on military and economic assistance to Egypt until a reply from the Egyptian Government to our message of October 6 had been received and studied. In our message we made clear that U.S. assistance to Egypt would be largely conditioned by the attitude of the Egyptian Government towards cooperating in the defense of the Near East. Insofar as economic assistance to Egypt was concerned, the Egyptians have so far not made any specific requests of great significance. The U.S. in the meantime is continuing to expand its Point IV Program.3

Mr. Jernegan indicated our agreement with the wisdom of the Turkish decision to defer any specific approach to Iraq until after the Iraqi elections had taken place. He said that the U.S. assumed that there would be further consultation on the subject of initial MEDO approaches.

Aside from these comments, it was agreed not to go into greater detail in view of the provisional nature of the British reply.

  1. This memorandum of conversation was prepared on Nov. 12. An account of the conversation was transmitted in circular telegram 539, Nov. 12, to Amman, Ankara, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, London, and Paris. (780.5/11–1052)↩
  2. Supra.↩
  3. For the Egyptian reply received by the Embassy in Cairo on Nov. 10 and considered by the Department to provide the basis for a limited program of assistance “at this time”, see Document 1024. Accordingly, the Department on Nov. 21 initiated a series of exchanges with the Department of Defense, extending to Dec. 29, in which the Department of State formally recommended the extension of certain military aid to Egypt as being politically essential for the purpose of obtaining desired U.S. politico-military objectives in the Near East. For those exchanges, and related documentation, see Documents 1031 ff.↩