Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 156

No. 36
Memorandum of Conversation, Prepared in the Embassy in Saudi Arabia¹

secret
ST D-7/2

Riyadh, May 19, 1953—10 a.m.

Subject:

• Saudi Arabia

Participants:

• United States
  • The Secretary
  • Mr. Stassen
  • Ambassador Hare
  • Mr. Byroade
  • Mr. MacArthur
  • Interpreter
• Saudi Arabia
  • Prince Faisal, Foreign Minister
  • Sheikh Yussef, Deputy Foreign Minister
  • Khalid Bey

Summary

Mr. Dulles opened the conversation by stating that although this was a short trip, it had been a very fruitful and useful one. He had been able, after talking with His Majesty and Crown Prince Saud, to formulate some ideas about the problem the Saudis had on their hands. Mr. Dulles added that the U.S. had been of help in the past, and he hoped she would be of great help in the future.

Prince Faisal replied that he and his government were pleased to have Mr. Dulles, Mr. Stassen and their group here personally, so that the Americans could listen with their own ears to the subject which he discussed with the Secretary in Washington and so that they could appreciate the feeling of His Majesty in connection with this matter, which had reached a degree that surpassed his feeling about all other matters existing between the Saudis and the Americans. Prince Faisal said he did not wish to reiterate what all of them had heard last night; what was important now was to find a way to reach a satisfactory solution in this matter, either through the reports from the American Ambassador in Jidda or from the Saudi Arabian Ambassador in Washington. Prince Faisal said he did not know whether Mr. Dulles would like to see the texts of the communications exchanged with Mr. Churchill in connection with the matter?

Ambassador Hare asked if such documents were available here? Prince Faisal said yes, and he believed that seeing the texts personally might furnish greater explanation to those present. Mr. Hare said it was his understanding that the treaties between the British and the Sheikhdoms did not delineate the frontier; they concerned only the relations between Britain and these Sheikhdoms. The Ambassador said he understood also that the treaties concluded between the King and the British did not delineate the boundary, and that the boundary problem was supposed to be studied later on. Prince Faisal replied that he believed that when these treaties were concluded there was not a single thought that there would be even a single dispute about boundaries. All that was considered was that the treaties between Britain and these Sheikhdoms would be respected. Ambassador Hare remarked that the boundary problem, therefore, was still hanging. Prince Faisal said despite the fact that the boundary problem was not discussed at that time, the Saudis had been and still were exercising their jurisdiction in the area; and since 1934/5 the boundary problem had been discussed, but nevertheless nothing was discussed about the Buraimi dispute. He added that when he was in London he requested the British to have the Sheikhs concerned attend the Damman Conference,² but that the British only brought in the Sheikhs of Qatar and Abu Dhabi; the Sultan of Muscat was not brought in. This was clear evidence, he said, that the Buraimi problem was not a question of dispute with the British. Prince Faisal said also that the question of the frontier between Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the Sheikhdom of Abu Dhabi was a subject of discussion. But, he said, we have never heard any mention about the Buraimi dispute.

Mr. Dulles said that for some time the U.S. had used its good office with Britain in order to reach an amicable and honorable solution; and he believed that after this visit, during which he had collected a lot of information, the U.S. could do more. Prince Faisal said he had explained and shown to him the documents and communications exchanged with Mr. Churchill and that Mr. Dulles had, of course, gotten a good idea about the situation now. He may have gathered that the Saudis desired to reach a solution with the British because it was the Saudi policy to maintain peace. But, he continued, with great regret there was no echo or any positive attitude on the part of the British. They asserted peaceful measures, but they had and were still committing forceful measures in the area. He would not put himself in the position of reciprocating such forceful acts as those committed by the British. At the same time, although Saudi Arabia was not of the same power as Britain, she would be able to create some trouble for Britain in that area, disregarding the ultimate results. He said the desire to maintain stability had motivated the Saudis to control themselves, but, of course, there would be an end to such self control. All he wanted from the U.S. was that she put an end to this disturbing action committed by the British, in such a manner that the result would not be displeasing to Saudi Arabia, to the U.S., or to the British themselves.

As an afterthought, Prince Faisal added that he had received a telegram that day from the Amir in Buraimi, Turki Bin Itaishan, in which it was stated that the camels which were being used for milk and flesh had been confiscated by a British patrol. This, said the Prince, was one of the annoying acts which the British were committing in that area, disregading the fact of Mr. Dulles’ presence in Saudi Arabia. Mr. Dulles said that he noticed from the Churchill letter that Churchill would permit Bin Itaishan to get his food supply from the local market in Buraimi. Prince Faisal replied that such permission by Mr. Churchill was supposed to be effective at the time the arbitration committee would be performing its duties. But what, asked the Prince, would be the situation between now and then? And particularly, what would be the situation in connection with the population of Buraimi itself? How, he asked, could they get their food supplies if the British are besieging and blockading the area? Prince Faisal said, he was sorry the British were creating these problems at this time, when the whole world was in need of order and stability. They were creating such problems in connection with a simple matter which was of no importance. Of what interest would it be to Britain if the whole of the area of Buraimi were stricken from the map, he asked? What would be the advantage to Britain in clinging to Buraimi, or the harm to Britain if she forgot about Buraimi? He added that he could not understand this British policy. While Britain was trying to force America to accept certain demands regarding communist danger on the basis that such acceptance might help stability in the world, he said, she was at the same time creating in other parts of the world certain problems which would not help in maintaining stability. Prince Faisal said he believed that if Mr. Dulles had any suggestion or any idea about solving this problem, his government would be ready to adopt it. Mr. Dulles replied that he would get in touch with the British in this connection and let him know. Prince Faisal said there were certain points that he would like cleared up, so that they might be used in reaching an amicable solution: (1) The British must execute their commitments under the London agreement and the stand-still agreement. (2) Saudi Arabia must be on equal footing with Britain in that area until this problem had been solved. (3) This problem must be solved in accordance with what was agreed upon with the British Ambassador (he referred to a joint statement lately made by Saudi Arabia and the British Ambassador in Riyadh).

Mr. Dulles said he believed that Saudi Arabia, in accepting the principle of arbitration, was following an important and helpful approach. Prince Faisal said he was pleased to know this willingness and desire to come to a peaceful solution by accepting the principle of arbitration was appreciated. He was motivated, he continued, by the desire to maintain stability and friendship with Saudi Arabia’s friends. Mr. Dulles said this was very important. Prince Faisal then remarked that the Buraimi problem did not need any more explanation.

Introducing a new subject, Prince Faisal said it was fortunate that there were certain points concerning the Saudi Kingdom and the U.S. which did not concern Britain. Sheikh Yussef added that Prince Faisal was referring to the military aid which Saudi Arabia would like to continue. Part of this military equipment had already arrived in Saudi Arabia, he said, but according to the information received, some of it was not in good condition. Saudi Arabia was interested, he continued, in accordance with what had been agreed upon, to receive good military equipment. Sheikh Yussef said that some of the armored cars had only traveled about 50 km and then stopped.

Prince Faisal said that when he was in Washington³ Mr. Smith told him there were certain arrangements to be made, and that there was a projected agreement to be sent to Ambassador Hare for discussion with the Saudi Arabian Government. Sheikh Yussef said that Ambassador Hare had already told them about it, but that they had not yet received anything.

Mr. Stassen stated that the U.S. was in the process of preparing the 1954 aid program for presentation to Congress, and he added that he believed President Eisenhower had told Prince Faisal that he had found Saudi Arabia eligible for grant aid, and that part of the present trip was to study the whole situation in connection with granting military aid to Saudi Arabia. Mr. Stassen said that when such information had been placed in the hands of President Eisenhower, action would be taken in the light of further reports which would be received from Ambassador Hare in connection with military equipment sent to Saudi Arabia. The whole subject, Mr. Stassen continued, would be studied from every angle and would then be presented to President Eisenhower. He said he believed that the recommendations which would be submitted in connection with the military aid program under the Mutual Security Act would parallel the policy of the Secretary of State. When a decision had been reached, it would be submitted to His Majesty’s government. Mr. Stassen added that he believed that after this step had been taken by the group on this visit, the discussion of this subject would be satisfactory and it would be reported either through the American Ambassador in Jidda or the Saudi Arabian Ambassador in Washington.

Prince Faisal said Mr. Smith told him while in Washington that President Eisenhower had decided to grant to Saudi Arabia special aid apart from that offered the Middle East in general and that the program of this aid would be sent to Ambassador Hare to be presented to the Saudi Arabian Kingdom after such program had been processed by Congress. Mr. Smith, related the Prince, said that in this program which was being submitted to Congress for 1954 there was aid for the Middle East. As part of this program, there would be an arrangement for the defense of the area against the communist danger.

Mr. Dulles said there were two points in approaching the question of military aid: (1) The general view which is based on aid for the whole area and which requires an understanding among the states of the Middle East area of their responsibility in its defense. (2) The approach to each country separately. Under this approach Saudi Arabia had been one of the countries found eligible for such aid. Saudi Arabia would be included in the general aid or the separate aid. Mr. Dulles desired the Saudi Arabian Government to understand that the American Department of Defense was anxious that this military equipment would be used in the best possible way, due to the fact that there were great and unlimited demands for military equipment at the present time. It was very difficult to estimate the demands which were submitted to the U.S. for military equipment. In addition to this fact, there was an actual war in Korea which was consuming great quantities of military equipment and ammunition, either for the American forces, the Southern Korean forces, or the UN forces.

If the war were stopped, this would reduce the demands for military equipment; but events did not prove that the war was going to be stopped. If the truce negotiations failed, the U.S. might have to double her military efforts, and as a result there would be an increased demand for military equipment. There were also the forces in Formosa. The new Administration had learned that the people in Formosa had been promised certain military equipment by President Truman but that only 30 per cent had been recognized. There was also the war in Indo China which required military equipment. When the last invasion was carried on in Laos, the U.S. sent more equipment to the people fighting there. At the same time, the U.S. was responding to demands for more military equipment from the members of the Atlantic Charter, such as Norway which was threatened by Communism. There was also a demand for military equipment from Turkey and her allies. In giving these explanations to the Saudi Arabian Government, Mr. Dulles said, it did not mean that the U.S. would not be able to help Saudi Arabia, but it meant merely that the U.S. had certain pressures for military equipment. The military experts had the last word as to which area should be offered preference for military equipment.

Mr. Dulles said it was evident that there was desire for collective defense in this area and that supplying military equipment for collective defense in this area was easier than supplying each country separately. He also believed, he said, that the program for the Middle East defense as it had been submitted did not mean that it must be accepted in the way it was presented. The whole aim of the project was to defend the area. It was up to the states of the area to come to an understanding on the way of defending the Middle East. In fact, the United States was motivated by the desire to unite the different, small states in order that they could defend themselves collectively. The Communist threat which we were facing now was also a result of a unity of different states like Czechoslovakia, Poland, etc.; but the difference was that these states were united by force. Nevertheless, they formed one-third of the whole population of the world. Such unity had to be faced, but the U.S. did not like to form her unity in the way the Communists had formed theirs. The U.S. would prefer that such unity be formed by means of understanding and satisfaction. Of course, this did not mean that the U.S. would request the free states to form a collective security solely to face the Communist threat. Such cooperation included all mutual matters to defend the country. And as far as the integrity of these countries was concerned, Mr. Dulles said, it must be maintained. America therefore hoped that such collective cooperation for defending the area would be increased, and America did not state, as a condition for offering arms to these countries, that they must accept the idea of a defense project. However, any collective cooperation among these states would help in complying with the demands for military equipment.

Prince Faisal said he was greatly appreciative of Mr. Dulles’ explanation, and Saudi Arabia recognized the responsibilities which were assumed by the United States. As to what Mr. Dulles had stated in connection with collective cooperation, the Arab League had lately decided to execute the Collective Security Pact.

Mr. Dulles said there was a point which he would like to refer to as evidence of cooperation. This point was the useful cooperation between the Saudi Arabian Government and Aramco. It might be that there were certain impressions given during the recent political campaign that the United States was not pleased with the relationship existing between Aramco and Saudi Arabia, but this was merely a domestic question which had to do with the political campaign. The U.S. was in fact very pleased and happy over the friendly relations and cooperation existing between Aramco and Saudi Arabia, and was also appreciative of the facilities offered at Dhahran Air Field. As a result of these points; the U.S. felt that the Government of Saudi Arabia was actually participating in mutual security activities, and Saudi Arabia’s cooperation in this field was appreciated.

If the U.S. gave any preference to any state by means of grant aid, Mr. Dulles said, it did not mean that she was basing her claim on regional worthiness but on the strategic requirements of that country. The U.S. always took into consideration the situation of that country and the circumstances in existence. In fact, there was only one division now in America while there were six in Germany and two in Japan. Mr. Dulles said he believed that defense of the United States must be made outside the United States, and this was why we were distributing U.S. forces. It was his desire, he said, that the King and His Highness understand that military aid was only offered on the basis of the military recommendation and not on the regional basis. If it were to be granted on the regional situation, the U.S. would have brought all her forces into the United States. The U.S. was also preparing defense of the United States alone, but she was preparing for the United States’ friends too. Mr. Dulles reiterated that His Highness must not get the idea that the U.S. was not ready to give military aid to Saudi Arabia.

Prince Faisal replied that it was a pleasure to hear from Mr. Dulles an expression of appreciation for cooperation given by His Majesty’s Government, which was considered as actual participation in mutual security activities. This at least would give the feeling that Saudi Arabia and the U.S. were real friends and would give the Saudis the right to request from her friend what she needed. But, of course, Prince Faisal added, America could not send all of her forces all over the world; and America had to gain strong friends who would be on her side and would be able to defend themselves; and in that case the United States had to offer military aid to these friends. This would save the United States the trouble of sending its forces abroad. Any collective cooperation in any area must be homogenous, he continued. This was why he desired to settle the whole problem of the Arab countries and to solve them, in order that there would be a very good atmosphere suitable for automatic cooperation among these countries for collective defense. He was sure that Mr. Dulles and his group had touched personally during their visits the situation existing in the Arab countries, and that they had felt the extent of the effect of these problems. For example, they had had an idea of the Egyptian problems, and they had understood them clearly. He personally had invited the British not to repeat the story of Iran and Egypt. He believed that the situation existing in Iran now was a result of the unwise policy followed by the British. One must not forget that there was also the question of the Arabs of Palestine, which, of course, needed an immediate solution. This was just a bleeding wound and he did not want to enter into any details about the subject because it was well understood by Mr. Dulles and the United States Government. There was also the problem of the Arabs in North Africa and the terrorism spread over it by the French people. He believed that this question, if not worse than any other problem, was at least equal. The people were living in very bad conditions, but, he said, he believed that the U.S. had more information about it than Saudi Arabia had. Prince Faisal added that this was generally what the Saudis had in mind in addition to her major problem, which was the Saudi-British dispute. Mr. Dulles answered that he appreciated greatly all the points mentioned by Prince Faisal.

Mr. Stassen stated that he was personally interested in the military equipment sent by the United States to Saudi Arabia. He added that if there were anything wrong with it, a report should be made to the United States Government through the American Ambassador.

1. This conversation took place at Riyadh.
2. For documentation on the Damman Conference, see Documents 244 ff.
3. For documentation, see Documents 242 ff.