Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 156

No. 44
Memorandum of Conversation, Prepared in the Embassy in Pakistan¹

secret
ST D–9/2

[Karachi,] May 23, 1953—11:30 a.m.

Subject:

• Pakistan

Participants:

• United States
  • Secretary of State Dulles
  • Mr. Harold E. Stassen
  • Ambassador Horace A. Hildreth
  • Mr. Henry A. Byroade
  • Mr. Douglas MacArthur II
  • Mr. John K. Emmerson
  • Lt. Col. Stephen J. Meade
• Pakistan
  • Sir Zafrulla Khan, Foreign Minister

There was some brief preliminary discussion of the Egyptian situation and of the forthcoming Commonwealth conference in London. The Foreign Minister referred to the Secretary’s trip to the Middle East and to the good psychological effect it was having on the peoples and governments of the area. The Secretary said there was a danger that expectations might be raised too high because of his trip.

The Secretary then referred to the Kashmir situation and expressed the hope that the forthcoming talks between the two Prime Ministers would be fruitful. Sir Zafrulla said he hoped this would be the case. However, Pakistan’s experience in the past was not too encouraging. Nevertheless one would never take the attitude that one should not try again. Preliminary talks would take place in London after which a series of meetings would presumably be held in Karachi and Delhi. These would probably begin toward the end of June or not later than the beginning of July.

The Foreign Minister stated that if there could be a settlement of the Kashmir question every other problem could be settled. Not only would a settlement of the Kashmir dispute produce a good atmosphere but Kashmir itself was half the canal water problem. Furthermore, after a settlement of Kashmir, the evacuee property problem could be solved automatically. Kashmir was 90% of the issues between India and Pakistan.

To a question from Mr. Byroade as to whether the Foreign Minister had more hope for a settlement at present than previously, Sir Zafrulla replied that his answer would be both no and yes: no, because he had received no indication that Nehru, who was more important as an individual than anybody else, now “really wanted to go forward”; yes, because the United States was beginning to take a little more interest in the problems. The Foreign Minister believed that if Nehru feels that the United States is taking an interest and that this interest is likely to be continuous, he might possibly exert efforts to find a solution.

The Secretary commented that he had indicated to Nehru the very great interest of the United States in this problem.

Sir Zafrulla stated that there were two things of importance with respect to Kashmir. The first was that an agreement must not be imposed. Pakistan had never asked that anything be imposed on the people of Kashmir and was willing to go along with what Nehru had telegraphed to the Pakistan Prime Minister on November 8, 1947. The substance of this telegram was as follows:

“We have gone in for the purpose of restoring law and order. Once law and order are restored we shall withdraw our forces and then Pakistan and India should hold a plebiscite to find out what Kashmir desires.”

The second point of importance was that the agreement already reached in the UN resolution should be carried out. India should be asked to carry out the obligations which she has accepted.

The Foreign Minister emphasized that Pakistan had never said that Kashmir must accede to Pakistan. Pakistan had said that the people of Kashmir should decide for themselves under conditions which guaranteed that the plebiscite would be free.

Dr. Byroade asked whether in addition to a solution based on the UN Resolutions, Pakistan would consider any other type of solution. Sir Zafrulla then described the efforts of Sir Owen Dixon, particularly his proposal of a conference to consider whether certain areas might immediately accede to India or Pakistan, according to whether they had Muslim or non-Muslim majorities, and that the remaining area should be the “plebiscite area.” Pakistan at first did not favor this proposal but the Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, finally reluctantly agreed on condition that if no agreement resulted, the former agreements would stand. When Sir Owen Dixon informed Nehru of Pakistan’s acceptance of this proposal, Nehru claimed he had never heard of it. Sir Girja Bajpai later attributed this statement of Nehru’s to the fact he was “temporarily overtaken by factual amnesia.”

The Foreign Minister stated that he had no hope that India would agree to such a solution in view of the fact that Dixon had tried and Nehru had refused.

The Foreign Minister assured his listeners that “he was talking from the heart” and stated that any fair proposal for the solution of Kashmir would be considered. He said that even if the non-Muslim areas were taken away, and a plebiscite were held in the valley, he would favor it. However, any plebiscite must be carried out in such a manner that unfair means would be impossible. He said that if such proposal came as part of a decision already taken and binding, he believed the Government would be willing to take the risk and face the country, provided of course that only those clearly non-Muslim territories were taken away and the plebiscite were fairly conducted under the UN.

Mr. Stassen asked whether it was possible to estimate the economic loss to the country because of the Kashmir dispute. Sir Zafrulla replied that the financial outlay was of course tremendous but that the actual loss was even greater. The dispute put both nations on the “qui vive,” it had bedeviled the relations of the two countries with regard to other questions and it had stopped both countries from going ahead with constructive programs to develop the prosperity of the countries. He added that Kashmir was the place where the greatest possible progress could be made and that it had great possibilities for development. He agreed that a solution would bring great economic benefit to both Pakistan and India.

Mr. Byroade asked whether, assuming one could ignore the will of the people, agreement could be reached on total partition.

Sir Zafrulla replied that he did not know what he meant by ignoring the will of the people. What Mr. Byroade suggested seemed similar to the proposal made by General McNaughton in December 1948. According to this proposal, Ladakh would have gone to India.

Pakistan would have been agreeable to such a proposal. The Foreign Minister referred to the suggestion that the valley become independent. He said if people of the valley wished to commit suicide, Pakistan would not stand in the way. However, independence would be infeasible since the area would become an arena of international intrigue.

Sir Zafrulla concluded the discussion by saying it was axiomatic that unless Kashmir is settled so that India and Pakistan cease to be hostile and suspicious of each other’s designs, there will be no peace in this part of the world.

1. This conversation took place at the Ambassador’s residence.