Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 156

No. 46
Memorandum of Conversation, by Lieutenant Colonel Stephen J. Meade¹

secret
ST D–9/4

[Karachi,] May 23, 1953.

Subject:

• Pakistan

Participants:

• United States
  • Secretary of State Dulles
  • Ambassador Horace A. Hildreth
  • Lt. Col. Stephen J. Meade
• Pakistan
  • Maj. Genl. Mohammed Ayub Khan

The Secretary opened the conversation by an inquiry as to the present state of the Pakistan Army. The General replied by explaining the difficulties encountered at the time of partition with many Pakistan troops being stationed at that time in Indian territory and the necessity in some cases of actually fighting their way back to Pakistan; how the majority of ordnance stocks and heavy equipment were grabbed by the Indians which posed a tremendous problem to the Pakistani Armed Forces. He related that how through their will power and determination they have since been able to improve this situation to the point where they now have a very efficient fighting force of approximately 250,000. He admitted that they were still wanting in heavy equipment, such as armor, heavy artillery and that their principal striking force is still found in the Infantry role. He said that they have about 7 Divisions of Infantry, 2 Brigades of Armor and other combat and service units. He expressed his gratification to the United States Government for sending 350 Sherman tanks mounting 76 MM guns as well as a number of M–36 tank destroyers equipped with 90 MM guns. He pointed out, however, that Pakistan must rely on sources outside of the country for ammunition supplies; that they have been able to acquire most of their stocks from England and the Continent, that he considers ammunition one of the critical problems within the military equipment. Some few years ago they had hoped to be able to accumulate a six-months reserve supply within the country but that the national economy did not permit. Since then they had to re-examine this project and have now reserve supplies from one to five months, depending upon the critical nature of the particular type of ammunition. The General pointed out that despite all of these handicaps, the morale, discipline and training of the Pakistan Army are superior, and that they constitute a real current and potential factor of force within this area.

The Secretary asked specifically what the General considered to be the needs of the Pakistan Army along the lines of military aid. The General replied that he had submitted just such a list a few months ago to the American Military Attaché in Karachi, but that he had brought with him this date the original of that memorandum. He gave this to the Secretary, who read it at some length and expressed his admiration for the thoughts contained therein. (… Since the Secretary expressed an interest in using this document at a later date, arrangements will be made for it to be available to him from the Pakistan Military Attaché in Washington by a telephone call from the Department of State.)

The Secretary next asked the General the state of the Air Force and air bases in Pakistan. To this he replied that at the time of partition Pakistan had only 3 Squadrons available; that they hoped to expand to 12 Squadrons, but here again the national economic situation had prevented this with the result that they have been able to establish and maintain only 6 Squadrons to date. These include 1 Jet Squadron based in the Karachi area, 2 or 3 Squadrons of conventional type aircraft based at Peshawar and Rawalpindi (portion of the planes from Peshawar are based at Miram Shah for action against tribal disorders in that area), and a transport squadron at Lahore. He stated that the transport squadron is used quite extensively to drop supplies to garrisons located in the inaccessible areas farther north of Gilgit. He said that the Air Force was efficient, but that they did desire to expand it if the economy of the country would permit such a measure.

In answer to the Secretary’s question as to existent Air bases in Pakistan, he replied that there were very many of these throughout the country which had been established during World War II, the largest ones being located in the vicinity of the cities referred to above. He said that some of these fields have runways of 2,000 feet which could be extended without difficulty.

(I suggest that more detailed and perhaps more accurate information regarding Pakistan Air Force be obtained from Air Attaché reports in the Pentagon.)

Since the GG had brought up the question of liberty ships and tankers to me in a previous conversation I inquired as to the status of the Pakistan Navy to see if he held the same opinion as the GG regarding ships and tankers. He admitted that the Pakistan Navy was very small and its principal use was the defense of the ports of Karachi and Chittagong. In reply to a specific question by the Secretary regarding petroleum products, he answered that they produced only 17 per cent of their own needs and relied on tankers to transport the rest from the Middle East oil fields.

The Secretary next channeled the discussion toward the Kashmir disputes. In this regard the General emphasized the necessity to bring pressure on Nehru through a display on our part of the strongest interest in the settlement of this issue; that unless this was done, Nehru would be quite content to bide his time since a delay was profitable to the Indians, extremely detrimental to the Pakistanis. He attempted to allay any suspicion on our part that such military aid that might be forthcoming would be used against India, as they could not afford the expense of such a war which would only result in the weakening of both countries. (That same evening I mentioned to the General the GG statements to me to the effect that they would be willing to sign an agreement to go to India’s aid in the event that any power should attack India. He said that he had forgotten to mention that and hoped that I would do so for him, to which I replied that I had already spoken to the Secretary about it.)

The General next expressed what is not only his concern but that of other leaders over the future of India when Nehru is either replaced or passes away. He feels very strongly that such occurrence would result in the dangerous splitting up of India into separate states, many of which would be susceptible and even amenable to Communist influence. He considers this a great danger to the future of Pakistan, feeling that there is no one in India with sufficient strength to take over after Nehru.

The Secretary spoke for several minutes expressing his conception of the recent change in Soviet tactics which could conceivably result in increased efforts in the direction of Southeast Asia. The General appeared interested and seemed aware of the global aspect of the present day conflict between the Communist and non-Communist worlds. His feeling is that the United States, which admittedly is the leader of the free world today, should not be afraid to openly aid those countries which have expressed a willingness, and even desire, to cooperate with the United States. He reiterated the potential, both in manpower and bases that is available in Pakistan and that his country under the present Government is extremely anxious to cooperate with the United States. He feels very strongly that if Pakistan were strengthened by United States economic and military aid, it would result in India dropping its present intransigent attitude, both toward Kashmir and other problems and even going so far as to having Nehru come to Washington in search of a settlement. He summarized this thought by saying that a strong Pakistan would frighten India out of her passiveness and intransigence.

1. This conversation took place at the residence of the Ambassador.