683.84A322/7–2654: Telegram
No. 844
The Chargé in Israel (Russell) to the Department of State
91. Deptel 41.1 Herzog, US Division Foreign Ministry, this morning informed me Prime Minister would like to have informal talk with me Tel Aviv Friday.2 Assured me nothing would be done re recommencement Banat Yaacov DZ construction prior to then.
If Department approves, I would like to develop following line with Sharett:
As result prospective transfer Suez base to Egypt, US program of arms aid to Iraq, other measures required by security of free world, possibility must be contemplated that relative arms strength of countries in area may change within next decade. Decision of US to strengthen free world position in area is a firm one.
Up to present time, Israel has been able to base its security largely, if not entirely, upon its own Armed Forces. If during next decade it enters period when its security cannot be guaranteed exclusively by its own Armed Forces, it will be in no different situation in this respect than US and all other countries of free world. US security today dependent only in part upon its own military might. Latter has to be supplemented by our reliance upon UN, as in Korea, and upon regional arrangements such as NATO, OAS, San Francisco Treaties, etc.
It would appear that Israel at present time faced with choice of basing its foreign policy upon opposition to measures which must be pursued by free world to prevent Soviet aggression in this area; or upon policy similar to that of US in achieving its security. In pursuance of latter, Israel would base its security in part upon its Armed Forces; in part upon measures designed to strengthen role of UN in this area; in part upon possible new and stronger declaration by tripartite powers conceivably supplemented by Turkey; and in part upon an evolving V-shaped pattern of security for area in which US and other major powers would work on one hand with Arab countries and on the other, as developments made it possible, with Israel (present temper of Arab countries does not permit round-table approach at this time nor even arms programs undertaken simultaneously).
If Israel’s policy is confined to one of obstruction, difficult to see how deterioration in US–Israel relations can be prevented. If our [Page 1593] efforts mutually concentrated upon second course, no reason why they should not remain close and firm, though Israel would have to understand necessity of our working closely with Arabs and would have to have confidence in US intentions during period pattern was evolving.3
- Supra.↩
- July 30.↩
- On July 27, Russell suggested further that at his meeting with Sharett on Friday, July 30, he refer to increasing public discussion in recent months of the possibility that Israel might adopt a policy of aggression, and say that the development of such a policy would, of course, have the gravest consequences for the relations of the two countries. (Telegram 95 from Tel Aviv, July 27, 2 p.m.; 683.84A322/7–2754)↩