780.5/9–552

No. 85
Paper Prepared by the Politico-Military Adviser of the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and Arican Affairs (Daspit)1

secret

United States Comments on the United Kingdom Memorandum on the Middle East Defense Organization

The Government of the United States has studied the proposals for the establishment of a Middle East Defense Organization set forth in the United Kingdom memorandum handed to the Department of State August 11, 1952 and desires to make the following comments.

1.
Subject to the considerations set forth below, the United States Government is prepared to participate in a Middle East Defense Organization and considers the United Kingdom proposals a satisfactory basis for the establishment of such an organization. In agreeing to participate in an organization of the general character described in the United Kingdom memorandum, the United States Government would be prepared to designate a representative to the [Page 272] Military Representatives Committee, to assign officers to the Planning Group, and to supply some arms and training assistance to certain of the States of the Middle East area in furtherance of the objectives of the organization. During the initial phase of the organization with which the United Kingdom memorandum is concerned, the Government of the United States does not contemplate any further contributions beyond those listed above, and its agreement to participate in the proposed organization does not imply any commitment to supply forces to the area for its defense.
2.
In the view of the United States Government, the building of an effective defense of the Middle East involves a political as well as a military problem. In the absence of the political cooperation of the Arab States, the solution of the purely military problem will be immeasurably more difficult. In a sense, therefore, the political problem is anterior and the United States Government considers that the proposals of the United Kingdom should be judged in large measure by the effectiveness with which they may be expectd to contribute to its solution.
3.
With the exceptions noted in paragraphs 4 and 5 below, the Government of the United States agrees to the United Kingdom proposals relating to the form and character of the organization. This Government would, however, be prepared to consider modifications in the structure of the organization which might increase its appeal to the Arab States.
4.
Subparagraph 4(d) of the United Kingdom memorandum lists among the functions of the Middle East Defense Organization, “To make plans for the operations in war of all forces within, or to be introduced into, the area…”3 In the opinion of the United States Government, this language should be so amended as to make it clear that this function does not include the drawing of plans for the operations in war of forces which may be introduced into the area but which are not specifically allocated for the defense of the area.
5.
Paragraph 6 of the United Kingdom memorandum states that the Military Representatives Committee would be “responsible for the general direction of the Planning Group.” Paragraph 8 of the memorandum, however, states that “members of the Military Representatives Committee and of the Planning Group would obtain direction and guidance from their respective governments.” The Government of the United States considers that it should be clearly specified that the Planning Group would receive military guidance from the Military Representatives Committee, the members of [Page 273] which would in turn receive guidance from their respective governments.
6.
The Government of the United States is in complete agreement with the judgment expressed in paragraph 12 of the United Kingdom memorandum that it would be desirable to have the Arab States as participants in the organization during the initial stage of its existance. The Government of the United States does not, however, consider that the proposals in paragraphs 13 and 14 and in the concluding paragraph of the memorandum are the most effective means possible for accomplishing this end. In the judgment of the Government of the United States, it is essential that the Arabs should be made to feel they are being treated as equals, and that their opinions as to the form and character of the organization carry weight with the sponsoring powers. This Government considers it particularly important to avoid giving the Arab States the impression they are being presented with a fait accompli.
7.
Taking account of these considerations, the Government of the United States is of the opinion that the Arab States should be consulted concerning MEDO at the earliest practicable time, and that the sponsoring powers should evince a willingness to meet any legitimate points they have to make with respect to the form and character of the proposed organization. In the opinion of this Government it should be possible to consult the Arab States as soon as the area of agreement among the sponsoring powers has been revealed by their initial statements of position on the United Kingdom proposals. This Government would not favor the convening of any meeting of the sponsoring powers to discuss MEDO prior to such consultation.4
8.
It is the view of this Government that the approach to the Arab States should be informal and that the proposed organization should be described to them in general and tentative terms. No formal invitation of any sort should be extended to the Arab States but they should be given to understand that the plans for the organization [Page 274] contemplate their participation, that the structure as tentatively planned is not finally fixed, and that their comments and suggestions would be welcome. At no stage of these preliminary talks should the Arab States be required to take a firm position as to their willingness to participate. The procedures to be followed in these discussions would vary from one state to another. In some cases the approach might be made by the four original sponsoring powers acting in concert; in others, one power might take the initiative, with the other powers taking supporting roles.
9.
It is the view of this Government that a decision as to the further steps to be taken in the establishment of the Middle East Defense Organization should be postponed until it becomes possible to assess the reaction of the Arab States to these approaches. The Government of the United States is convinced that plans for the defense of the Near East must proceed regardless of the attitude of the Arab States. This attitude, however, may affect both the form of the planning arrangements and the procedure whereby these arrangements are put into effect. The Government of the United States suggests that the Governments of the several sponsoring powers should exchange views as to further steps to be taken as soon as reports on the consultations with the Arab States are in hand.
  1. This paper is a statement of the U.S. position on a British memorandum of Aug. 11 setting forth proposals for the establishment of a Middle East Defense Organization. The text of the British memorandum of Aug. 11, not printed, is the same as the text transmitted in telegram Secto 24, Document 79. Except that the last sentence of paragraph 6, “The chairmanship of the committee would rotate,” had been deleted in the Aug. 11 text.

    The source text was attached to a memorandum from Byroade to Matthews, dated Sept. 5, not printed. The memorandum informed Matthews that the paper reflected agreement reached with the Department of Defense, and an advance copy of the paper had been given to them on Sept. 4. Unless Defense registered an objection, the paper was to be handed to the British that afternoon. The source text bears the notation “O.K. H. F[reeman] M[atthews].” (780.5/9–552)

    Telegram 1645 to London, Sept. 6, transmitted this paper to the Embassy in the United Kingdom. Telegram 1646 on the same day informed the Embassy that a Department of State officer made the following points when he handed the paper to a representative of the British Embassy: The United States “1. wld postpone circulation to other sponsors until middle next week in order give Brits time comment if they desired. 2. Re suggested procedure para 7, Dept thought that fol receipt comments of all sponsors on UK memo shld be possible prepare paper indicating general area agreement—a sort of lowest common denominator showing only essential outlines of proposed org. This paper wld not necessarily be shown Arabs but wld serve as briefing paper for reps who wld discuss MEDO with them. Such generalized position preferable for type tentative conversations Dept favors. Dept hoped that Brits wld undertake prepare such paper.” (780.5/9–652) This paper was also transmitted on Sept. 16 in telegram 1555 to Paris, 372 to Ankara, 40 to Pretoria, 45 to Wellington, 50 to Canberra, 218 to Amman, 591 to Cairo, 167 to Damascus, 312 to Baghdad, 518 to Beirut, and 143 to Jidda. (780.5/9–1652)

  2. Delivered to a representative of the British Embassy on Sept. 6.
  3. Ellipsis in the source text.
  4. Telegram 1909 to London, Sept. 16, not printed, informed the Embassy that the only change requested by the British was the deletion of the last sentence in paragraph 7. Since comments from the sponsoring powers indicated some divergence of views among them, the British considered an unofficial and informal meeting of the London representatives of the sponsors the best way to collate the comments. The Department of State disagreed on this point, but suggested amending paragraph 7 to read as follows: “Taking account these considerations, US Govt of opinion that Arab States shld be consulted concerning MEDO at earliest practicable time, and sponsoring powers shld evince willingness meet any legitimate points they have to make with respect to form and character proposed org. This govt assumes that the area of agreement revealed by the current exchange of views will be sufficient to permit prelim discussions with the Arab States. If this assumption is correct, this govt wld favor the prompt initiation of such prelim discussions prior to any mtg of the sponsoring powers.” (780.5/9–1652)