771A.00/9–553: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France1
826. For Ambassador. You should at moment most advantageous in your judgment, but as soon as possible, discuss following as well as Deptel 6272 with Laniel and Bidault with view obtaining full understanding our problems forthcoming UNGA and most constructive French attitude there. Strictly FYI Department has decided vote for inscription Moroccan-Tunisian items. Department concerned re possible effect this decision on conclusion US-French Indochina understanding. We hope NSC decision Indochina can be made Sept. 93 and French advised confidentially soon thereafter. Public announcement could not be made until after Congressional consultation, i.e. perhaps by Sept. 20. We hope be able avoid divulging US position on inscription until after we have informed French our decision Indochina confidentially. If queried now by French re inscription issue, suggest you simply state position not firm.
As set forth Deptel 627 we hope be able assist our French friends and allies in UN—even though we hardly consider Franco-Moroccan relations satisfactory. Our ability to do so in forthcoming UNGA depends not only upon French reform programs of real substance (reftel) but also upon French approach to UNGA consideration.
US position is that GA has competence. Recent events in Morocco make it unreasonable for US oppose inscription on ground there have not been significant developments or sufficient lapse of time since 7th GA resolutions adopted. Obviously these events increase pressure for discussion. Arab-Asian pressure further increased by rejection inscription Security Council. Item almost certain to be placed on agenda even if US were to oppose and our ability moderate subsequent action would be greatly reduced. Difficulties would be compounded if in addition [Page 632] French delegation were again to walk out in expectation US would carry burden.
Last fall we attempted persuade French it was in their own best interests not to oppose inscription but to emphasize their positive contributions welfare Morocco and Tunisia. French decision to take negative attitude then made by Pinay in midst severe parliamentary difficulties particularly concerning Schuman. French position regarding UN legal competence coupled with probable domestic political reaction to any UN “interference” appear limit possibilities new French attitude. However, present internal political situation in France appears somewhat different from that which confronted Pinay. We believe French must realize US bound to have different point of view concerning competence. We therefore hope they might pursue course which will help moderate discussion and action as well as temper reactions in France, Morocco and US. For example, if UNGA decides to discuss question in spite of French views on inscription, as seems inevitable, we would hope that French would not belabor issue of “competence”, walk out, threaten withdraw from UN, etc. but would help facilitate acceptable treatment in UNGA in which case US efforts exercise restraining influence in debates would be much more effective.
We realize that course of action advocated this message goes directly counter current French mood of increasing intransigence re North Africa and have taken this into account in drafting this instruction. However, Department fears that US Government’s sincere desire to help France will come to naught unless she compromises somewhat with her absolute position and thus makes it possible for us to help her.
- This telegram was drafted by Fisher (WE) and cleared in NEA, UNA, and C.↩
- Dated Aug. 24, p. 627.↩
- For documentation on Indochina, see volume xiii.↩