771.00/8–2654
Position Paper Prepared in the Department of State1
SD/A/C.1/444
The Moroccan Problem
the problem
The Arab-Asian States have submitted the question of Morocco for inclusion in the agenda of the Ninth General Assembly. In their explanatory memorandum they charge that France has not taken effective steps to develop “free political institutions” for the people of Morocco, that tension and repression have increased in that country since deposition of the former Sultan a year ago, and that this situation, involving contradiction of human rights, represents a “constant threat to peace”. The French Government, having worked out since July 31, 1954, a constructive plan of reform in Tunisia, is expected to work out and announce proposals for reforms in Morocco which can be made the subject of negotiations between the parties concerned.
united states position
- 1.
- Assuming that this problem will be actively pressed before the Assembly, the United States should support, and if necessary vote in favor of, inclusion of the Moroccan problem in the agenda.
- 2.
- The United States should not play a prominent part in the debate. It should maintain that although the problem of developing self-government is considerably more complex in Morocco than in Tunisia, the method of direct negotiations between the parties which was recommended by the General Assembly in 1952, and now being applied in Tunisia, is the best available method of insuring preparation of the Moroccan people for greater self-government.
- 3.
- The United States should oppose any proposal inconsistent with the above view (e.g., proposal for direct United Nations intervention in Morocco through a United Nations Commission) or expressing undue criticism of France, but may encourage development of a resolution expressing the hope that progress will be made toward increased Moroccan self-government.
- 4.
- The Delegation should consult the Department with respect to specific texts under consideration.
comment
The problem of Morocco has previously been considered by the General Assembly at its Seventh and Eighth Sessions. The problem was brought there by the Arab-Asian Governments which, at various times, also attempted unsuccessfully to raise these problems in the Security Council. In December, 1952, the General Assembly adopted a moderate resolution recommending that France and Morocco continue to negotiate on an urgent basis “towards developing the free institutions of the people of Morocco …”.2 The Assembly resolution also stressed the importance of avoiding acts which might aggravate the situation. At the Eighth Assembly in 1953, the matter was again fully discussed only a few weeks after the political crisis in Morocco during which the former Sultan was replaced. However, no resolution was adopted by the Assembly last year. Both in 1952 and 1953 the United States Delegation actively used its influence to moderate debate and to avoid Assembly action which might be harmful.
On August 24, 1953, in the midst of the crisis connected with the deposition of the former Sultan by France, the Secretary informed the French Ambassador that “it was essential that the French Government proceed rapidly with the institution of far-reaching reforms” in Morocco and Tunisia. In an instruction at that time to our Paris Embassy, the Secretary’s idea on reforms was further described as being of “real substance with a view to granting internal autonomy”. The situation in Morocco has, if anything, deteriorated during the past year. Wtihin the past few months a new Resident General, M. Lacoste, has entered upon his duties, displaying a conciliatory but firm approach to the problem. It is his hope that representative Moroccan opinion can be fully consulted on appropriate reforms through a council in which [Page 650] Moroccans of different political views may be able to reconcile their respective positions and thus assist the French in moving ahead with the program.
At the extremes of Moroccan opinion the advanced nationalists on the one hand, and elements of the Berber population under the influence of the pro-French Pasha of Marrakech, El Glaoui, on the other hand, have pursued sharply different aims as to the political status of Morocco. It is these extreme elements which have been most critical of Lacoste’s moderating efforts. Our representatives in Morocco believe that, in the long run, the forces of nationalism will prove to be the most important factor in the situation.
During the past year France worked out and sought to apply limited reforms in Morocco with approval of the new Sultan whom they placed in authority a year ago. However, these reforms were resented rather than welcomed by Moroccan nationalists because (1) they could be applied only after the former Sultan had been deposed; (2) their overall effect was to strengthen French control of major policy agencies and to limit the influence of the Moroccans on future political development; and (3) they included provision for the participation of French nationals in the elective, municipal and regional councils on an equal numerical basis with Moroccan representation in such bodies. The Moroccan nationalists have long bitterly opposed the idea of such representation on the ground that a sort of “co-sovereignty” would thereby be exercised. These elective councils are mainly advisory in nature, although they would presumably be the forerunners of future organs with policy-making powers. Reforms of the judiciary, while more substantial and promising than in the political field to date, have nonetheless provided for the retention of extensive French control over the native courts.
Admittedly, the Moroccan situation is considerably more complex and difficult to contend with than that of Tunisia. There has been less opportunity to develop experience in the art of self-government. A small part of Morocco is under the administration of Spain which has been following a line of cultivating closer relations with, and support from, the Arab-Moslem world. The local Spanish authorities in the Spanish zone of Morocco have refused to accept the authority of the new Sultan placed in power by the French a year ago. The international city of Tangier is technically an integral part of the Sherifian Empire. The native population of Morocco far more heavily outweighs the European population than is the case in Tunisia.
We continue to believe, and recent developments in the Tunisian picture tend to support the conviction, that the best hope of speeding self-government for Morocco lies in direct negotiations between France and Morocco in an atmosphere free from extremist agitation or irresponsible outside pressure. We can therefore accept (assuming that [Page 651] tension in Morocco continues and that there is no satisfactory progress) a moderate resolution which, free from undue criticism of France, reiterates the interest of world opinion in a better rate of progress toward the desired goal. However, in view of the recent statement of Mendes-France that the time has arrived to adopt a reform program for Morocco, it is in our interest to avoid adoption of any resolution on Morocco which might endanger the prospect of mutual agreement between the parties, encourage excessive and unreasonable demands by the Moroccan nationalists, or drive the French Government into more severe, repressive policies.