USUN files

Memorandum of Conversations, by Henry Villard of the United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly

confidential

Subject:

  • North African Items (Separate Conversations)

Participants:

  • Sheikh Ahmed Abdul Jabbar, Saudi Arabian Delegation
  • Dr. Mohamed Fadil Al Jamali, Iraq Delegation
  • Henry S. Villard, U.S. Delegation

Sheikh Jabbar approached me at the opening of the afternoon session of the GA on October 6th and stated that the Arab delegations were meeting immediately after the session to decide, among other matters, what priority they would urge for consideration of the Tunisian and Moroccan items in Committee I. He referred to our luncheon conversation of October 5th with Dr. Hassouna, Secretary General of the Arab League, when the latter had suggested that these questions might be deferred if there was any hope that the US through Secretary Dulles would urge Mendes-France to expedite the negotiations with the Tunisians and Moroccans in order to reach some acceptable solution before it became necessary to debate the subjects in the GA. Specifically, Sheikh Jabbar asked that some indication of the US attitude be conveyed to him before the Arab delegations’ meeting so that it might be taken into account in the formulation of Arab policy.

After talking with Ambassador Lodge, and with Mr. Jernegan (NEA) on the phone, I informed Sheikh Jabbar (1) that Ambassador Lodge was taking the matter up personally with Secretary Dulles (2) that the US government was keenly interested in the progress of the negotiations and was confident that the French were devoting as much attention to North Africa as other important problems permitted, and (3) that if we felt progress in the talks was not being made we would take the first opportunity to let the French know our views. I added that I would be glad to keep in touch with Sheikh Jabbar over the next few weeks on the progress of negotiations so that further consideration could be given to the matter if necessary.

Sheikh Jabbar expressed himself as satisfied with my remarks and said that the Arabs would, in the light thereof, be inclined to put Tunisia and Morocco toward the end of the agenda in order to allow the maximum amount of time for the negotiators to reach agreement without public controversy in the UN. He said that in taking this position, the Arabs would expect US support for deferment of the items until later. I said the US delegation also favored putting the North African items toward the end of the agenda.

Later, Dr. Jamali of Iraq asked to see me and expressed a somewhat [Page 655] dissenting opinion. He said he went along on the suggestion to defer Tunisia but that he was pessimistic about any constructive steps being taken in the case of Morocco. Jamali felt therefore that Morocco should come up early, so that no time would be lost in compelling the French to seek a solution. Morocco and Tunisia were the only subjects in the GA which really interested the Arabs, and they were prepared to make a particularly strong case on Morocco. I replied that according to my information the French authorities were working hard on the subject of Morocco, which was much more complicated than Tunisia, and that deferment of this item was equally desirable to give the negotiations a chance. Jamali finally said he would consent to putting Morocco, as well as Tunisia, in the latter part of the agenda.

When I spoke to Mr. Jernegan on the phone, I reported to him the view of Ambassador Lodge that it would be very helpful here in the UN if Secretary Dulles could, when he next met Mendes-France, and subject to any other considerations which the Secretary might have in mind at the time, inquire about the progress in the North African discussions in the hope that this subject would not have to be too much publicized here.