771.00/10–2554: Telegram

The Consul at Rabat (Porter) to the Department of State1

secret

57. It seems clear from Embassy telegrams 1707 October 222 and 1714 October 233 to Department that French officials in Paris, though aware of seriousness, are less impressed with urgency of Moroccan situation than their counterparts here. Even allowing for detachment which comes with distance, however, it is difficult discern basis for belief that Lacoste has made encouraging progress and has calmed “enflamed emotions”. It was not very long ago that same officials were equally reassuring about fact that terrorism was confined to Casablanca and that countryside remained calm. Today terrorism continues in major cities and we are witnessing widespread series of attacks [Page 659] throughout Central Morocco, significance of which lies in fact they are occurring in Berber territory.

French statistics also indicate attacks increased 25 percent during first three months of Lacoste tenure as compared with similar period prior his arrival. At this time, French Zone is enduring average of twenty armed attacks (bombings and shootings) per week and this average is increasing. Figure does not include other incidents such as train derailments and arson.

Embassy conclusion that French intend wait until Ben Youssef and Arafa agree on latter’s successor is new and depressing note. It is probably true, as Ministry believes, that French can in meantime maintain present degree of order but cost of doing so should not be overlooked: 300 people are estimated to have died during August, mostly as result French anti-riot action at Port Lyautey.

Lacos’e has prolonged his stay in Paris and we sincerely hope he will return this time with something more substantial than instructions to cope with secondary issues. To break present impasse, French must begin with dynastic question and approach general problem along lines mentioned Department telegrams 1449 to Paris October 194 and 74 to Tangier October 22 (repeated information Paris 1487).5 Speed is important as in my view population of this country is slowly but surely being infected and controlled by extremist elements which owe much of their success to French failure to come to grips with and rectify past errors. Resulting dissension here, as Department pointed out, will jeopardize not only French interests but ours and those of free world generally.

Porter
  1. This telegram was repeated to Paris, Tangier, Casablanca, and Tunis.
  2. Not printed; it reported on conversations between the Embassy in Paris and members of the Protectorates Ministry concerning a visit to Morocco by Lacoste. (771.00/10–2254)
  3. Not printed; it stated the conclusions of the Embassy in Paris, that the French Government was probably prepared to replace Moulay Arafa, but would not do so until it found a successor who would be acceptable to both the present Sultan and the ex-Sultan. The Embassy informed the Department of State that it did not favor an approach to the French at that time to urge further action on Morocco, as it considered the French to be seriously working on the problem. (771.00/10–2354)
  4. Not printed.
  5. Not printed; it stated that the Department of State recognized some inadequacies in the French program for Morocco and favored a high level approach to the French. If practicable, the Secretary planned to tell Mendès-France the United States hoped some further steps could be taken in Morocco soon, or the United States could not work to avoid a debate in the Ninth General Assembly. (771.00/10–2154)