Editorial Note
On April 24, Bonbright (EUR) sent a memorandum to Under Secretary of State Bruce, to which he attached an early EUR draft of telegram 6353 to Paris, April 29, infra. The memorandum suggested Bruce speak to Bonnet the next day, provided he agreed with the approach indicated in the telegram. The memorandum also suggested that showing a draft of the telegram to Ambassador Gross “might help to make Gross more cooperative in trying to keep the lid on the Tunisian problem in New York if he were to know personally how strong a line we are taking with the French.”
Attached to the Bonbright memorandum in Department of State files were two other memoranda. One, by Ambassador Jessup (S/A) to McBride (WE), dated April 24, pointed out that both Gross and the Secretary had given the impression the United States was familiar with the French plan for reform in Tunisia and thought it promising. Jessup suggested the United States would be in an even more difficult position if it should become known that we did not really know what the program was. He said we could not continue to support the French position unless we were fully informed.
The other memorandum, by Wainhouse (UNP) to McBride, dated [Page 735] April 25, stated that the United States should avoid assuming any commitment that we would be able to maintain our present position of abstention on a Tunisian vote in the Security Council. While believing the draft telegram was useful and necessary, he proposed strengthening it so that the French would be in no doubt that the United States would reconsider its position if the Tunisian problem was brought to the United Nations again. The draft telegram and memoranda are in the WE files, lot 54 D 467, “Tunisia”.
A memorandum by Hickerson (UNA) to Bruce, dated Apr. 25, listed some background considerations UNA hoped the Under Secretary would keep in mind if he met with Ambassador Bonnet before the draft telegram was sent to Paris. The memorandum stated that the United States could prevent Tunisia from being included on the Security Council agenda a second time; but the consequences would be extremely serious, especially since the French had failed to move toward negotiations for Tunisian autonomy. If the Arab-Asian states requested a special session of the General Assembly to deal solely with Tunisia, the United States might not be able to prevent that. An unsuccessful attempt on the part of the United States to prevent a special session “would constitute the greatest defeat we have ever suffered in the United Nations and could not fail to jeopardize most seriously our future leadership in the Organization.”
UNA suggested that a continuation of the present course on Tunisia would strengthen the belief the United States was only interested in the United Nations as a tool to serve its own narrow interests and contribute to a suspicion of NATO on the part of non-European nations. In addition, a frustration of United Nations efforts to deal with the Tunisian problem would stimulate a recourse to violence by nationalist groups in French and other colonial territories. The memorandum concluded that further United States efforts to prevent United Nations consideration of Tunisia would harm rather than help its national interests, and any commitment to abstain if the question came up in the Security Council again should be avoided. (772.02/4–2552)