Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 1

745A.00/8–1353

The Ambassador in the Union of South Africa (Gallman) to the Department of State

confidential
No. 57

Capetown, August 13, 1953.¹

Ref:

• Embassy’s Despatches No. 410 of March 2, No. 488 of April 29,² No. 559 of June 11,³ and No. 14 of July 30, 1953.⁴

Subject:

• Further Evaluation of the South African Scene

In Despatch No. 410 of March 2, 1953, I gave an evaluation of the South African scene as I saw it after somewhat over a year in the country. Six months have now passed since that appraisal was made. I feel it might be well once more to take an overall look at developments.

During these past six months I have talked freely and widely about the trend of internal developments with a considerable number of people. These people, I think, make up a good cross section of the thoughtful, responsible element of the population. There were among them Government officials, members of Parliament, party workers, and representatives of business and the professions.

Basically, I should say, the situation is pretty much as I described it early in March of this year. There is no immediate threat to public security from action by any widely organized group of non-Europeans. No visible, comprehensive and really significant advance has been made during these past six months in organization among the non-European element, which is attributable in part to Government sponsored restrictive legislation. There has been, however, I think, a constant, steady growth of sensitivity among non-Europeans about discriminatory treatment and of the conviction that action, not necessarily violent, must be taken to assure a life of some measure of dignity, opportunity, and comfort. Things are shaping up, I should say, where a leader or leaders of intelligence, character and vision could, before too long, get a fairly wide response to appeals for enlarged and more effective organization. The growing consciousness I have mentioned I sensed from public statements made during the past few months by Native leaders and European students of race relations, and from talks I have had myself with Natives and some Coloreds outside the leadership group. There have also continued the usual sporadic and scattered nonviolent demonstrations against discriminations.

But from the talks I have had during these past six months with South Africans both in and outside the Government, I have also sensed a growing awareness of the need for positive action in easing growing tension among non-Europeans if ultimately widespread disruptions or even disorders are to be avoided. These particular talks with Government officials which I have mentioned I should explain were mainly with the civil servant class.

I have been following a standard approach during these past few months in sounding out opinion on how best to proceed to meet the number one problem, adjustment of white-black relations. I generally start with the observation that the complexity of the problem makes it virtually impossible, even with the best will imaginable, to draw up now a comprehensive, definitive plan for peaceable regulation of white-black relations. A long-term solution must be approached on a day-to-day, trial-and-error basis motivated by good will and an honest desire to find a just and balanced answer. Time is therefore essential, and to gain time some “safety valves” must be devised. Could not time be won in a more or less tranquil atmosphere by officially meeting with and maintaining pretty continuous contact with Native leaders—and they are as yet few in number—those few who have up to now emerged from the mass? Such contact, it is to be understood, of course, would be maintained without the intention of furthering only the personal position of the few leaders at the expense of the mass of Natives but with the sincere intent of working toward a long-term solution for the benefit of the mass of Europeans and Natives alike.

I have been struck with the unanimity of response to this line of reasoning. From Government officials of the civil servant class, party workers from both Nationalist and United Party camps, and from professional and business men the reaction has been the same. Contact and discussion with Native leaders, the consensus is, would serve as a “safety valve” and result in gaining essential time. During my recent trip through the Rhodesias, I tried out the same line of reasoning, and from officials and non-officials as well I got the same kind of reply as I have been getting in South Africa.

Shortly after the general election in April I tried unsuccessfully, during a talk with Prime Minister Malan, to get him or some members of his Cabinet to meet face to face with Native leaders.⁵ On August 14 Malan is to receive a group of Coloreds, at their instance, who will give him their views on the Government’s attempt to remove Colored voters from the common electoral rolls. While this group can speak for only a part of the Cape Coloreds (the “moderate wing” as Malan described it to me a few days ago) and while the move is probably meant primarily to confuse the European political opposition, nevertheless direct contact with a non-European element will at last take place on the Prime Minister level, and that is something to be noted. Also to be noted in this connection are the humanitarian provisions on the treatment of Natives appearing in the program of the recently founded Liberal Party⁶ and, although to a lesser extent, also in the program of the new Natal Federal Party.⁷ The need for direct dealings and exchanges with Native leaders is gradually being more widely recognized.

A word about the atmosphere prevailing at the Cabinet level. In my talks in those circles I have been struck with how generally the future is viewed pessimistically. Not so long ago at my home one evening, two very prominent and very articulate and loquacious Cabinet members, in answer to my question as to how they viewed the future, replied without any hesitation, “most gloomily.” One, the father of several children, added that he feared very much for their future.

The Governor of Southern Rhodesia, Sir John Kennedy, when I had my talk with him in Bulawayo last month, asked me whether members of Malan’s Cabinet really feared the future or whether they were playing some game in saying so. A number of them, he explained, in recent visits to Rhodesia had in talks with him viewed the future of European-Native relations in the Union very pessimistically. I told Sir John that Cabinet members in talks I had had with them struck the same note and that I got the impression that they were sincere and really did fear the future.

Fear, I do believe, is the prime moving force behind the program of restrictive measures sponsored by the present Union Government. These men see a handful of whites in the midst of what to them seems countless blacks, a handful that has brought to this part of the continent Christianity and Western civilization in the nature of agriculture, mining and industrial methods, productive of vast wealth for which whites beyond the continent have benefited as well. They want to maintain their position in the same way as they always have, for themselves and their children, and they tell themselves that this is for the benefit of the whole Western world too. They are only too aware of the stirrings for an ampler way of life, materially and politically, among the Natives; but instead of weighing facts, particularly the fact of the ever growing disproportion in numbers between whites and blacks, with some detachment, they are seized with fear and the result is panic, and ever more restrictive, legislation. That fear, on that high level, must be overcome before one can view the long future with any measure of calmness. Fortunately, some forces are at play, as I have tried to indicate above, making gradually for a factual approach to the problem of white-black relations.

I would, then, sum up the situation as of today with the observation that there still is not that degree of organization among Natives to cause one to expect nationwide disorders, threatening internal security on a nationwide scale. Awareness among Natives of their present mean way of life and a desire for an ampler one are, however, growing day by day, and no opportunity should be lost to encourage those who recognize the trend, in their efforts to spread the light.

My staff and I are trying quietly and unobtrusively to do that.

W. J. Gallman

1. This despatch arrived in the Department of State on Aug. 28, 1953.
2. Not printed. In this despatch, the Embassy conveyed an account of a conversation between Gallman and Malan. (745A.13/4–2953)
3. Not printed. In this despatch, the Embassy reported on the formation of new political parties within the Union of South Africa. (745A.00/6–1153)
4. Not printed. In this Pretoria despatch, Gallman reported on a trip which he had taken to Mozambique and the Rhodesias. (123 Gallman, Waldemar J.)
5. See telegram 262 from Pretoria, Apr. 27, 1953, p. 997.
6. The Embassy in Pretoria reported that the Liberal Association of Capetown founded the Liberal Party on May 9, 1953. The Party’s first statement of principles affirmed, among other points, the essential dignity of every human being, irrespective of race, color, or creed. Although its leadership was European, party membership was also open to non-Europeans. (Despatch 559, June 11, 1953; 745A.00/6–1153)
7. Apparently reference is to the Union Federal Party. The Embassy in Pretoria reported that the Union Federal Party, organized in Johannesburg following the Apr. 15 election, was the latest expression of “English nationalism” in the Union of South Africa, which was sometimes called “the Natal stand”, i.e. loyalty first to the British Crown and all the traditions it represented. Most of the Party’s leaders and members had been active in the Torch Commando movement. The Party’s principal proposal was for a federated Union of South Africa. (Despatch 559, June 11, 1953; 745A.00/6–1153)