493.919/8–2753: Telegram
The Ambassador in India (Allen) to the Department of State
402. For the Secretary. I had long discussion with Pillai yesterday at his request re thorium nitrate. He said he had discussed subject several times with Deshmukh but had not yet taken it up with Prime Minister for several reasons, chiefly to await outcome of Korean conference and other pending questions “in order not to have too many quarrels with US presented to Nehru at one time”.
Pillai said he would tell me in all friendliness that both he and Deshmukh felt genuinely that we are being somewhat harsher on India in this matter than we had been with some other countries receiving aid who had also traded in strategic materials and who had been left with a warning not to do it again.
He said GOI would much prefer, for purely economic reasons aside from other considerations, that any exports of fissionable materials go to US or Western world and GOI had demonstrated this by selling [Page 1716] US monazite despite its publicly announced policy of not exporting these sands.
He emphasized that it would be impossible for Indian Government to give a written commitment restricting its sovereignty with respect to trade since there was possibility in leakage of any written document. He thought we would have to make our own decision whether this one shipment was “knowingly permitted” and let future take care of itself, cutting off aid if further shipments of this kind took place.
As regards possibility of leakage, I said I did not like to approach problem with point of view of reaching clandestine solution, although I realized need for secrecy where atomic materials were concerned. I would prefer to reach basic understanding on principles involved which would be mutually acceptable to both countries and which could be published to world, if necessary, in dignity and self-respect. I thought this only sure basis for solid, friendly relations.
I told Pillai about my conversation yesterday with Nehru (Embtel 390, August 26 [25]) and emphasized that I must have something helpful to report to Washington embracing at least an assurance by India that GOI would let us know in advance if it decided to trade in banned commodities. I said I did not want my staff to have to continually pour over export statistics, cargo manifests, etc., in effort to ferret out information re India’s trade. Pillai expressed emphatic concurrence and said he personally saw no difficulty in giving us such assurance and would work along this line, talking it over with Deshmukh and probably presenting matter to Prime Minister within next few days. He might wish further talk with me before doing so.
Comment: Present case has had salutary effect of bringing Battle Act in most prominent and acute manner to attention of every Indian official concerned, all of whom are now fully aware that any further shipment of barred items could not be passed off as not knowingly permitted and would, therefore, result in automatic termination of aid.
Considerations presented in Deptel 212 August 21 are impressive evidence that India has requested our aid. I am inclined to think chief difficulty in past has been general tendency to press our aid on India and some wishful thinking on our part re requests received and assurances obtained. I now believe this aspect is being taken care of by a basic shift in our point of view from one of encouraging Indians to ask for aid to one of insistence that every Indian request either for technicians or programs be carefully screened to be certain that all branches of GOI concerned, including Prime Minister himself when appropriate, are genuinely and strongly in favor of request. This change is already having some effect on Indian thinking, particularly in overcoming criticism, still current, that we are pressing our technicians on India.
[Page 1717]I would welcome further thoughts and suggestions from Department in light of these latest discussions with Nehru and Pillai.