Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 2

033.9111/11–454

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Byroade) to the Secretary of State¹

secret

[Washington,] November 4, 1954.

Subject:

• Recommendation for the President to Ask Prime Minister Nehru to Visit him during 1955

Discussion:

For some time I have been concerned about our deteriorating relations with India.

Recognizing that our policy toward Communist China has been a continuing source of disagreement with India, the basic causes of the deterioration are (1) our military aid program for Pakistan, and (2) our policy of collective security through military arrangements, particularly those affecting South and Southeast Asia, which India considers within its legitimate sphere of strategic interest.

Because of widespread Indian resentment toward these policies our substantial economic aid programs for India and our information and cultural efforts to improve United States-Indian relations have in a sense become holding operations rather than means of extending our influence. It is entirely possible that the Congress may be tempted in the future to cut India off from special economic assistance, which could only make matters worse. Moreover fractional increases in our economic aid or cultural programs for India probably would not, at this time, greatly improve our relations with India.

Since no significant change in the policies to which India objects is likely in the foreseeable future, we should find some means of making those policies more acceptable to India. In my opinion the only way in which that might be done would be through a personal approach to Prime Minister Nehru by President Eisenhower himself. Nehru virtually dictates the foreign policy of India, and as long as he remains alive and with his full mental powers he will continue to exert enormous influence on our relations with India. It is evident that to some extent, though by no means completely, he misunderstands our foreign policy objectives and measures, and further that he feels he has not been sufficiently consulted in our approach to Asian matters of vital importance to India. I understand that Nehru’s sister, Madame Pandit, believes that if Nehru were to spend two days with the President in informal surroundings and have the opportunity to get to know him and to exchange ideas with him and to hear the President express his views on world problems and our efforts for peace, it might effect a profound change in the Prime Minister’s attitudes toward the United States. I believe that it is in our national interest to make the effort.

I consider it extremely important that this visit be regarded in terms of a major personal and public relations effort which, if successful, would be of incalculable value to the United States.

Recommendations:

1. That you discuss the problem of United States–Indian relations with the President and suggest that he invite Mr. Nehru to visit with him in the United States during 1955.

2. That you emphasize that if the visit is to succeed it should be an extraordinary gesture by the President to Mr. Nehru personally (accompanied by a minimum of formality).

3. That you suggest the visit should last at least two days, preferably at the President’s farm near Gettysburg, or at his summer vacation residence in Colorado.²

1. This memorandum was drafted by Harold G. Josif of SOA and by Henry T. Smith, the Acting Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs.
2. The following handwritten notation appeared at the bottom of the source text: “Sec.—While this has to be considered very carefully I see much merit in it if handled properly. Here is one case where the visitor would not come begging for aid ! B[yroade].”