611.9194/11–3054: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Allen) to the Department of State

confidential

729. Department telegram 642 November 26.1 I am sending following communication to R.K. Nehru today, making proposal in accordance with approach 3 of Department’s Airgram 124 November 10 re aviation:

“Dear Mr. Foreign Secretary:

I have received official instructions from my government authorizing me to propose an interim arrangement under which United States airlines operating under the Civil Aviation Agreement between the United States and India would not henceforth increase their frequencies to India without prior concurrence of both governments if the existing agreement could be continued in effect until other mutually satisfactory arrangements can be made. My government has in mind that this interim arrangement might continue for at least one year.

I regret that my departure from India tonight2 makes it impossible for me personally to continue discussions on this subject, but the Chargé d’Affaires of the Embassy, Mr. Donald D. Kennedy, and the Counsellor for Economic Affairs, Mr. Frederick Bartlett, will be fully [Page 1788] authorized to carry them on. If you could let Mr. Kennedy know your government’s reaction to the above proposal, I should be most appreciative. He and Mr. Bartlett will be available for further discussion at any time with either the Ministry of External Affairs or the Ministry of Communications.

Sincerely, [Allen]”

I talked with R.K. Nehru about this last night. He commented, “In other words, you are proposing a standstill arrangement.” I said, “Yes, more or less.” He seemed fairly sympathetic.

Today, amid last-minute departure preparations, I spoke first to Jha by telephone for 15 minutes and later to Ram even longer. Both Jha and Ram immediately said our proposal was worse than we had offered last year when elimination of one flight to Bombay was “conceded”. I pointed out that general aviation traffic had increased since last year and emphasized that American flights to India had not been increased for two years and that our present suggestion would freeze present level another year unless GOI concurred in increase. I said our present proposal in effect constituted de facto concurrence by US in predetermination of frequencies and that while our suggestion was for temporary arrangement at present level, it seemed to me very significant accommodation to Indian point of view. Both Jha and Ram said GOI would have right after January 14 not only to predetermine frequencies and Fifth Freedom percentage but more important, to reduce our frequencies. I said I could not agree to any reduction, that freezing us for three years was bad enough at time when aviation was steadily increasing and Air India International was doing well. Jha said our proposal would deprive India of freedom of action it would acquire within six weeks without offering anything in return. I said only real reason for reducing present level would be punitive. Jha denied any punitive intent but said GOI would probably reduce our frequencies on January 14 even if it increased them again later. I urged both Ram and Jha to consider our proposal carefully and sympathetically before making up their minds. They agreed, but Ram wanted to know whether our proposal was “take-it-or-leave-it” proposition. I said we would, of course, have to consider any alternative they might offer but repeated that they should accept this one since it was fair and even generous.

I described situation briefly today to Madame Pandit, who is on our side and favorably disposed toward American aviation. Unfortunately, she does not have much influence in this situation.

My guess now is that we may possibly get by with temporary elimination of only one flight to Bombay but this is by no means certain. GOI will probably insist, for face-saving if nothing else, that existing agreement terminate January 14. Jha said our efforts to extend present agreement were “too little and too late”. I said very purpose of 12-month notice was to enable new developments during that time to be taken into account. He said he saw nothing new. I said increase in general [Page 1789] traffic and our willingness to freeze our frequencies if necessary for another 12 months were new.

My discussions have been friendly and agreeable throughout and I believe as favorable atmosphere as we could reasonably expect has been created. GOI will probably offer some counterproposal. I do not believe approach 4 would have any chance whatever.

Allen
  1. Not printed; see footnote 2, p. 1783.
  2. Ambassador Allen was returning to the United States on Nov. 30. He did not return to India as Ambassador; rather, he was appointed Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs on Jan. 24, 1955.