Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 2

320/1–1552: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France¹

secret
priority

Washington, January 15, 1952—7:07 p.m.

719. Re Kashmir re Delga 1027.² Fol are Dept’s views after consultation with Amb Bowles re SC handling of second Graham report:

1. Preferred course of action. Graham reports to SC Jan 17 giving complete explanation situation, his views. Such statement shld include spelling out Devers plan for reasons set forth Gadel 688 Jan 12.³ At subsequent mtg week or 10 days later, UKDel and USGADel in statements to Council take fol position: a) Note satisfactory progress made; b) Note 2 major problems yet unsolved, namely troops to remain on either side of cease fire line at end demilitarization period, and appt PlebAd by end demilitarization period; c) Express belief and hope remaining differences can be resolved in very near future. Accordingly, SC wld be ill-advised act now in manner which might jeopardize reaching agreement these 2 fundamental points; d) State opinion Graham has authority and shld use it to return to sub-continent for further negots with understanding this is final effort before substantive SC action in event differences cannot be resolved; e) Indicate belief Dr. Graham shld report to SC on results final effort at his discretion and in any event no later than Mar 31. Under this procedure USGADel and UKDel shld undertake urge other dels make similar statements, so as to indicate SC majority opinion verbally Graham make one more attempt.

2. Alternative course of action. If, after assessing possibilities re course of action indicated one above, USGADel convinced it cannot be undertaken, Dept leaves to USGADel’s discretion decision to co-sponsor UKDel res continuing Graham effort. Dept does not agree with UK draft res. Believes it essential, if res necessary, that it contain fol elements: a) Note Graham report and Graham statement; b) Indicate appreciation points of agreement; c) Note that 2 basic differences remain, namely, number of troops remain on either side cease fire line at end of demilitarization period and appointment of PlebAd by end demilitarization period; d) Direct Graham make final effort to effect agreement by parties on these 2 points; e) Direct Graham to report on outcome final effort at his discretion but no later than Mar 31.

3. As USGADel knows, basic problem either course of action is selling it to Pak Del. USGADel after reaching agreement with UKDel on course of action to be pursued shld assure continuing UK initiative with strong US support. If UKDel and USGADel agree preferred course of action in one above, line of argument with Pak Del cld be: next res logically shld be one either commending parties for reaching agreement re demilitarization or recommending steps to parties on how demilitarization shld be achieved. Now is not time for such res in view of Indian internal polit situation with real or alleged negot problems arising therefrom. Pak position in eyes all UN members and in world opinion will be stronger by agreeing final delay whether or not Indians eventually accept remaining points demilitarization program. India can thus have no excuse for failing to come to agreement on remaining points unless GOP changes present well known attitude full cooperation with SC in solving this problem. If UKDel and USDel decide res must be introduced, efforts shld be made obtain agreement both sides that their statements will be brief and not conducive protracted heated debate, which more likely to be avoided by not having res tabled.

Acheson

1. This telegram was repeated for information to London, Paris, and New Delhi.
2. Not printed.

3. In telegram Gadel 688 to the delegation at Paris, Jan. 12, not printed, the Department suggested that Dr. Graham should explain in detail the exact nature of Devers’ proposals. The Department appreciated Graham’s fear of a strong Indian reaction, but believed no useful purpose was served by withholding the proposals, as long as Graham in detailing them indicated their tentative nature. Full divulgence, in the Department’s opinion, would not jeopardize Graham’s position vis-à-vis India so much as his failure to do so would vis-à-vis Pakistan.

   The Department indicated for the delegation’s own information that it had now seen details of Devers’ proposals and believed them to be “fair, well thought out, and most sensible and practicable suggestions on staging of demilitarization.” (320/1–1052)