357.AB/3–1054: Telegram
The Ambassador in India (Allen) to the Department of State1
1405. Department’s 1041, March 4. I had long talk with Pillai yesterday about Kashmir and other questions. He said Indians regarded Graham as “very fine gentleman”. He had no idea whether Prime Minister objected to his continuation as UN mediator but would inquire.
Speaking entirely personally, he was highly pessimistic re possibility of any progress on Kashmir and other matters in dispute between India and Pakistan. He said he doubted very much Nehru and Mohammad Ali would meet before they come together at Colombo April 28. Again emphasizing that he was speaking entirely personally and beseeching me not to give him away, he said he was most dubious that any progress would be made even if two Prime Ministers did meet at this stage. He said Nehru had worked himself—or been worked—into adamant position from which he would not budge.
Pillai did not know whether Kashmir dispute would come before SC this spring.
Comment: It seems to me most unlikely that India will take initiative bringing Kashmir case before SC. GOI tendency is towards lessening UN role in Kashmir dispute. GOI may fear India’s present position in Kashmir would prove embarrassing and difficult to defend in full-dress debate. I do not think SC proceedings on Kashmir would improve our relations with India since we would find it most difficult not to show favoritism towards Pakistan position. However, I would not recommend that we make strenuous efforts to avoid case coming up if Pakistanis insist.
As re US observers, I told Pillai that while this Embassy would have less worries if they were removed, I thought GOI should think carefully, in its own interests, before pressing for their withdrawal. If incidents occurred, it might be most helpful to India if American observers on the spot could report facts.
If Americans were only on Pakistan side of line, they would hear only Pakistan story. I pointed out that President Eisenhower would find it easier to implement his promise to prevent Pakistan aggression if American observers were present, whereas if India insisted on their removal, India might have itself to blame if US Government and public obtained biased picture. Pillai said he appreciated strength of this consideration but repeated that Prime Minister had taken unchangeable position and would not rest until Americans had left. He mentioned report that American observers had been seen with known [Page 1343] Pakistan agents in their jeeps in Srinagar and said Nehru was convinced Americans were not “neutral” on Kashmir issue.
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- This telegram was repeated for information to London and Karachi.↩