Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 2

690D.91/3–1154: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Pakistan¹

top secret
priority

Washington, March 11, 1954—5:37 p.m.

762. Limited distribution. Atmosphere of tension in subcontinent would be eased substantially if some progress re Kashmir dispute were evident. At moment it does not appear likely plebiscite administrator will be appointed by April 30 as provided in Nehru–Mohammed Ali agreement reached New Delhi August 21, 1953. Such failure implement agreement will no doubt further increase tension and feeling ill will.

Suggest in your discretion you see PM privately with following line making clear your comment entirely in spirit friendly help and in no way should be considered as a request or Department position:

1. At an appropriate time (we believe should be no later than April 1) Mohammed Ali address communication to Nehru referring to agreement, failure thus far to have meeting to select plebiscite administrator and desire make progress, and putting forward three (or more) names of individuals who would be acceptable to Pakistan as plebiscite administrator. It most important individuals named be recognized as men of ability so that Nehru would have difficulty rejecting. They should also meet test of coming from small neutral nation and at least one should be an Asian. We would suggest nationals following countries for consideration, making clear it entirely Pakistan’s decision: Sweden, Switzerland, Burma. Would be impossible of course obtain prior consent individuals considered so any nominations would have to be subject willingness individuals to serve. Understand Pakistan has informed Secretary General UN it agrees resignation Nimitz and this would be good time for public announcement by Secretary General it accepted.

2. Depending on the status of communications between Mohammed Ali and Nehru,² of which we know next to nothing, and Mohammed Ali’s evaluation of chances of success this tactic, the proposal might be made public in order to make Pakistan position clearly evident to all. This of course also to be Mohammed Ali’s decision. Presumably names would be held secret but countries represented could be specified.

3. Nehru would seem to have three alternatives: (a) Accept one of the men in which case a real step forward would have resulted. FYI only. This believed unlikely but rejection of good nominations by Nehru would result in India’s losing standing before free world and within UN. End FYI only. (b) Reject all three with a counter offer of one or more. FYI only. If Nehru suggestion anywhere near reasonable one we could urge Pakistan acceptance. On other hand, if nominations obviously not impartial or not possessing stature and ability, Pakistan would have maintained good position although necessary reject. End FYI only. (c) Reject all nominations with no counter nominees on basis US military aid creates new situation with need for study and reconsideration of position. This would clearly place responsibility of failure of agreement of August 23 on Nehru. You should make it clear that we continue favor bilateral negotiations and believe reference to SC should only come as last resort (Embtel 708).³ If Paks do finally decide, all else failing, to raise issue in SC, would seem its position strengthened as result above line. PM should understand we not committing ourselves any position if SC debate requested.

If you discuss above with PM make clear we should not appear in matter and any steps he takes should be on basis his own initiative. As part of keeping ourselves out of it, we are not informing anyone else including UK and Pakistan Embassy. Any comment from Embassy should be marked Limited Distribution.

Smith

1. This telegram was repeated by the Department to New York (eyes only for Lodge and Wadsworth).
2. The texts of messages exchanged between the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan in 1953 and 1954 are contained in two publications of their respective governments. See Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, Kashmir, Meetings and Correspondence between the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan (July 1953–October 1954): White Paper (1954); and Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Kashmir Affairs, Negotiations between the Prime Ministers of Pakistan and India regarding the Kashmir dispute (June 1953–Septemher 1954) (1954).
3. Dated Mar. 9, p. 1340.