611.91/3–2054: Telegram
The Ambassador in India (Allen) to the Department of State1
1450. Reference Embtel 1444, March 19.2 Pillai called at my house this morning enroute to his office to discuss question of US observers in Kashmir “entirely personally, informally and without instructions.” (It is obvious that Pillai would not have come to see me without Nehru’s knowledge.)
Pillai said he was deeply disturbed over deterioration of Indian–American relations and wanted “desperately” to find some means of reversing trend. For this reason he was most anxious to explore every possible avenue for solution of question of observers to prevent Indo–US relations from growing much worse. He wonders whether some basis might not be found for us to withdraw the American observers voluntarily.
I expressed full agreement with his desire to prevent further [Page 1351] deterioration of relations and said I was ready and felt confident my government was also, to explore any feasible possibility. As regards the observers, I pointed out that Secretary General Hammarskjold appeared to have rather definite views and my government would find it most difficult to take any action which might run counter to his wishes. I also said, speaking in entire frankness, that I would not wish to “go out on a limb” in endeavoring to solve this question if there was any likelihood that we might immediately be faced with some further dramatic action by GOI which would undo any amelioration which might be achieved. Pillai said he knew of no such action under contemplation and expressed confidence that quiet solution of observers problem would start pendulum swinging in reverse direction and lead to steady improvement of Indo-American relations. He asked what type of dramatic action I had in mind. I said I had heard rumors that Doctor Kitchikew was going to Moscow and Peking soon to negotiate tripartite act of friendship and non-aggression between USSR, China and India. Pillai said this rumor was nonsense. He said Kitchikew might well be trying to foster such reports but he could assure me categorically that no approach whatever would be made by India towards USSR. He thought that if negotiations with Peking over Tibet were satisfactorily concluded, some kind of statement of mutual desire by India and China to maintain peace between two countries with long common frontiers might naturally follow.
I asked whether GOI wanted Americans to withdraw from both sides of cease-fire line in Kashmir or merely from Indian side. He said he had not thought of this point but presumed that since each observer changed sides every three months, he did not think it logical for any observers to operate exclusively on one side.
I repeated my question whether American observers in Kashmir was [were] sole barrier to reversal of current trend in Indian-American relations. He said only other problem, which he wished to talk to me about at some length next week, concerned Nepal. He personally put little credence in reports that Americans were intriguing against Indian interests in Nepal but said conviction was growing among people of both India and Nepal that this was true. I expressed confidence that we could give India full reassurance on this score. While we recognized independence of Nepal, we also recognized that Nepal’s situation was such that it must lean either towards north or south. Certainly we had no desire to disrupt Indian-Nepalese relations and throw Nepal into hands of Communist China.
Comment: I believe it is timely for us to consider once more effect on Indo–US relations of our decision to give military aid to Pakistan. This decision has been serious defeat for Nehru. I hope with time it will undermine his entire concept of neutralism in this region. If this develops it will be a major victory for US policy. We should try to find way in which price we pay for such victory is cut to minimum. [Page 1352] The price might well be permanent impairment of Indian-American relations and alienation of Indian good will for indefinite period. Pillai and other high Indian officials are sincere in wishing to prevent this and are asking for our help. Observer problem is immediate issue to be met. I know the vigor with which those who find Nehru exasperating will argue that we should not cater to him in any way. I believe, however, that we may well let our own feelings do us a disservice if we fail to look beyond the present. I therefore suggest that we re-examine present impasse and see if some formula cannot be found which would permit a solution.