689.90D/12–1354.
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Pakistan—Afghanistan Affairs (Thacher)
Subject:
- U.S. Thinking on Questions Raised by Prince Naim During his Visit to the U.S.
Participants:
- Mr. Mohammad K. Ludin, Ambassador of Afghanistan
- NEA—Mr. Jernegan
- SOA—Mr. Thacher
- Ambasssador Ludin asked whether we could give him any replies to the questions raised by Prince Naim in his conversations with the Secretary and Mr. Byroade in October.1
Mr. Jernegan said that Prince Naim’s remarks to Ambassador Lodge relative to the possibility of a confederation between Afghanistan and Pakistan had attracted considerable interest in this government but our feeling was that an attempt to carry out such a plan at this time might perhaps be somewhat premature. Pakistan is itself in the throes of an internal political reorganization, and in addition we felt that a confederation of the two countries might lead to a strongly unfavorable Russian reaction. Mr. Jernegan said that frankly we did not feel the amount of military aid which, in the light of our commitments elsewhere in the world, we could deliver to Afghanistan would be sufficient to be of any real benefit. We are not in a position to strengthen Afghanistan to the point where it could resist any outside attack. U.S. arms delivered to Afghanistan might simply create undue complications with the USSR. Moreover, considering the difficult budgetary and economic situation now existing in Afghanistan, we feared that a military buildup would result in increased internal expenses for the Government [Page 1436] of Afghanistan, which it could not afford, and there might thus arise the question of finding means to assist Afghanistan in meeting these expenses.
Mr. Jernegan declared that on the other hand we saw considerable merit in gradually strengthening the ties between Afghanistan and Pakistan through development of closer economic relations. We were interested in the possibility of practical steps to bring Afghanistan into closer relations with the West through improving its communications with the rest of the world. As a practical matter it appeared that this would have to be done by developing Afghanistan’s lines of communication with Pakistan, since opportunities for a similar strengthening of ties through Iran were not as apparent. At present Kabul must rely for its communication with the western world on the inadequate railway lines up to Peshawar and thence via the rough road from Landi Khotal. We thought there might be much advantage in the two governments working out means for improving these communications by consultation among themselves. The United States would have an interest in assisting such a development as this or in other mutually beneficial interchanges as, for example, the extension of power from the Warsak project in the NWFP over to Jalalabad or, similarly, of facilities for sending power from the Kajkai dam to areas in Pakistan where it was needed. Mr. Jernegan stressed that there were no funds in the present fiscal year ending June 30, 1955 for the U.S. to assist in these developments. Discussion between the two governments themselves to discover the feasibility of arrangements along these lines would naturally increase the interest in the U.S. Government in trying to discover means of assisting through loans or possibly through some grants in aid.
(On his way out of the building Ambassador Ludin expressed considerable disappointment with this line of thinking. He stressed that confederation had never been conceived of without the idea of some accompanying settlement of the Pushtunistan issue. He said that Afghanistan could not consider leaving aside the Pushtunistan issue and proceeding with the establishment of economic ties with Pakistan. He said he believed this desire for establishment of closer relations through strengthening economic ties with Pakistan had in fact been a position of the State Department for the last several years. He asserted that economic assistance was not really the problem. After all, Afghanistan could get such assistance from other sources—Czechoslovakia, for example. He professed to believe that Prince Naim had failed somehow to get across his point in his talks with the Secretary and other U.S. officials. Ludin indicated some hesitancy in reporting to his government what he had just been told, preferring rather to return for a further discussion with Mr. Jernegan.)2