689.90D/12–2254
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Pakistan—Afghanistan Affairs (Thacher)
Subject:
- Afghanistan’s Attitude Towards Cooperation with Pakistan
Participants:
- Ambassador Mohammad Kabir Ludin, Embassy of Afghanistan
- Mr. John D. Jernegan, NEA
- Mr. Nicholas G. Thacher, SOA
Ambassador Ludin said he had come in for some further discussion of the points mentioned by Mr. Jernegan on December 13.1 He said that since Mr. Jernegan had mentioned the conversation between Ambassador Lodge and Prince Naim last fall in which Naim had alluded to the possibility of confederation between Afghanistan and Pakistan, he had seen Ambassador Lodge in New York and had tried to clarify Afghan views on this matter.2 Ludin believed that perhaps Ambassador Lodge had been under a misapprehension as to Naim’s suggestions about confederation, and he had wished to make it clear to Ambassador Lodge that Afghanistan could consider the possibility of close association with Pakistan only after there had been a settlement [Page 1439] of the Pushtunistan question. Ludin said that Ambassador Lodge had given him sympathetic attention and said he might find an opportunity to mention this problem to the President.
Ludin continued that he had not yet supplied a full report to his government on the points mentioned by Mr. Jernegan at their previous conversation since he wished to discuss them further. These are most difficult and anxious times for Afghanistan. Ludin said he was very discouraged by the recent decision of the Pakistan government to combine the provinces of West Pakistan into a single unit. This was a blow to the hopes of a majority of the members of the Pakistan Constituent Assembly, who had been, he understood, largely in favor of greater autonomy for the various provinces. In addition, this was a severe blow to the hopes of the people of the North West Frontier Province and the tribal areas for a just determination of their political rights. Although there are now two Pathans in the cabinet at Karachi, General Ayub and Dr. Khan Sahib, Ludin felt that the former was so strongly pro-British in outlook as to be scarcely a Pathan at all, and Dr. Khan Sahib might well be under severe restraints within the cabinet. Discouragement and disappointment at developments in Pakistan were reflected in a letter from Prince Naim which Ludin had received by special courier in the last few days. In this communication Naim stressed his interest in receiving the clearest possible answers to the questions he had raised with Department officials last fall. The courier who brought this message was now waiting to carry back a full report from Ludin on the Department’s views.
Mr. Jernegan said that he wished to make clear that there was no misunderstanding on his part, nor did he believe on the part of Ambassador Lodge, relative to the importance which the Government of Afghanistan attached to settlement of the Pushtunistan question and its view that such settlement must be a prerequisite to confederation with Pakistan. However, in previous conversation with Ambassador Ludin, Mr. Jernegan had in a sense gone around this question in order to give our thinking on other possible means of developing cooperation between Pakistan and Afghanistan, since we do not see how we can be of any assistance in bringing about a settlement of the Pushtun question. We feel that were the two countries to undertake certain joint and mutually beneficial economic enterprises, a considerable measure of cooperation would by the very nature of the projects have to emerge. At the same time we do not wish to imply that we want to force any particular settlement with Pakistan on Afghanistan. We are not proposing to attach any strings or special political conditions to our aid.
Ambassador Ludin reiterated that this was a most difficult and anxious time for Afghanistan. Because of United States aid to Pakistan [Page 1440] the latter’s increasing sense of strength had made it more rigid and inflexible with regard to any settlement of the Pushtun question. Meanwhile, United States aid to Iran was helping that country to advance. In the north the Soviets were achieving economic progress in the areas adjacent to Afghanistan, and the latter thus found that on its northern, eastern and southern borders, countries were moving ahead in their development while Afghanistan remained in a kind of “trough of depression.”
Referring to future U.S. aid to Iran, Mr. Jernegan said that most of this would be in the form of loans which reminded him of the fact that there had been considerable delay in concluding arrangements for Afghanistan to secure funds from the loan granted by the Eximbank last summer.3 Ludin pleaded guilty personally for a good deal of this delay, saying it had arisen from certain misunderstandings about the terms of the loans.
Ludin described various impediments to cooperation with Pakistan. He said that any slight degree of cooperation by Afghanistan might be given a twisted public interpretation by the Pakistanis, who would maintain that Afghanistan had been agitating the Pushtun question merely as a means for getting economic concessions from Pakistan. Ludin said the Afghans were most upset over the way the Pakistanis had tried to make propaganda favorable to themselves out of the talks of the Afghan Minister in Karachi. He cited the press story by Callahan, New York Times correspondent in Karachi, that the Afghans were eagerly seeking confederation but which did not make clear the Afghan prerequisite of a Pushtun settlement.4 Callahan had later admitted that he got his information from the Pakistanis. Similarly, when Naim had discussions in Karachi on his way to and from the United States, the Pakistan Urdu radio had broadcast that Naim had come hat in hand begging the Pakistanis for concessions and agreements. The Pakistanis would inevitably suggest that any steps toward cooperation represented some weakening of Afghanistan’s firm stand on the Pushtun question.
Mr. Jernegan wondered whether this was perhaps a situation in which separate problems should be considered separately. Would it not be possible to go ahead on mutually beneficial economic agreements with Pakistan without an immediate settlement of the Pushtun question? Because of existing physical facts Afghanistan has inevitably to seek its connection with the free world through Pakistan.
Ludin said that increased economic ties with Pakistan would simply [Page 1441] make it possible for the Pakistanis to bring added economic pressure to bear. He cited in some detail an instance of several years ago when there had been difficulty in getting adequate petroleum products into Afghanistan through Pakistan for the use of the Morrison–Knudsen Company, and referred to the assistance given by the United States in this matter after Ludin had taken it up with the Department.
Mr. Jernegan felt that improvement of the actual physical facilities for Afghan trade and communication with the rest of the world through Pakistan could not in fact give Pakistan more opportunity for exercising pressure than it had at present.
Ludin remarked that Afghanistan could not participate in any projects which were connected “even by so much as a thread” with the concept of bringing about a closer relationship with Pakistan since this would be seized by the Pakistanis as a sign of weakness. Ludin said that there were, after all, other places where Afghanistan could find economic assistance. But he felt certain that upon a word from us Pakistan would be willing to consider some dignified and reasonable settlement of the Pushtun question. He declared that it was of the greatest importance that answers be provided by us as completely as possible to the questions raised by Prince Naim.
Mr. Jernegan said he understood that Mr. Ludin had requested an appointment with the Secretary, and that we would try to arrange for Ludin to receive our views on Prince Naim’s questions from the highest level in the Department.5
- See the memorandum of conversation by Thacher, Dec. 13, p. 1435.↩
- In a memorandum dated Dec. 18, Ambassador Lodge recorded a conversation at the United Nations with Ambassador Ludin. Ludin explained that confederation between Afghanistan and Pakistan was contingent upon a solution of the Pushtunistan question and he asked that the United States exercise its good offices to facilitate a settlement. Lodge endorsed the request. (689.90D/12–1854)↩
- On Apr. 29, 1954, the Export-Import Bank authorized a new loan to Afghanistan. For information regarding this loan, see the memorandum by Kirk and the letter from Arey, pp. 1466 and 1472, respectively.↩
- See footnote 3, p. 1416.↩
- See the memorandum of conversation by Thacher, Dec. 28, p. 1442.↩