Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 2

689.90D/12–2854

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Pakistan—Afghanistan Affairs (Thacher)

secret

[Washington,] December 28, 1954.

Subject:

• U.S. Views on Military or Economic Assistance to Afghanistan and on Greater Cooperation Between Pakistan and Afghanistan

Participants:

• The Secretary
• Mr. M. K. Ludin, Ambassador of Afghanistan
• NEA—Mr. Jernegan
• SOA—Mr. Thacher

Ambassador Ludin explained that Prince Naim, Foreign Minister of Afghanistan, had recently sent him a letter by special courier expressing deep concern over developments in Pakistan, particularly the Pakistan Government’s declaration of its intent to create a single political unit out of the existing provinces in West Pakistan. These events had accentuated Prince Naim’s desire to secure the Secretary’s views on the matters raised by Naim in his discussion with the Secretary last fall. The special courier would carry to Kabul the Secretary’s views.

The Secretary gave Ambassador Ludin an Aide-Mémoire setting out our views.¹ Referring to the paragraph in the Aide-Mémoire, expressing the U.S. view that a military aid agreement with Afghanistan at this particular time would create problems for it which would not be offset by the strength such aid might create, the Secretary said that at present we have to be careful that any actions we take do not tend to increase the considerable tensions already existing in Europe and Asia, and that we believe it is better to defer consideration of possible military aid for Afghanistan until a later time when conditions may be more favorable. Regarding the part of the Aide-Mémoire which expresses hope for better Afghan–Pakistan relations, the Secretary observed that perhaps the Pushtun question could best be settled in the context of an over-all improvement in relations with Pakistan rather than as a prelude to such improvement. The settlement of the Trieste problem, for example, was made possible by a general improvement of the relations among the countries of Southern Europe. In trying to reach a settlement of the problem of the Saar, talks at the outset had concentrated on possibilities of increased economic interchange. Thus we believe that a first step in the settlement of the Pushtun problem might lie in improvement of facilities for trade and other cooperative projects with Pakistan.

Ambassador Ludin observed that the Afghans believe U.S. military and economic assistance extended by the United States to Pakistan has increased Pakistan’s rigidity although he had been assured by the Department that U.S. aid would not make Pakistan less conciliatory but would contribute to its willingness to settle its disagreements with its neighbors. Alluding to the Pakistan Government’s intention to combine existing provinces of West Pakistan into a single unit, Ludin declared this would further deprive the Pathans of any opportunity for the autonomy they desired and that zonal federation represented a device for assuring Punjabi dominance over Bengalis, Sindhis and Pathans alike. Prince Naim has indicated Afghanistan’s readiness to accept any position which the United States may allot it in the Middle East. Afghanistan would understand if the U.S. decided to leave it out of military and economic aid programs, but it was deeply anxious to preserve the “entity” of the Pushtu people on both sides of the frontier. The Afghan people wish to be able to hold on to their individuality in the future pattern of events in that part of the world. A word from the U.S. would greatly influence Pakistan. Pakistanis have abused recent Afghan approaches made in good faith.

The Secretary declared that we would be displeased if we felt our aid to Pakistan made it less reasonable in its dealings with Afghanistan and that we did not believe this was the case. We hoped our influence would encourage cooperation between the two countries. It was the Secretary’s understanding that the concept of zonal federation in West Pakistan had sprung from attempts at resolution of Pakistan’s other difficult internal problems rather than being directly connected with the situation of the Pathans.

Ambassador Ludin expressed his appreciation for the receipt of these views and declared that he would convey them to his government.

[Attachment]

The Department of State to the Afghan Embassy

secret

Aide-Mémoire

In the memorandum presented by His Highness, Prince Mohammad Na’im Khan, Foreign Minister of Afghanistan, to the Secretary of State on October 8, 1954,² and in conversations between the Foreign Minister and His Excellency, Mohammed Kabir Ludin, Ambassador of Afghanistan, on the one hand, and United States officials on the other, various problems relating to Afghanistan have been discussed.³It has been suggested that the United States should aid Afghanistan in the military sphere and should augment its assistance in the economic sphere. The United States’ attention was invited to proposals for improving relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Subsequently, these problems have been given fullest consideration within the United States Government, which attaches great importance to the preservation of the ties of friendship and understanding which have characterized its relations with Afghanistan.

The United States Government has given careful consideration to the possibility of extending military assistance to Afghanistan. It has come to the conclusion that a military aid agreement at this particular time would create problems for Afghanistan which would not be offset by the strength such aid might create.

We have noted with satisfaction His Highness’ observation on the importance of close and harmonious cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The United States Government shares the belief that Afghanistan can best realize its potential for progress through cooperation with Pakistan. Such cooperation would also strengthen Afghanistan’s ability to resist efforts from any other quarter to render it economically subservient. We share the concern expressed in His Highness’ Memorandum that Afghanistan may be vulnerable to inimical activities on the part of another neighbor, and hope that the Government of Afghanistan will take advantage of all opportunities to guard against such activities.

The United States Government has examined the Government of Afghanistan’s latest suggestions concerning a possible solution of the Pushtun question in conjunction with confederation of the two countries with the same friendly interest which has characterized its attitude over the past several years. It is realized that Afghanistan believes a settlement of the Pushtun question is a necessary prerequisite to possible confederation. However, since the United States Government sees no way in which it can help to bring about a settlement of that particular question, it has considered other possible means for the improvement of Afghanistan–Pakistan relations and the strengthening of the Afghan economy, particularly the possibility of economic development projects of benefit to both countries which would by their very nature make for an increasing degree of cooperation between them. The United States might be able to assist in execution of such projects although United States participation could only be realized after extensive further study and upon the authorization of necessary funds by the United States Congress. The United States would hope that Pakistan and Afghanistan might themselves undertake in the near future joint consultation on the feasibility and practicability of such projects as sharing of electric generating facilities, improvement of communications and facilitation of trade. Such consultation might produce concrete plans which would assist the United States in determining whether and how it might participate.

It should be emphasized that the United States Government is not a partisan of any particular settlement with Pakistan, nor is it proposing to attach political conditions to any aid it might be able to offer.

Washington, [December 28, 1954.]

1. Printed below.
2. Not printed; it repeated the arguments made by Foreign Minister Naim to the Secretary, as recorded in the memorandum of conversation by Thacher, Oct. 8, p. 1420.
3. See the memoranda of conversation by Thacher, Oct. 8, Dec. 13, and Dec. 22, pp. 1421, 1435, and 1438, respectively.