751G.00/6–254: Telegram
The Ambassador in Ceylon (Crowe) to the Department of State
priority
385. Reference Deptel 363, June 1.1 In my opinion it would be exceedingly embarrassing politically for the Government of Ceylon to permit another flow of US aircraft ferrying French troops to Indochina at this time.
Prime Minister has been under strong pressure as result of last two airlifts. He has been severely attacked in the press and by leftist and independent members in Parliament. A mass meeting of citizens called on this issue further underlined unpopularity of his decision.
[Page 1615]I believe that he would face same reaction if requested for another airlift and unless additional airlifts absolutely essential I would certainly advise against them at this time.2 Constant calls here of French troopships en route Indochina have never aroused public concern for the past seventy years as they, unlike Globemasters, are considered routine movement.
Developments at Geneva which might tend fix blame for failure of settlement in Indochina on Red Chinese might be reflected here by a less hostile public attitude in which case our assistance might be regarded more favorably and the pressure on the Prime Minister not to allow such flights would be minimized.
- Department telegram 363 to Colombo, repeated to 11 other capitals, asked that all addressees estimate the reactions of their host governments to possible U.S. requests to land on their territory and use their air space for the ferrying of French troops to Indochina (751G.00/5–3054).↩
- The Department concluded in telegram 365 to Colombo, June 3, 1954, that since the bypassing of Ceylon was not possible in any airlift from the west, it would recommend to the Department of Defense that the airlift be performed via the United States–Pacific route (751G.00/6–354).↩