Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 2

690B.9321/9–1753: Telegram

No. 101
The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China¹

secret
priority

Washington, September 17, 1953—7:08 p.m.

227. Bangkok’s 533.²

I. Burmese withdrawal gives Chinese proposal top urgency. Department considers requirements situation call for Chinese statement to be made formally in US–Thai-China committee meeting soonest along following lines based on reasonable Yeh position Taipei’s 168:³

a. China will sign agreement and plan.

b. Is issuing orders all Chinese troops leave Burma.

c. Approximate 2,000 estimated respond first call, will make every effort induce many more as possible.

d. Will evacuate six bases as in plan and have 2,000 men across frontier by October 31.

e. Will issue statement re those remaining after fair chance given join exodus: wash hands of irregulars, declare regulars deserters.

Subject minor alterations Department considers these minimal requirements. If Chinese Government will make statement in committee along foregoing lines US will give full support and attempt enlist Thai cooperation. Will also make every effort induce Burmese resume negotiations and sign agreement; if this unsuccessful will seek GUB assurances not interfere with unilateral Chinese evacuation and will lend logistic help Thai border and transportation Formosa as planned. If on other hand Chinese Government unwilling make such commitment US no longer able support Chinese position effectively. Embassy to take this up soonest at high levels indicated Deptel 222 to Taipei.⁴

II. Embassy Bangkok and US representative committee should sound out Thai willingness go along with committee support above lines and continue offer logistic aid in event Chinese troops reach Thai border seeking onward transportation. If Thai concur inform Taipei soonest.⁵

III. Embassy Rangoon: Department prefers no formal attempt induce Burmese resume negotiations until concrete Chinese proposal forthcoming. Should intimate however we are urging Chinese make offer which we believe realistic, and continue stress viewpoint Deptel 193 to Rangoon that Burmese actions wholly unrealistic. In view statement attributed Pe Khin⁶ that troop clashes would renew, make every effort impress Burmese with unwisdom hasty military action.⁷

Smith

1. Also sent to Bangkok, Rangoon, and to USUN for Assistant Secretary Robertson.
2. Dated Sept. 17; the Embassy in Bangkok reported that at the Committee meeting that day, the Burmese representative amended his proposal to require no fewer than 5,000 troops to evacuate within 35 days of the signing of the agreement and the rest within 3 months of the same date. The Chinese representative stated that the proposal was unacceptable and that he did not anticipate making a reply; the Burmese Delegation then withdrew from the conference. (690B.9321/9–1753)
3. Dated Sept. 17; the Embassy in Taipei reported that Yeh had supplied an official estimate that there would be 1,500–2,000 evacuees. He had stated that the Chinese Government was ready to sign the four-power agreement and the evacuation plan, and if the Burmese refused to sign, the Chinese Government desired U.S. and Thai cooperation in carrying out the evacuation as planned. (690B.9321/9–1753)
4. Printed as telegram 193, Document 99. Rankin reported on Sept. 22 that he discussed the matter with President Chiang the previous day, and Chiang told him that there was no difference between them in principle but only in matters of detail and timing and that Yeh was preparing a memorandum on the subject. (Telegram 179; 690B.9321/9–2253)
5. On Sept. 30, the Embassy in Bangkok reported that Thailand concurred. (Telegram 613; 690B.9321/9–3053)
6. Burmese Ambassador to Thailand.
7. Sebald reported on Sept. 21 that he had communicated the substance of this paragraph (Part III) to Kyaw Nyein. (Telegram 252; 690B.9321/9–2153)