Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 2

690B.9321/10–353: Telegram

No. 110
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Burma¹

secret
priority

Washington, October 3, 1953—12:47 p.m.

255. Department believes efforts assist in removal KMT troops in Burma at critical and decisive stage. US Government including President and Secretary State have made great efforts insure maximum feasible Taipei contribution to evacuation, and in context these high-level approaches Chiang being pressed for clear-cut declaration indicating Chinese proposals as submitted September 30² are minimum commitment with every effort obtain added results (Deptel 286 to Taipei).³ If despite above factors GUB cannot see way to acceptance of and cooperation with course of action not words, prospect of any progress through international good offices will have been lost because of Burmese refusal face facts. Department recognizes anticipated evacuation will not constitute final solution of problem which we have all worked for but believes it would represent substantial progress which GUB should not reject.

It is matter of indifference to Department whether GUB cooperation insured through framework Bangkok military committee or at diplomatic level if GUB prefers latter. If however US to continue good offices and assist in implementing action as proposed it appear essential GUB provide written assurances, in diplomatic note if desired, of willingness cooperate. Such assurances should include agreement to: a) stop all attacks on troops in areas from which evacuees to come; b) guarantee safe passage troops to specified border points; c) await committee notification evacuation base points completed before occupying these; d) permit collected arms transit Burma if this becomes necessary. Re point a) GUB should also agree refrain from attacks now.

These considerations should be set forth at appropriate GUB level without delay, after you receive indication Chiang response Deptel 286 if in your discretion and in light of GUB reaction to September 30 such timing preferable. In your talks with Burmese authorities you should point out proposed action is stage in final solution. Make clear continued understanding and sympathy of US Government and its desire continue exploration further useful steps following presently contemplated movement and also of any resistance US Government might be able render GUB toward restoring its authority over its own territory (for example expediting reimbursable arms aid and possibly other forms of assistance which we are exploring). Please also indicate that if this first stage can be completed, US Government would be glad study means continuing its good offices to continue provide facilities further evacuees if any present themselves and to observe activities and possible outside ties of remaining Chinese irregulars.

Dulles

1. Repeated to Bangkok, Taipei, and USUN.
2. Reference is to a statement made at the Sept. 30 meeting of the Joint Committee by the Chinese representative as a supplement to a statement he had made on Sept. 19. Telegram 552 from Bangkok, Sept. 21, reported the Sept. 19 statement as follows: (1) 1,500–2,000 troops plus several hundred dependents were prepared to evacuate; (2) if Burma refused to accept the estimate, China wished to carry out the evacuation as long as Burma did not interfere; (3) after the evacuees withdrew, the remainder would be no concern of the Chinese Government; and (4) Burma’s demands of Sept. 16 were beyond the competence of the Chinese Government. (690B.9321/92153) The Chinese statement of Sept. 30 was reported in telegram 621 from Bangkok, Oct. 1, as follows: (1) The first group of evacuees could cross the Thai border within a week of the arrival of the evacuation teams at the border provided that Burma did not interfere with the operation; (2) the Chinese Government would guarantee the evacuation of the six bases agreed upon earlier by the Joint Committee provided that Burma followed the procedure laid down in that agreement (see Document 95); (3) the Chinese Government had no intention of perpetuating the existence of Li Mi’s forces in Burma by furnishing them with supplies of any kind; and (4) the Chinese Government requested the Joint Committee to ask the Burmese Government to cease immediately its attacks on Li Mi’s troops. (690B.9321/10–153)
3. Dated Oct. 2; it instructed the Embassy to urge that Chiang make a public declaration to this effect, also stating his personal desire that all troops loyal to him leave Burma and warning those remaining that they would receive neither material nor moral support. (690B.9321/10–253)