Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 2

690B.9321/10–553: Telegram

No. 112
The Chargé in the Republic of China (Jones) to the Department of State¹

secret
priority

Taipei, October 5, 1953—6 p.m.

211. Re Deptel 286, October 2, repeated information Bangkok 654, Rangoon 252.² Immediately upon receipt of Department’s telegram I saw Foreign Minister and gave him substance of message. He responded that he and President Chiang had already discussed matter and agreed that the Foreign Minister would make public statement³ to be followed by personal response from President Chiang to President Eisenhower.⁴ This statement, he said, had been drafted and included most of points in Department’s telegram. He would review matter carefully and give sympathetic consideration to points not included.

He raised question as to why there was necessity of repeating reference to six bases since that had been agreed in Bangkok. I responded that failure to make such reference might be misunderstood and since Chinese Government had agreed to turn over these bases, I saw no objection from his standpoint to making such reference. On the other hand, I urged this was the time for the Chinese Government to make as strong a public commitment as possible in order to strengthen its international position and shift responsibility to Burmese for breakdown of negotiations should they refuse to permit implementation of Chinese proposals. Foreign Minister indicated he was convinced and would include reference to bases.

Foreign Minister then said he had received a telegram yesterday from General Liu Yuen-lin, most loyal and reliable of the Generals now in Mong Hsat, to effect that reaction to bombings and artillery attack by Burmese was most unfortunate from standpoint of evacuation program. Eighty individuals who had agreed to evacuate were killed and resentment was rising which might result in others refusing to leave. Chinese Government is urging General Liu to take all steps to combat reversals of decision to evacuate. General Liu also reported he had given orders not to resist Burmese attack and that his troops had held off for six days but he could hold them no longer.

Jones

1. Repeated to Bangkok and Rangoon.
2. See footnote 3, Document 110.
3. For text of Foreign Minister Yeh’s statement, issued on Oct. 8, see U.N. document A/C.1/L.69.
4. The text of Chiang’s letter to Eisenhower, dated Oct. 8, was transmitted in telegram 223 from Taipei, Oct. 8. The letter stated that: (1) The Chinese Government had secured the consent of the leaders of the Chinese irregular forces in Burma to evacuate 2,000 officers and men, together with their dependents; (2) the Chinese Government would continue its sincere cooperation in any evacuation scheme agreeable to all the concerned governments; and (3) it would not maintain any relation with or give any support to those troops who remained in Burma, but the Burmese Air Force had been bombing the points where the troops were concentrating for evacuation and that this had rendered actual movement of the evacuees almost impossible. (690B.9321/10–853)