756D.00/2–2252: Telegram
No. 192
The Ambassador in Indonesia (Cochran) to the Department of State
niact
1249. Have had two conflicting versions of Cabinet mtg 21st a.m., one from PriMin and one from reliable Cabinet friend of longstanding. I give more credence to second version of what took place but submit for Dept’s info account of both.
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PriMin Sukiman called me to his home 6 p.m. 21st. Told me Cabinet had disapproved Subardjo’s granting MSA assurances and accepted resignation as consequence. He asked if Indo cld be permitted change to 511 (b) assurances. I told him I had no auth approve withdrawal from commitment already made by FonMin with knowledge PriMin but wld report facts to my govt.
In answer my question PriMin said Subardjo’s undertaking binding far as Cabinet concerned but he thought parliament wld insist on necessity ratification act and wld disapprove. He feared Indo-US relations wld be damaged by Parliament debate and resulting rejection.
I reminded PriMin neither Natsir’s nor his own govt had seen fit submit for ratification basis ECA bilateral agreement negotiated Oct 1950. I said that when Parliament Comite recently insisted upon internatl agreements being submitted to Parliament, FonOff had provided list those negotiated but not ratified. This list did not include ECA bilateral. He confirmed it required ratification.
In answer my question whether his govt wld now resign, PriMin said decision wld be taken at next mtg provisionally scheduled 5 p.m. 22nd. I asked if decision wld depend upon US attitude toward replacing 511 (a) assurances with (b). He replied affirmatively.
I told PriMin I hoped his Cabinet had not been influenced by polit and press campaign of other countries. I insisted Pakistan, Burma and India had actually signed MSA agreements. I told him I was not at all convinced his govt, after failure submit ECA bilateral for ratification and after now disapproving FonMin’s negot of [Page 271] 511 (a) assurances, wld have spirit or ability defend successfully before Parliament an agreement involving 511 (b) assurances.
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- Visited Cabinet friend 7:30 p.m. Gave him account my talk with PriMin. He expressed disagreement Sukiman version and surprise at his approach to me. He said Cabinet session had not progressed beyond voting disapproval of Subardjo’s procedure in consummating agreement. Said substance agreement not discussed. Said question consulting me with respect substitution (b) for (a) assurances not mentioned in mtg. He interpreted Sukiman tactic as unfair endeavor place responsibility for life Cabinet on US Govt.
My friend said he had opposed Subardjo being required seek any clarification or interpretation. He said Sukiman, Wibisono,1 Leimena2 and he had been constantly in favor 511 (a) assurances, they all realizing Indo need for mil equipment now and perhaps increased aid in future.
My friend confirmed he had given story to press to effect Subardjo’s negots should be considered binding. If govt not willing approve shld resign in toto. To me, he was critical Sukiman’s idea throwing out Subardjo and still trying carry on with same Cabinet. He thought Sukiman only confusing situation further by this last maneuver of appealing to US. He said both Indo and US Govts wld lose prestige through any weakened arrangement. Cabinet had not been canvassed to see whether it wld approve 511 (b) assurances. He was not at all sure Sukiman govt wld present any mutual security arrangement to Parliament and obtain approval thereof.
I was unfavorably impressed by Sukiman’s fumbling and faltering explanations and arguments when we discussed questions. In view my friend’s forthright version am most reluctant place any faith in Sukiman being able see present issue through satisfactorily. I am basically and strongly against US retracting from agreement honorably entered. Moreover, I feel we shld be taking tremendous risk of losing prestige and incurring further misunderstandings if we count on Sukiman getting 511 (b) assurances through Parliament. Fol violent public campaign against MSA, any thing smacking of mutual security undertaking likely be strongly opposed. In addition, there are phrases in 511 (b) such as “to take such action as may be mutually agreed upon to eliminate causes of internatl tension” that wld cause much real or simulated concern and involve us in further clarifications, interpretations, etc. To present, I have refrained from any public statement, leaving opportunity to Indo Govt defend its action and obtain our help. Believe we can, however, wait a little longer to state our position in view [Page 272] attempts Sukiman to horsetrade with us and reduce Indo commitments to lowest denominator of weak Asian power.
I told PriMin I cld not obtain instructions from my govt by evening 22nd and cld not guarantee nature of answer in any circumstances.
See immed following Embtel 12503 summarizing situation and presenting recommendations.