Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 2

796.00/10–3152

No. 317
The Counselor of Embassy in the Philippines (Lacy) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison)

Manila, October 31, 1952.

Dear John: The Ambassador and I have certain “security” reasons for believing that the subject matter with which I am here concerned had best not be passed by telegram, despatch or typed letter; therefore we are obliged to subject you to my poor efforts at penmanship.¹

At about 6:45 P M yesterday evening, October 30, Magsaysay appeared, unannounced, at my house. I received him in the drawing room, where our conversation continued until about 7:20 P M. I shall enunciate the principal heads of conversation in such detail as I can to the end that you have some record of this remarkable incident to fall back on should any of the contingencies described by Ramon M. eventuate.

1. Magsaysay, obviously in a state of great concern, said that he had come from the Palace where the President had said, in the presence of others, that the army must be used to assure the success of the Liberal Party at the next election. This, he said, was to be accomplished through the use of the army “to report the results of the polling”. Magsaysay says Quirino “appeared”² to have made this statement during a temporary “lapse of memory,” forgetting Magsaysay’s presence, and that Q “seemed” chagrined upon realizing that M had overheard the remark. I asked M if he had or would make a record of this statement. M replied that he had a dictaphone in his briefcase which he hoped had picked it up. I expressed astonishment and indignation upon receipt of Q’s alleged purposes.

2. With several burning characterizations of Q as introduction, M stated that he, Magsaysay, could “ruin” Q if we would do two things: a) withhold the extension of the MDAP requested in Monday’s conversation³ until after the elections, and b) allow M to use publicly the Aide-Mémoire in which we accorded to M control of the $10 million fund for certain emergency purposes.⁴ He added, with no little heat, that his people were “through” with Q and still pinned their faith on the U.S. and its friend in the Philippines (meaning M).

I limited my responses to such sounds and gestures as would indicate that I understood him.

3. M then asked what he should do if Laurel wanted to see him to discuss M’s possible candidacy on the Nationalist ticket. To gain time, I interpolated that I had heard that Recto would support him if he resigned from Q’s cabinet with a blast at Q & Co. M appeared to receive this information with surprise and pleasure. Upon M’s asking again what to do with Laurel, I advised him to thank Laurel for the honor, etc., to ask to be allowed to consider the proposal for a while, and to make clear to Laurel the particulars of M’s program for the Philippines. This he agreed to do.

4. M spoke of the Liberal and Nationalist Parties in such terms as to leave me under the impression that he would prefer to run on that [sic] Nationalist ticket to running on the Liberal slate. He said that he was making a fast friend of Recto, Jr., as well as Laurel, Sr. He set no great store by a third party movement, holding the machines of both parties in some respect. He said Laurel liked the army but that the army distrusted Laurel because of his collaborationist record; that Recto was brilliant and patriotic but lacked the common touch; that the army, the J. Cees, Lions & Rotary Clubs would stand by him (Magsaysay) in any free election.

5. Magsaysay, speaking informally, said that I should understand that the lives of Recto, Laurel and Puyat⁵ were in danger; that Q had previously asked M to liquidate them (also Tanada);⁶ and that he himself now slept in a different place every night and had told his wife, Luz, to prepare to leave their house. In answer to my question, he said he was followed by Q’s MKVD and was surrounded at all times by five of his own bodyguards.

6. On several occasions during the conversation M used the expression, “They are moving very fast.”

7. M said Q was filled with bitter resentment by our allusions to clean elections and land reform during Monday’s conversations. He said, however, that because of Laurel’s trouble with the anti-Americanist label, Q had lately emphasized in Cabinet meetings his desire to appear as a great friend of the U.S. M says he isn’t, and will never forget Myron Cowen’s⁷ heavy hand. He added that Q fears and dislikes the Ambassador, and your red-headed friend,⁸ too. He warned us against possible attempts by Q & Co. to assassinate the Ambassador’s and my character. He declared again his belief that he would continue to deal with the symptoms of Communism until the land problem had been solved. He characterized Q & Co. as “agents of the Kremlin” in obstructing the dispensation of justice here.

8. I asked M if he thought Recto, Laurel and Tanada should be warned of their danger. He said yes, that we should do it. I neither agreed nor disagreed to do so.

. . . . . . .

10. I gave M a lecture on his strong position vis-à-vis both parties, his popularity with all levels of honest Philippine society, and his mission to save his country from communism or cheap dictatorship. I exhorted him to keep cool, weigh carefully his chances, and consolidate his control of the army, his popularity with civic groups, etc. I said and he enthusiastically agreed, that the future of his country depends upon the holding of free elections in 1953.

. . . . . . .

Having spoken again of his affection for and confidence in the U.S. and this Embassy, M took his leave.

Now, the Ambassador and I have been speculating on the reasons for this remarkable visitation. The following observations seem to us pertinent to any sensible conclusion:

1. This Embassy has suspected, over a period of years, that the Philippine Govt’s has some fairly reliable means of determining the nature of business transacted here—whether by telegram, despatch or in conversation. We have not been able to find out if our suspicions are justified or if they are, how our friends manage it. Since the Chancery has been “cased” regularly, it occurs to us that the leakage may take place in residences or by way of indigenous personnel here in the Chancery. All this suggests the possibility that M’s visit, doubtless foreseen by Q, was in the nature of a “plant”.

2. Why a “plant”? In reply several things suggest themselves:

a) To determine to whom and when M tells his story, how soon and in what manner the Dept. is informed, etc. (Hence this holograph tour de force of mine.)

b) To determine M’s relations with the Nationalist leadership.

c) To determine this Embassy’s attitude towards M’s candidacy, Nationalist plans, Q’s strategy, etc.

d) To prepare, if the requisite evidence can be adduced, grounds for asking that the Ambassador or I or both be withdrawn, if the going gets too rough later on.

e) To make M out as a tool of the U.S.

This is about the size of it. Very likely other conclusions will prove warranted later on, but we can offer no more now that seems worthy of my cramped right hand, or your abused eyesight. Certainly the situation here is dangerous and suggestive of our [sic] first lines of Swiss Family Robinson.

It was great to see you. Your visit here was a tremendous help to us all. Give my best to the Dulles’, the Secretary, David Bruce;⁹ and by all means Bill Gibson.

Faithfully

William S.B. Lacy

The Ambassador has read all the foregoing and approves it—minus personal remarks last paragraph! WSBL

1. The source text was handwritten by Lacy.
2. Underscored in the source text.
3. Reference is to the bilateral talks held on Oct. 27; see telegram circr 38, supra.
4. The aide-mémoire is not printed. Concerning the fund, see Document 308.
5. Senator Gil Puyat, a member of the Nacionalista Party.
6. Underscored in the source text. Senator Lorenzo Tanada was a member of the Citizens Party.
7. Cowen was Ambassador in the Philippines from March 1949 to November 1951.
8. Presumably this is a reference to Lacy.
9. Under Secretary of State.