PSA flies, lot 58 D 207, “Vietnam Correspondence”
The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs (Bonsal)
[Extract]
Dear Phil: We were exceedingly grateful for the most helpful fill-in on the somewhat turgid situation in Washington which you provided in your letter of February 12. We had, as you no doubt surmised from our recent telegrams, come by a process of deduction in the dark to the same conclusion that, despite all the good will in the world, there was much doubt and soul-searching in high quarters at home as to a) what is wrong with the Indochina situation, and b) what to do about it.
I must say on reading the news magazines and the papers, I am still puzzled as to the degree of gloom which seems to have settled on everyone at home as to the military posture here. Actually in the tactical sense Navarre and Giap have been playing chess with each other. For the life of me, I cannot see why we should be wringing our hands if we consider the fact that Navarre, in his mauling of the 320th division and his later lightning seizure of Dien Bien Phu, completely frustrated the Vietminh’s plans for what might have been a very costly uprising in the Delta. Subsequent developments, such as the thrust to the Mekong and the descent toward Luang Prabang, have successfully been checkmated by Navarre, while to his credit is the Operation Atlante on the coast north of Nhatrang. Navarre has had the courage to continue the pursuit of his strategic plan, and on overall balance, he is in a better strategic position with a greater measure of military strength than he was six months ago. At the same time, the Vietminh are not increasing the size of their armed forces because they have reached the limit of the man power pool upon which they can draw, and even though the Chinese have stepped up deliveries of equipment and supplies, their support in this regard is by no means comparable to the massive supply line which comes from the United States and France.
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