651.51G/3–154: Telegram
The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State
1573. Repeated information Paris 476, Hanoi 248. I talked with De Jean today who leaves March 4 for Paris where he will be present during Franco-Vietnamese negotiations. He expects be absent 15 days.
- 1.
- De Jean said he was extremely pleased with Pleven’s visit which had made an excellent impression on Vietnamese. Pleven, he said, had arrived here with impression that military situation was rather hopeless but had changed his mind on that point. Pleven had been very critical of Vietnamese governmental performance but had been rather agreeably surprised with progress made in Vietnam National Army, although there was still much room for improvement in latter. De Jean said he had made clear to Pleven that Vietnamese were unused to government and one should not expect them to blossom immediately forth with determined, efficient administration. De Jean had told Pleven that present government was certainly best that Vietnam had enjoyed during its five years of independence. Majority of ministers were young, intelligent, and honest. But government had been in office only two months and could not be expected to change administrative picture overnight. He disagreed with Pleven and De Chevigne who thought “screws might be put on Vietnamese Government” and that it would be possible to insist as condition of continuing French support [Page 1089] that Vietnam subscribe to a rigid timetable of administrative and military improvement. As for military side they had already agreed upon program of expansion of Vietnam National Army. On governmental side more could be obtained by suggestion, encouragement, and help than by “putting screws on”.
- 2.
- De Jean said he was still confident that year or 15 months from now Navarre could gain victories over Viet Minh substantial to point of being decisive subject, however, to proviso that Chinese Communist assistance to Viet Minh does not match increased American and French aid. Of course, appearance of Chinese aircraft, however, marked as being Viet Minh would completely alter this situation, but he did not think it was likely that Chinese would undertake this step under present circumstances.
On other hand, Chinese Communist aid was certainly increasing. French intelligence was that from a branch of Kunming railroad, roads were being constructed on both sides of frontier via Laichau to Viet Minh forces investing Dien Bien Phu. At some points along this route rivers were used for reshipment. There was no doubt that, as has been frequently rumored before, Viet Minh forces at Dien Bien Phu now had 37 mm. anti-aircraft guns which would greatly increase difficulties of maintaining Franco-Vietnamese garrison there, which required airlift or airdrop of 80 tons a day. Nevertheless French were confident that Dien Bien Phu can be held.