751G.00/3–1854: Telegram
The Consul at Hanoi (Sturm) to the Department of State
500. Sent Saigon 395; repeated information Department 500. Reference Saigon telegram sent Hanoi 277 repeated information Department 1710.1 Governor Tri believes it would be very difficult for Bao Dai or Buu-Loc government to take any meaningful steps to counteract adverse domestic effects of factors listed in reference telegram until and unless it is possible to present to people of Vietnam convincing documentary evidence that they have in fact regained their complete independence. He is himself (and he states that most persons with whom he is [in] contact here share his feeling) profoundly discouraged by turn which Franco-Vietnamese negotiations have taken in Paris. Tri accepts Commissioner General De Jean’s assurance that most questions of substance have been resolved. He is all the more distressed for that reason to observe how much time is being wasted over questions of form, and [Page 1131] how unwilling French are to give solemn recognition in a suitable document to Vietnam’s independence, particularly at a time when Frenchmen in high places call openly for a negotiated settlement with Viet Minh.
Tri recognizes that French Government may have legitimate scruples about surrendering full political authority here to a government “without roots in the people” (a point brought sharply home to Paris Cabinet by recent activities centering about movement for national coalition and peace). However, French should be satisfied on this point by appropriate guarantees that elections will be held as soon as practicable, and authority turned over to resulting government.
Assuming Vietnamese independence is established in suitable manner, Tri believes it is indispensable at earliest moment set up some kind of national assembly. As general elections are out of the question for time being, Tri thinks it desirable to adopt National Congress of last October as foundation for this assembly, incorporating new members as necessary. He believes that if elections were held, majority of National Congress members would be chosen for new assembly in any case. Tri would not grant assembly legislative powers demanded by coalition, but would, nevertheless, endow it with wide consultative powers and assure it opportunity for debate on all major governmental issues.
Tri remains convinced that there is no real possibility of acceptable negotiated settlement either with Viet Minh separately or with Communist bloc at Geneva. He believes, moreover, that most discerning Vietnamese and French share this view. If Vietnamese independence is given appropriate expression at Paris, he feels that Vietnamese Government can thereafter formulate its position, which to be tenable must be firmly backed by US, in opposition to any surrender, however disguised, to the Viet Minh. In adopting such a stand, Buu-Loc government would reflect the wishes of an overwhelming majority of non-Communist Vietnamese. Government cannot, however, do more than go through the motions unless Vietnamese independence is worthily proclaimed and US can be counted on to prevent any sell-out, at Geneva or elsewhere.
Comment: Above statement appears as reasonable to me as any that can be made from here at this time, pending outcome of battle at Dien-Bien-Phu. While political factors have temporarily taken second place in thinking of most people here, it is indisputable that unless problems stated by Governor Tri are solved, Vietnamese and their government will continue have plausible excuses for their failure make significant contribution to cause of free world. While to solve these problems will not in itself instill distinguished performance by [Page 1132] Vietnamese, to ignore them will assure temporary continuance of an unsatisfactory status quo, followed by further deterioration.
- The reference telegram read as follows: “For next few days it will be difficult for me to come to Hanoi as I had planned. Would appreciate your ideas and those of Governor Tri and other qualified observors Hanoi as to what measures of internal effect might be taken by Bao Dai and Buu Loc Government in view of such events as French Parliamentary attitude in favor of a negotiated peace, the action of certain southern nationalists demanding early elections to a National Assembly and the forthcoming conference at Geneva.” (751G.00/3–1654)↩