751G.00/3–2154
Memorandum for the Record by Captain G. W. Anderson, USN, Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Radford)1
Subject:
- Conversations with General Paul Ely, Chairman of the French Chiefs of Staff on the subject of Indo-China.2
Conversations with General Paul Ely, Chairman of the French Chiefs of Staff, on the subject of Indo-China were initiated on the evening of Saturday, 20 March, at a private dinner at the quarters of Admiral Arthur Radford, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. In attendance at this dinner, in addition to Admiral Radford, were:
- Vice President Nixon
- The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency,
- Mr. Allen Dulles
- Chief of Staff of the Army, General Ridgway
- Mr. Douglas MacArthur II, of the State Department
- General Ely
- General Valluy, the French Mission to the United States
- Colonel Boron [Brohon], Assistant to General Ely
- Captain Anderson, Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Lt. Colonel Cocke, U.S. Army interpreter.
Admiral Radford opened the discussions by welcoming General Ely to the United States, stressing the importance of his current mission to the success of the Free World in combating the menace of Communism in Indo-China. He stressed the hope that General Ely would feel absolutely free to be utterly frank in discussing the current situation, and stating in exact terms his view of what should be done to insure the denial of Indo-China to the Communists. General Ely agreed that [Page 1138] it was necessary and appropriate to be absolutely forthright in facing this issue.
The first facet of the problem which was discussed involved the current attitude in France towards the war in Indo-China. In response to a question by the Vice President, General Ely indicated that there was no doubt that the people of France were weary of the war in Indo-China and its drain on the resources of France, even as were the people of the United States with respect to the termination of hostilities in Korea. This feeling, of course, stemmed from the length of the conflict, the attitude of certain defeatist elements, and the deliberate provocation of such feelings by the Communists. It is probable that the newspaper reports exaggerate in some degree this defeatist sentiment. This particular feeling was not, however, shared by the present government of France, which was determined not to capitulate to the Communists. The true attitude of the French Government has been stated recently by Mr. Laniel, who had set forth the only conditions which would be acceptable to France for a termination of hostilities, and which would involve maintaining the honor of the French Expeditionary Corps. There was no doubt that the particular situation at Dien Bien Phu was being closely followed in France and that the outcome of this battle would have a marked effect on French public opinion. A victory for France at Dien Bien Phu would greatly enhance morale and determination. Conversely, a major defeat would have serious adverse effects.
The discussion then shifted to the question of native leadership in Viet Nam. The Vice President asked General Ely his opinion of Bao Dai, indicating that in his opinion Bao Dai has potentialities to be, in reality, a suitable leader for his people, but that up to the present time he had not exercised effective leadership. It was agreed in general by General Ely that Bao Dai did have suitable qualifications to lead and inspire his people, and that his position as Emperor was a suitable symbol of leadership in addition to his personal qualifications. General Ely indicated that General Navarre was endeavoring to get Bao Dai to take a more aggressive attitude and actually to demonstrate his leadership by public appearances before his people and his armed forces. It was the general consensus that there was not in evidence at this time any other potential leader of Viet Nam.
General Ely then proceeded to outline the situation in Indo-China in which he emphasized that political factors were of great importance. There was no question that the Government of France stood by the July 3rd declaration in which the independence of Viet Nam within the French Union would be guaranteed. General Ely was optimistic over the outcome of discussions presently being conducted in Paris with the representatives of Viet Nam working towards the [Page 1139] implementation of the July 3rd declaration. Progress on the military front was definitely related to ability to achieve success on the political front in order to obtain the full support of the local populace against the Communists. For example, many villages which had been liberated from the domination of the military forces of the Viet Minh would revert to Viet Minh control after the French Union military forces had moved on to engage the Communists in other localities. General Ely indicated that maintenance of suitable control and the pacification of areas from which the Communist military forces had been eliminated was a very difficult problem which had not yet been solved.
General Ely then focused attention on the military situation at Dien Bien Phu. He indicated the strategic purpose of General Navarre in establishing the French strong point at Dien Bien Phu. This involved the establishment of a strong air ground position at a road communication center carefully selected to give protection to Laos. Maintenance of a French strong point in this location required the Communists to concentrate their battle corps against it relieving pressure on the Delta area. The French position at Dien Bien Phu had served to negate the effectiveness of Viet Minh operations directed against Luang Prabang and penetrations into Laos. The French, indeed, had a strong position at Dien Bien Phu but the Communists had concentrated the major portion of their battle corps against it and had gone to extreme measures to build up large supplies of ammunition. Support from the Chinese Communists approaching 4000 tons per month has enabled this build up. The current assault on Dien Bien Phu by the Viet Minh forces was undoubtedly for the purpose of achieving a major political victory to influence public opinion in France and designed to afford the Communists a position of strength from which to negotiate at Geneva. The Communists have taken very high losses already to achieve this success. The French still hold Dien Bien Phu. We could not yet judge how high a price the Viet Minh were prepared to pay for Dien Bien Phu. In General Ely’s mind this price would be so high that the Viet Minh would, in fact, lose the military effectiveness of their battle corps in achieving success, whereas even if the French lost Dien Bien Phu, the French Union forces would have lost only about 5% of their own combat forces in Indo-China. The losses to the Viet Minh would proportionately be very heavy. Therefore, in reality a military defeat was in prospect for the Viet Minh regardless of the outcome of Dien Bien Phu. On the other hand, General Ely fully recognized the serious political consequences of the outcome of this battle. In response to questions, General Ely indicated that the most serious deficiency of the French forces in connection with Dien Bien Phu was in the air. He indicated that there was urgent need for more combat type aircraft. He judged that the prospects [Page 1140] for the French holding out at Dien Bien Phu were 50–50 at this time. Therefore, one could recognize the great political importance attached to the success of the French Union forces at Dien Bien Phu.
Covering the military situation elsewhere in Indo-China, General Ely indicated that operations in South Viet Nam were proceeding in accordance with General Navarre’s plan. He touched only lightly on the situation in the Delta area where Communist operations were causing the French considerable difficulty. General Ely indicated that a military solution in Indo-China was not to be expected in 1954 or 1955.
General Ely indicated that he had with him a detailed list of the most urgent requirements of General Navarre for additional material assistance from the United States. These were being submitted to the U.S. Military Aid Group in Indo-China but General Ely would provide a statement of these needs during his visit. The most urgent item was one for 800 type G–12 parachutes required for the continued support by air of the forces at Dien Bien Phu. He also stated that the French needed 40 more B–26 aircraft for which they would have flight crews by the first of April. He emphasized that the greatest military deficiency was in offensive air forces.
In response to a question by Mr. Dulles, General Ely indicated that General Navarre was fully aware of the importance of guerrilla operations and was proceeding to improve his capabilities in this field. Such forces were in operation in the northern part of Indo-China. He attributed the success of the Viet Minh in this field to the fact that they were waging a politico-military struggle. The French Union forces lacked the political support of the mass of the people.
The discussion was terminated at this point.
- Douglas MacArthur II, Counselor of the Department of State, a participant at this meeting, transmitted copies of this memorandum to Deputy Under Secretary of State Murphy and Bonsal of PSA under notes of transmittal dated Mar. 22.↩
- For General Ely’s account of his conversations in Washington, Mar. 20–25, see Paul Ely, Mémoires: L’Indochinc dans la tourmente (Paris, Plon, 1964), pp. 59–81. For Admiral Radford’s memoir account, see From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam, pp. 391–401.↩