751G.00/3–2354
Memorandum of Conversation, by William R. Tyler of the Office of Western European Affairs1
Subject:
- Visit of General Ely with the Secretary.
Participants:
- The Secretary
- Mr. MacArthur, C
- Admiral Radford, JCS
- Lt. Col. Cocke, OSD NATO
- Mr. Bonsal, PSA
- Mr. Tyler, WE
- General Ely
- General Valluy
- M. Daridan, Chargé d’Affaires, French Embassy
General Ely started the conversation by telling the Secretary how much he appreciated this opportunity of calling on him and telling him how grateful he was for the courtesy and understanding which he had experienced in the course of his present visit. The Secretary said that he was glad to welcome General Ely and that, as he knew, everyone here had the situation in Indochina very much in mind, and in particular the present siege at Dien-Bien-Phu. The Secretary expressed the admiration which he and everyone felt for the gallant garrison.
General Ely then gave an account of the military situation at Dien-Bien-Phu. He said that it was quite evident that the Viet Minh were out to reap political advantages before the Geneva Conference by taking Dien-Bien-Phu, if possible, at any price. He said that it was quite clear that the military value of Dien-Bien-Phu was not such as to justify the tremendous military power which had been brought to bear against it or the equally great sacrifices which the Viet Minh had already expended in attempting to take it. He said he could not predict the outcome of the current fighting and qualified the situation as being serious but not critical as of now. General Ely said that the Viet Minh had only captured the two outposts which they now hold at tremendous [Page 1143] sacrifices amounting to about 6,000 men. He had this very morning received the news that the Viet Minh are continuing to reinforce and bring up to strength the losses in men that they have suffered and that they are receiving constant supplies of ammunition from China itself in this process of reinforcement. He said that bad weather had originally hampered the defense of the Fort but that clear weather of late had enabled the French aviation to harass the besiegers effectively. General Ely said in conclusion that at the end of his recent visit to Indochina with the French Defense Minister, M. Pleven, both had been in complete agreement that the primary factor in Indochina was not so much the military, as the political aspect. He said that the latter was of priority significance and importance in the attainment of a solution of the problem in that area.
The Secretary said he was not surprised that the Viet Minh had committed such strong military forces to try to achieve a dramatic victory even at great cost to itself, just as the North Koreans had attempted to do shortly before the armistice in Korea. He had forecast that to Bidault at Berlin. The Secretary said that the United States wished to help France in Indochina by furnishing such matériel assistance as was appropriate and usable.
Admiral Radford agreed with the estimate of the situation as presented by General Ely and said that he had been very recently in communication with General Trapnell in Indochina. There did not seem to be, said Admiral Radford, anything much that could be done effectively with regard to increased aid to Dien-Bien-Phu within the next three or four days. However he had given orders that some C–119s could undertake napalm bombing. Due to their freight-carrying capacity these aircraft could launch big containers which would burn out a considerable area and help to reveal enemy artillery positions. General Ely agreed that this could be a helpful development.
General Ely then asked the Secretary if he could give him any indication of what the United States would do if MIGs were to intervene in the Indochina fighting. He pointed out that they could only come from South China, since there are no airfields in the area of Indochina controlled by the Viet Minh which are capable of jet fighters. Their presence would therefore signify direct Chinese intervention. Admiral Radford commented that the only planes we have which could be put against MIGs would be F–86s.
The Secretary said that he would not attempt to give an answer now to a question of this importance involving so many factors. He did wish, however, to point out that the issue raised by General Ely was one of extreme importance. If once the United States were to engage itself in actual fighting in the war in Indochina it would thereby create a situation from which it would not be easy for it to withdraw. Therefore, such a development would have to be looked at in terms of the [Page 1144] factors necessary to assure a military success and to sustain the prestige of the United States throughout the world. The Secretary said the United States would hesitate to participate in the fighting in Indochina on the basis of uncertainty as to the political relations necessary for a successful outcome. The United States felt that both on the political and military plane, it was necessary to consider something of a partnership-relationship to assure that the patriotic participation of the local population, and its most effective military mobilization and training, could be assured.
General Ely asked whether the Secretary’s remarks should be taken to imply that he did not have sufficient confidence in the French military command in Indochina. In reply, the Secretary recalled that the United States had had considerable experience in Greece and Korea which might be useful in training the Vietnam [Vietnamese]. He stressed that the factors he had mentioned would have to be taken into consideration by the Government of the United States in reaching a decision on the point raised by General Ely. M. Daridan observed that he felt that there were not many traces of colonialism left in Indochina and that France was doing all it could to give that area its independence. M. Daridan then asked the Secretary whether in the event of intervention by MIGs, the decision as to retaliation against Communist China would be subject to consideration of the factors which the Secretary had just mentioned. The Secretary said that he did not desire to undertake now a “negotiation”, and that the conversation had gone on as far as was useful on this subject. The meeting then came to an end.