751G.00/3–2454: Telegram
The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State
[Received 1:31 p.m.]
1778. Repeated information Paris 563. Re paragraph 1 Deptel 1703 repeated information Paris 32201 and final paragraph Embassy telegram 1762 repeated information Paris 552.2
We submit that French and ourselves would be in far stronger position at Indochina phase of Geneva conference if French Government could find its way clear to accept essence of Vietnamese proposals re independence. As we understand these proposals, France would simultaneously sign two treaties with Vietnam. One would clearly establish absolute independence and sovereignty of Vietnam; second invoking this sovereignty, would trace voluntary relationship of Vietnam within French Union and such concessions, economic or otherwise, and such military alliance as both parties would freely enter into.
Such procedure would do much to convince present attentistes and fencesitters that Vietnam has in fact achieved what Ho-Chi-Minh can never achieve since he is in reality a puppet of Communist imperialism.
If however, French Government refuses present Vietnamese demands and stands on letter of French Constitution and on fourth paragraph Assembly Ordre du Jour of March 9,3 it seems obvious [Page 1156] that Communists will come to Geneva conference with a much stronger hand. They can very convincingly, so far as Asiatic public opinion is concerned, maintain that Vietnamese representatives at Geneva are of inferior status to Viet Minh representatives since Vietnam is not in fact truly sovereign and Viet Minh have consistently held themselves out to be sole champions of nationalism in Indochina. More important, if a plebiscite or national elections should result from Geneva conference, it would be difficult to persuade many people here to vote for Vietnamese Government which had been unable to obtain proof of complete independence at Paris negotiations.
However, if French Government accepts present Vietnamese proposals, situation will be redressed. If Geneva conference leads ultimately to a plebiscite or to eventual elections in a unified Vietnam, we should of course play for time in which to let impact of full sovereignty sink in, and likewise to afford our information media opportunity to convince that half of Vietnamese population which for eight years has been under Communist domination that the independence for which they have fought is an actual thing and brings tangible benefits. Therefore, acceptance now by French Government of Vietnamese proposals will make it possible for free world to convince peoples of Indochina and all of Southeast Asia that Vietnam was able to secure by free grant from France what Ho-Chi-Minh can never win from Communist China.
If Department concurs in this reasoning, we feel that at highest level French Government should be apprised of our views.4
- Paragraph 1 of telegram 1703 to Saigon, Mar. 18, read as follows: “Dept would be delighted at any successful manifestations of political vitality in Vietnam including holding of national elections prior to Geneva Conference if this were feasible. Dept cannot however from here judge extent to which difficulties described by you can be overcome, and as practical matter there would obviously be very great material difficulties in organizing and holding elections prior to April 26. Do you recommend any action by Embassy or Dept?” (751G.00/3–1554) For related documentation on planning for the Geneva Conference, see vol. xvi, pp. 397 ff.↩
- The final paragraph of telegram 1762 from Saigon, Mar. 21, read as follows: “We hope that French Government will agree to accept Vietnamese proposals as signature of convention establishing complete sovereignty would have good effect on public opinion throughout Vietnam, would effectively refute Ho Chi-Minh propaganda that Vietnam is a puppet state, and would do much to rally opinion to a government of national union.” (751G.00/3–2154)↩
- See footnote 2, p. 1103.↩
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Telegram 1766 to Saigon, Mar. 25, also sent to Paris as telegram 3309, read as follows:
“Saigon’s 1778 repeated Paris 563.
“Department impressed with and generally in agreement with reasoning contained reftel. Anything which will perfect independence of Vietnam and increase Vietnamese determination make sacrifices without which that independence cannot be defended against present threat is desirable. Department also concurs general Western position at Geneva in light particularly of Asian opinion will be much improved by French acceptance Vietnamese proposals.
“On other hand, we must face fact that pending further strengthening Vietnamese national army, principal asset of our side at Geneva will be capacity and will of French continue current French military effort until cessation hostilities on terms acceptable our side achievable. Therefore before deciding to express views on this subject to French Government as suggested by Saigon Embassy, Department wishes Paris Embassy’s views particularly on this aspect.” (751G.00/3–2454)
For comments by the Embassy in France on this subject, see telegram 3675 from Paris, Apr. 2, p. 1212.
In a memorandum of Mar. 29 to Robert R. Bowie, Director, and Charles C. Stelle of the Policy Planning Staff, Edmund A. Gullion, also of S/P, stated the following with regard to telegram 1778 from Saigon: “I am entirely in accord with this telegram and only wish that it had come in under the same dateline three years, two years, or even one year ago.” Gullion contended that it would be helpful if Secretary Dulles could present the French with such recommendations as were contained in telegram 1778, even though the French would be “annoyed.” (PPS files, lot 65 D 101, “Gullion”)
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