Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

751G.00/3–2654

Memorandum by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Radford) to the President¹

top secret

[Washington,] 24 March 1954.

Subject:

• Discussions with General Ely relative to the situation in Indo-China.²

1. During the period 20–24 March I conducted a series of discussions with General Ely, Chairman of the French Chiefs of Staff, on the situation in Indo-China. In addition, General Ely conferred with the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of CIA and the U.S. Military Representative to NATO.

2. General Ely requested urgent action to make early delivery of various items of material that had previously been requested through the MAAG Indo-China. These were all arranged to the satisfaction of General Ely except for 14 C–47 transport aircraft which are in critical supply and did not come in the urgent category. Noteworthy is the supply of 25 additional B–26s for a third squadron which will be furnished immediately on a temporary loan basis. A recent request for 20 helicopters and 80 additional U.S. maintenance personnel was discussed and he was informed that it was not possible to grant the request at this time.

3. General Ely made no significant concessions in response to suggestions which would improve the situation in Indo-China, He explained French difficulties involving domestic problems and maintenance of prestige as basic reasons for his non-concurrence. He agreed to explore informally the possibility of accepting limited U.S. assistance in training the Vietnamese, but is generally in opposition.

4. General Ely submitted a request in writing as to what action the U.S. would take if aircraft based in China intervened in Indo-China.³ No commitment was made. The matter is being referred to the Secretary of State.

5. General Ely affirmed the gravity of the situation at Dien Bien Phu stating the outcome as 50–50, and emphasized the great importance of that battle from the political and psychological standpoint. In this I am in full accord but share the doubts of other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to the adequacy of the measures being taken by General Navarre. He was given approval to use C–119 transport aircraft to drop Napalm provided no U.S. crews were involved.

6. General Ely expressed the view that military successes but not total military victory were to be expected in 1954–55, with the presently programmed resources in pursuance of the Navarre Plan. He considers the problem in Indo-China to be political as well as military. Ultimate victory will require the independence of the Associated States, development of a strong indigenous army, manning and defending the Chinese frontier and commitment of resources greatly in excess of those which France can supply. He envisages some sort of coalition by the nations of S.E. Asia.

7. As a result of the foregoing conferences I am gravely fearful that the measures being taken by the French will prove to be inadequate and initiated too late to prevent a progressive deterioration of the situation. The consequences can well lead to the loss of all of S.E. Asia to Communist domination. If this is to be avoided, I consider that the U.S. must be prepared to act promptly and in force possibly to a frantic and belated request by the French for U.S. intervention.

Arthur Radford

Enclosure

Memorandum by the Chairman of the French Chiefs of Staff (Ely) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Radford)

top secret

Washington, 23 March 1954.

The absence of enemy air has been a characteristic of the military situation in Indochina since the beginning of operations. Therefore, an enemy air intervention would carry grave consequences.

On the other hand, the lack of jettable airfields in Vietminh controlled areas leads to the conclusion that any intervention by modern aircraft would start from Chinese territory.

Without prejudging decisions of a general nature which our governments could take in the event of an air aggression starting from China, it seems to me it will be of some use to study the best way of limiting the effects that such an attack might have on the French Air Force units and on the Corps Expeditionnaire even if it were carried out by aircraft of a doubtful nationality; this last assumption has not been made so far.

Can direct intervention by U.S. aircraft be envisaged and, if such is the case, how would it take place?

Contacts have already been made in the past by CINCPAC and the French CinC Indochina on this problem. I feel they ought to be renewed and pave the way for more precise studies and more detailed staff agreements with a view to limiting the air risk which characterizes the present situation.⁴

P. Ely

1. Copies of this memorandum were transmitted to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of Central Intelligence.
2. For Admiral Radford’s memorandum of Mar. 29 to the President’s Special Committee on Indochina, describing the discussions held with General Ely, see United States–Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967, Book 9, pp. 277–285.
3. See Enclosure, below.

4. In his memorandum on the Ely conversations submitted to the President’s Special Committee on Mar. 29, Admiral Radford indicated that he and the general had exchanged a minute which read as follows:

   “In respect to General Ely’s memorandum of 23 March 1954, it was decided that it was advisable that military authorities push their planning work as far as possible so that there would be no time wasted when and if our governments decided to oppose enemy air intervention over Indo-China if it took place; and to check all planning arrangements already made under previous agreements between CINCPAC and the CINC Indo-China and send instructions to those authorities to this effect.” (United States—Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967, Book 9, p. 281)

   A copy of the minute, bearing the typed signatures of Radford and Ely and indicating that the meeting thus recorded occurred on Mar. 26, is in the files of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the National Archives.