Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

State-JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417

Substance of Discussions of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting at the Pentagon Building, March 26, 1954, 11:30 a.m.¹

top secret

March 26, 1954, 11:30 a.m.

Present

• Admiral Radford
• General Ridgway
• General Twining
• Admiral Derveen [Duncan?]
• General Shepherd
• General Lemnitzer
• General Carns
• General Mathewson²
• General Everest³
• Admiral Boone
• General Fox
• General Tate⁴
• Admiral Gardner
• Mr. Murphy
• Mr. MacArthur
• Mr. Bowie
• Mr. Robertson
• Mr. Bonsal
• Mr. Stelle
• Mr. Goodyear
• Defense
• Admiral Davis⁵
• Mr. Sullivan
• CIA
• General Cabell
• Mr. Amory
• NSC
• Mr. Gleason

[Here follow opening remarks and discussion of administrative and procedural aspects of preparations for the Geneva Conference.]

Mr. Murphy then asked Admiral Radford about General Ely’s visit, and noted that the Indochina question had been referred to the Planning Board by NSC on March 25.

Admiral Radford said General Ely had made him pessimistic about Indochina. The General had come over to make an urgent request for matériel, particularly B–26s. He had at first said that the French had no maintenance problem, but rather a problem of lack of spare parts. This had not been Admiral Radford’s information, so a request for clarification had been sent to General Navarre through General Trapnell. The reply had come back (through a French channel) that spare parts had never been critical, but that maintenance personnel had.⁶(General Ely had obviously [been] miffed that someone had crossed him up.)

Admiral Radford continued that the French were getting only 25 flying hours a month out of their planes instead of the 75–100 hours they should. But, the Admiral added President Eisenhower did not want the U.S. Government to be in the position of not letting the French have material which we had available, and which they desperately needed, simply because of a technicality. It had finally been agreed with General Ely that if the French permitted a group of high level USAF officers to investigate on the spot in Indochina, and if it were determined by this group that the French needed and could service additional planes, a third squadron of B–26’s would be made available to the French on a loan basis. Including the 22 we had sent them a few months back, that would make 35 planes they would have which we originally had not planned to give them.

The French also wanted transports and helicopters, the Admiral said. We had turned down the request for helicopters because we could never get them to Indochina in time. You couldn’t fly them there; and there were no mechanics available. The French already have eleven helicopters, it was noted.

Admiral Radford explained that in an overall discussion, General Ely had given the garrison at Dienbienphu a 50–50 chance. We had plainly told the General that we didn’t think the French were doing all they could. For example, why hadn’t they organized a relief column? Impossible, said General Ely. We pointed out that the Viet Minh had driven down to Dienbienphu and back. It was still impossible, according to the General.

General Ely had said that General Navarre had absolute authority, but the Chiefs expressed interest in a despatch from our Consul General in Hanoi indicating a difference of outlook between General Cogny and General Navarre.⁷ It would appear that General Cogny was not happy with certain aspects of the Navarre plan.

When the Admiral discussed the question of training the Vietnamese forces with General Ely, the General had said this was a most difficult problem because of questions of “French prestige”. The French felt that they would lose face in the eyes of the Vietnamese if they invited American military personnel to participate in a training program. It would mean that the solution of the problem was beyond purely French capability. Admiral Radford had countered to General Ely that allowing American participation in the training program might actually improve French prestige because that would show the Vietnamese that the French were really interested in making a success of the exercise.

General Ely had said the French were depressed by Secretary Wilson’s press conference in which he had said that we were trying to get the French to accept a training program participated in by the U.S.⁸

Speculating on the future in Indochina, General Ely had stated that in 1954–1955, military “successes”—but not victories—are to be expected. The General had added that the problem was importantly a political one. It involved the building up of a strong indigenous army. It involved manning the Chinese frontier. The General envisaged a possible coalition in South East Asia, which would be required to hold the line after victory.

Admiral Radford got the definite impression from his talks with General Ely that the French were playing Indochina by ear; that they were not sure of themselves. They took the position that Dienbienphu had been blown up out of all proportion. There could be, the French admitted, unpredictable psychological results if Dienbienphu was not held; the Vietnamese army, according to the General, might even turn on the French. General Ely had admitted all this, but he maintained that the French could hold Dienbienphu if they had extra airplanes and supplies from the U.S.

General Ely had relayed a personal message from Bidault to Admiral Radford indicating an intention to hold the line at Geneva if there were no military catastrophes in Indochina.⁹ On the subject of “negotiations” with the Viet-Minh, General Ely had no illusions. There was no alternative to military victory in Indochina. You either won a military victory, or you lost the Associated States.

According to Admiral Radford, General Ely had stressed in a memorandum his interest in what the U.S. would do if MIGs appeared over Indochina.¹⁰ Admiral Radford had expressed a willingness to investigate the problem without making any commitments.

The Admiral elaborated further on the ramifications of this question. What advance preparation could be made? Would carriers be involved? What about an F–86 squadron? Were there airfields in Indochina capable of servicing an F–86 squadron? To Mr. Murphy’s inquiry concerning whether or not the French would supply the personnel for any jets which we might make available in Indochina, Admiral Radford replied in the negative: introducing jets would involve direct intervention on our part.

At this point Mr. Murphy adverted to Secretary Dulles’ radio and television speech planned for Monday, March 29,¹¹ and said that while it dealt with Communist China and Indochina it contained nothing new or startling in the way of policy.

Admiral Radford then summed up the general JCS feeling concerning General Ely’s visit. He said the Joint Chiefs concluded that the present situation in Indochina was the result of too little too late, and that it might involve the loss of all of South East Asia. The U.S., the Admiral emphasized, must be prepared to act promptly and in force to a last minute French request for help. He added that if the French waited too long before asking for help, there would probably not be much we could do. The business of “nibbling” help made for difficulties. In short, the JCS derived no feeling of strength from General Ely.

At this point, General Ridgway reverted to Dienbienphu. Commenting on General Ely’s estimate that the garrison had a 50–50 chance, General Ridgway stated that he did not agree because the men at Dienbienphu had no alternative but to fight. It was a question of morale. Their lives were at stake.

Discussion then took place concerning the composition of forces at Dienbienphu. Mr. Bonsal noted that while there had been reports of some desertions of the native forces, it had turned out that these reports had probably been engendered by the fact that some of the natives had gone off temporarily to join their families, but presumably planned to return to the front.

Mr. Murphy noted that the Planning Board was scheduled to discuss Indochina on Monday.¹² Mr. Bowie inquired if it would be possible to have the Annex to the paper prepared by the JCS on Indochina. (The Annex referred to apparently dealt with an analysis of the forces required to hold Indochina if the French withdrew.)¹³ Admiral Radford agreed to hunt up the paper and to make it available to State.

General Cabell (CIA) inquired concerning the JCS position on the question of supplying guerilla type arms in Indochina. Should we supply such arms in quantity now, or should we wait, and supply only small amounts at the present time? It was noted that guerilla arms would be of no help in the current crisis.

Admiral Radford replied that among the matters he had discussed with General Ely had been the desire of the U.S. to form a better association with the French in psychological warfare matters.

General Cabell remarked that General Ely had frustrated our efforts to help them by playing the same old broken record about French prestige. He noted that we had supplied some small arms to guerillas, but on no large scale. Apparently the French were not doing much with respect to guerillas.

Admiral Radford noted that Senator Knowland had recently asked him what would happen to all the U.S. equipment in Indochina if there were a disaster there. The Admiral was inclined to think that it would be possible to make provisions to gain control of the equipment in Hanoi warehouses and in other available sites, but that it would be necessary to write off matériel already in French hands.

Reverting to the guerilla question, Admiral Radford indicated that we had no idea concerning (1) the capabilities and (2) the intentions of the natives. He agreed to ask General Trapnell for his opinion of these points. General Cabell indicated that the French were pessimistic both as to native capabilities and intentions. General Ridgway suggested that it would be advisable to hold up initiating any elaborate program with respect to guerillas unless and until we got the basic situation in hand—and momentum in our favor develops. Otherwise, he said, all would be lost.

Mr. Murphy inquired when General O’Daniel was planning to leave for Indochina, and was told sometime early in April. On this note, the meeting came to an end.

1. This State Department draft was not cleared with the participants.
2. Lt. Gen. Lemuel Mathewson, USA, Director, Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff, since Mar. 19, 1954.
3. Lt. Gen. Frank F. Everest, Deputy Chief of Staff, USAF.
4. Maj. Gen. Robert F. Tate, Air Force Member of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
5. Vice Adm. Arthur C. Davis, USN, Director of the Office of Foreign Military Affairs, Department of Defense.
6. The correspondence under reference has not been found in Department of State files.
7. See telegram 512 from Hanoi, Mar. 24, p. 1149.
8. See footnote 3, p. 1158.
9. The message has not been found in Department of State files, or in the files of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
10. For text, see p. 1160.
11. See the second editorial note, p. 1181.
12. Mar. 29.
13. Reference is presumably to the annex to the Planning Board study of Apr. 5. prepared for the National Security Council, or an antecedent draft thereof. Regarding the Apr. 5 report, see footnote 2, p. 1250.