751G.5/3–2754: Telegram
The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State
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[Received 2:25 a.m.]
1806. Repeated Paris 573. General Gambiez, Navarre’s Chief of Staff, called on me this morning at Navarre’s request once more to reiterate absolute urgency of prompt action granting French request for 20 helicopters to be sustained by 80 US mechanics to meet requirement at Dien Bien Phu for evacuating wounded.
Gambiez read most of a top secret telegram from Navarre to French Government giving Commander-in-Chief communication of military situation at Dien Bien Phu. As Gambiez pointed out, an entire page of this 11/2-page message was devoted to problem of evacuating wounded.
Navarre’s estimate of situation is that Viet Minh are faced with two choices: An all-out attack, or a prolonged “smothering operation”. In either event, problem of removing wounded is of paramount importance to French—Navarre informs his government that Intelligence is positive that enemy has sufficient [supplies] in his supply line from China to continue operations at Dien Bien Phu at least until end of April.
Navarre is not optimistic that Viet Minh will grant French requests for truce during which wounded can be evacuated. He suggests, however, that French Government be prepared to give assurances, as is customary under international law with regard to removing wounded from besieged fortresses, that personnel removed under a truce will not again bear arms against Viet Minh. If, however, as he expects, [Page 1178] enemy rejects French request, then two courses of action must be followed:
- 1.
- Every medium of information must be used to show world that Viet Minh are violating laws of war by refusing truce and by deliberately focusing their fire on Red Cross aircraft;
- 2.
- Immediate means must be found, preferably by helicopter, to remove wounded which can be performed by night using US techniques.
General Gambiez added that there was no doubt whatever that Viet Minh were following a deliberate policy of concentrating fire on Red Cross aircraft. He, himself, had participated in a recent parachute drop and, although his plane was hit twice, there did not seem to be any concentrated ack-ack fire at French drop aircraft. This was in contrast to spotter-called fire on French helicopters and C–47s clearly identified by Red Cross markings which had sought to evacuate wounded.
Gambiez said that in order to allay anxiety at home, French Command here had at first given impression that most of wounded were now out of Dien Bien Phu. This, however, is not actually the case. Numbers of wounded increase daily and world must now know what sort of enemy French and Vietnamese are facing at Dien Bien Phu.
I told Gambiez that we would urgently recommend Department do its utmost with our Defense authorities to assure that Navarre’s request for helicopters is promptly met.
I also feel that a statement, either by the President or the Secretary, would be helpful. As Gambiez, who lost his own son to Viet Minh fire on a Red Cross helicopter, very truly said, “I do not expect that enemy will grant a truce for any humanitarian motive. However, he may grant a truce because of his fear of outraged world opinion and his constant concern for the propaganda effect of what he does.”