Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

S/P–NSC files, lot 62 D 1, “Indochina”

Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay) to the NSC Planning Board

top secret

Washington, March 29, 1954.

Subject:

• U.S. Policies with Respect to Certain Contingencies in Indochina

References:

• A. NSC 5405¹
• B. NSC Actions 1019-b, 1074²
• C. Memo for Planning Board, March 26, 1954³

The enclosed Special Annex on Indochina, originally distributed December 31, 1953, and subsequently recalled, is re-circulated in a limited number of copies for the use of the Planning Board in its current consideration of the subject.

It is requested that special security precautions be observed in the handling of the enclosure and that access to it be very strictly limited on an absolute need-to-know basis. All copies of the enclosure will be recalled when the Planning Board completes its work on the subject.

James S. Lay, Jr.

[Enclosure]

Special Annex On Indochina⁴

first contingency

1. If it is determined that in the absence of an offer of U.S. military participation the French would seek to conclude the struggle on terms likely to result in the loss of Indochina to the Communists, the United States should:

Alternative One

[Refuse to commit U.S. forces to the French military effort, accepting the probable loss to the Communists of Indochina, and the necessity for expanded U.S. efforts to prevent the loss of the remainder of Southeast Asia.]⁵

Alternative Two

[Offer U.S. service forces, and if necessary combat forces, subject to mutually acceptable command and strategy agreements, for use in Indochina to prevent the loss of that country to the communists.]

2. In considering any offer of direct U.S. military participation in the French military effort account must be taken of:

a. The risk of large-scale Chinese Communist intervention and of the anti-colonial reactions of countries in the Near and Far East; and

b. The probability that the timely communication to the French and Vietnamese of a U.S. decision to intervene would prevent their reaching a decision to negotiate on unacceptable terms or abandon their present military effort. Because of this probability, the United States should make the fundamental choice between the alternatives in paragraph 1 above, as far as possible in advance of such a decision by the French or Vietnamese.

c. Availability of U.S. forces at the time. (See Enclosure B)⁶

3. If a decision is made to participate with U.S. forces in the French military effort and the French agree to continue the war under these circumstances, the United States should:

a. Seek the perfecting of the independence of the Associated States on terms which would be acceptable to them and to the French, and which would provide maximum safeguards against communist domination.

b. Insist upon the most rapid build-up of indigenous forces and participate in training these forces by providing U.S. officers and equipment either in Indochina or in nearby suitable areas.

c. Negotiate at the highest level the necessary command arrangements.

d. Insist upon maintenance of at least the present level of French forces in the joint effort.

e. Continue necessary U.S. assistance and support.

f. Provide sufficient U.S. forces to make possible the success of the joint effort.

g. Take all diplomatic and political actions which will assist in making clear the purpose of the defense effort and facilitate its success.

h. Explore with the French the desirability of internationalizing the conflict.

4. If the U.S. and French governments should agree to internationalize the conflict, the United States should seek either:

a. To organize a UN effort, possibly through appeal by the Associated States, or

b. To organize a regional effort outside the UN, including as many nations as possible, particularly the following: the UK, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, Burma, the Philippines, and possibly Nationalist China.

second contingency

5. If the French refuse to continue participation in the war in Indochina, despite all offers of U.S. assistance outlined above, the United States should:

Alternative One

[Refuse to commit U.S. forces to replace the French forces in Indochina, accepting the probable loss to the Communists of Indochina and the necessity for expanded U.S. efforts to prevent the loss of the remainder of Southeast Asia.]

Alternative Two

[Urge the French to phase their withdrawal to permit the implementation of one of the following alternatives (See Enclosure A for details):⁷

• Alternative A. Support and intensify the development of indigenous forces and deploy U.S. and Allied forces (ground, sea and air) to Indochina to undertake operations with the objective of reducing Communist activity to the status of scattered guerrilla bands.
• Alternative B. Support and intensify the development of indigenous forces; deploy sufficient U.S. and Allied ground forces to hold critical strong points vacated by the French; and provide air and naval support for such operations as may be taken until such time as indigenous forces can undertake the objective in Alternative A above.
• Alternative C. Support and intensify the development of indigenous forces and provide U.S. and Allied air and naval support for such operations as can be conducted by indigenous ground forces.
• Alternative D. Support and intensify the development of indigenous forces by U.S. supervision of training and provision of necessary logistic support for such operations as can be conducted by the indigenous forces.]

6. The following analysis of alternatives A to D above assumes:

a. There is no resumption of hostilities in Korea. b. The Chinese Communists or Soviets do not intervene in force in Indochina.

c. Combat operations are limited to Indochina.

d. French Union forces will retain essentially their present positions, particularly in the Tonkin Delta, until the withdrawal of French forces from Indochina can be phased with U.S. force commitments. Furthermore, the French will comply with existing agreements concerning MDAP equipment and supplies furnished them in Indochina by the United States.

7. Any significant alteration in these assumptions could result in seriously jeopardizing the success of the alternatives. For example, the force requirements indicated in Enclosure A are based on the assumption that Communist China will not overtly intervene, but will continue a policy of covert assistance to the Viet Minh. However, overt Communist Chinese intervention is a distinct possibility, with which the United States must be prepared to cope should it occur. Logically, it follows that should overt Communist Chinese intervention occur, the United States will be faced with a radically altered military situation in the Far East. Such a possibility would precipitate a situation not unlike that of renewed Communist aggression in Korea. Under such circumstances there is no suitable alternative to a course of action similar to that recommended by the Secretary of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in response to Council Action No. 972—b.⁸

8. The following political actions might be taken prior to or in conjunction with any one or a combination of the foregoing alternatives:

a. Reiterate a previous warning that should the Chinese Communists overtly intervene in Indochina, the United States can be expected to take retaliatory action which might not be confined to Indochina.

b. Seek to obtain UN action to include force contributions in Indochina similar to that taken with regard to Korea, with the provision that the United States be designated executive agent.

c. Seek to organize a regional effort outside the UN including as many nations as possible, particularly the following: the UK, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, Burma, the Philippines and possibly Nationalist China.

9. The four alternatives outlined above possess the following advantages and disadvantages.

a. Alternative A is the most positive and offers the greatest assurance of success. Its disadvantages include an increased calculated risk adversely affecting war plans, major alterations in fiscal and budgetary policies and programs, major increases in military production and mobilization schedules, and a reversal of policy planning to reduce the size of the U.S. Armed Forces. The deployment of U.S. troops in accordance with present policies and commitments limits the number of forces readily available to 5 divisions (including the 2 divisions scheduled for redeployment from Korea in March, 1954), whereas 7 divisions are required for a successful implementation of Alternative A.

b. Alternative B, if resolutely prosecuted, probably offers some chance for success, although considerably less than Alternative A. Alternative B would be satisfactory as a temporary measure, provided that the United States was prepared to follow through with Alternative A, if necessary to succeed in denying Indochina to Communism. Alternative B requires retention of present forces, and increases in military production, and re-examination of fiscal and budgetary policies and programs; but less adversely affects war plans than Alternative A above. Furthermore, it can readily result in a continuing stalemate similar to Korea.

c. Alternative G has relatively simple logistic problems. At best, it provides very questionable assurances of success and would likely result in a military defeat.

d. Alternative D is even weaker than Alternative C and would very likely result in a military defeat.

e. Whether Alternative A, B or C is initially adopted, if U.S. forces engage in combat in Indochina, the United States must be prepared to commit whatever forces are necessary to insure military success.

1. Dated Jan. 16; for extracts, see p. 971.
2. NSC Action No. 1019 is included in extracts from the memorandum of discussion at the 181st Meeting of the National Security Council, Jan. 21, p. 986. For Action No. 1074, see extracts from the memorandum of discussion at the 190th Meeting of the Council, Mar. 25, p. 1163.
3. Reference is to a memorandum by NSC Executive Secretary Lay to the NSC Planning Board, Mar. 26, transmitting a list of points made in Council discussion and an analysis of the problem by General Cutler, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The memorandum and its enclosure are not printed. (S/P–NSC files, lot 62 D 1, “Indochina”)
4. This paper was originally prepared as a special annex to NSC 177 (renumbered NSC 5405). It was recalled as the result of action taken at the 179th Meeting of the National Security Council, Jan. 8; for extracts from the memorandum of discussion at that meeting, see p. 947.
5. Brackets throughout this document are in the source text.
6. Enclosure B, “Availability of United States Forces,” is not printed.
7. Enclosure A, “Detailed Consideration of Alternatives A–D in Paragraph 5 of the Special Annex,” is not printed.
8. In NSC Action No. 972–b, taken by the NSC at its 173d Meeting, Dec. 3, 1953, the Secretary of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were directed to prepare a statement of military objectives and courses of action in the event that hostilities were renewed in Korea by the Communists. At its 179th Meeting, Jan. 8, 1954, the Council approved the State–JCS recommendations. For documentation on this subject, see volume xv.