Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

651.51G/3–3154: Telegram

The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State

secret

Saigon, March 31, 1954—4 p.m.
[Received 8:34 a.m.]

1846. Repeated information Paris 591, Hanoi 320. I saw Buu Loc yesterday following his return from consultation with Bao Dai.

1. He at first implied that the difference between French and Vietnamese points of view as to form of new accords now under negotiation in Paris was not great and he “hoped that present efforts to find a compromise formula would shortly be successful [“]. Later he expressed less optimism on the score and said rather belligerently that if French, specifically Mister Bidault, refused to accept Vietnamese thesis that there must be two distinct accords, the first one unqualifiedly granting full independence to Vietnam, and second expressing Vietnam’s voluntary adherence to French Union, there would be no other course than to call Vietnamese Delegation back from Paris. He argued that Vietnamese thesis had long been known to French and was approved here by DeJean and was really in French interest. He expressed hope that Secretary of State, without going into question of former content of accords, would express to Bidault American hope that present negotiations would terminate and accords be signed before Geneva Conference. I said I would transmit his request.

2. With respect to Conference at Geneva, he was in quandary. He said what French obviously wanted was credible agreement from China that it would stop aiding Viet Minh. China would not give any assurances on that score unless it received counter-advantages or yielded to menaces of action against it in case it refused stop aiding Ho. There was only one country in position to offer advantage or proffer menaces. That was US. He had understood that there would be great objection in US to any move to relax present restrictions on trade with China or to give it advantages even in return for Chinese promises to desist from aiding Ho. Perhaps if French Government could promise US that it would ratify EDC if US would persuade China to stop aid to Ho, American Government might consider making such “concessions” to China. But Buu Loc did not believe that present French Government could make good on promise of French ratification of EDC.

I listened to these speculations on American attitude and policy without comment. Buu Loc went on to say that even if Chinese Government gave assurances it would not continue to support Viet Minh, these assurances would be valueless. Aid would continue but Chinese Government would pretend that it was result to [of] private contracts with Chinese or foreign businessmen, and it was beyond Chinese governmental power to keep it from passing across frontier.

Begin Noforn. Buu Loc said that he wanted to tell me in strictest confidence that personally he was unalterably opposed to Vietnamese Delegation sitting down at conference table with Viet Minh Delegation, thereby extending to latter a sort of political recognition. He would resign as Chief of Government rather than preside or send such delegation. In fact, he had told Bao Dai when latter had entrusted him with forming government that his only condition was that he would not have to negotiate with Viet Minh. While that was his personal feeling now, he was very careful not to say so to Bidault because Bidault might well seize on such a statement as a pretext for either complicating or termination present negotiations in Paris or negotiating with Ho Chi-Minh without consultation with Vietnamese Government. Buu Loc then qualified his objection to Vietnamese representation at Geneva Conference by saying that unforeseen developments might make it necessary or advisable for Vietnam to send a delegation to Geneva, if invited to do so. In that case government would send strongest, most representative delegation, including representatives of all political groups and the sects. End Noforn.

3. With regard to his announcement of formation of National Assembly,¹ he could not enlarge on that at present for several reasons. First of all important thing was of course, not National Assembly but formation of a war Cabinet to insure a more determined and efficient prosecution of war. Formation of Assembly must come as secondary step and whatever powers it might be entrusted with must not be allowed to interfere with powers of war Cabinet or interfere with prosecution of war. In any case, he could not form a National Assembly until he had settled his difficulties with Cao Daists and that might not be easy since matter had very great pretentions. He could form a government without Cao Daists participation but a National Assembly without such participation was unthinkable. He had less worries about coming to terms with Hoa Haos.

He could hardly come to terms with Cao Daists, however, without French support. Fact was that since 1947 Cao Daist auxiliary troops had been under French command and paid by latter. French must stop paying these auxiliary troops and turn them over to Vietnamese National Army for pay and command. Buu Loc added that Vietnamese budget could hardly be stretched to take on this extra expense and it might be necessary for France and/or US to turn over to Vietnam Government money they were now paying Cao Dai troops.

4. I said to Buu Loc that we had been much struck with his promise to punish and prosecute grafts in government aid. I thought that successful prosecution of proven cases of corruption would be well received in country and enhance popularity of his government. Buu Loc said that he thoroughly agreed and he had not renounced this ambition but it was no good punishing a score or so of petty officials; what was needed would be conviction of three or four highly placed grafters in previous governments. That would be very difficult indeed to do—but not impossible, he said. He added that he might take a leaf out of the Egyptian book and proceed against wives of these formerly highly placed individuals in whose names proceeds of peculations have usually been placed. Comment:Buu Loc refused to specify any accusations but it is legitimate to assume that he had in mind common law wife of former Prime Minister Tam, who is frequently locally referred to as “Queen of Blackmarket”.

Heath

1. Upon his return to Saigon on Mar. 29 having conferred with Bao Dai at Dalat, Buu Loc announced the formation of a “war cabinet” consisting of certain ministers and the Army Chief of Staff. He also announced the immediate beginning of planning for the convening of a national assembly, the nature and powers of which he did not specify. (Joint Weeka No. 14, Apr. 4, 1954; 751G.00(W)/4–454)