PPS files, lot 65 D 101, “Indochina”
Memorandum by Charles C. Stelle to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Bowie)
Subject:
- Prospects for a Regional Grouping to Support Action in Indochina1
1. General
A U.S. decision that in the last analysis it would commit its forces into Indochina to prevent the loss of that area to the Communists, if accompanied by U.S. willingness to undertake long term commitments for the defense of Thailand and Malaya, would provide a basis on which a regional grouping for Southeast Asia could be constructed. No one of the countries of the area would accept a regional organization that entailed military commitments if the U.S. were not committed to [Page 1196] military participation. But a clear U.S. commitment to employ its own forces in defense of Indochina, Thailand, and Malaya would provide cement for an alliance.
2. Australia and New Zealand
Australia and New Zealand treasure their association with the U.S. in ANZUS. They would not be happy to have this organization diluted by expansion. Nevertheless their interest in the defense of Southeast Asia, together with the embarrassments which U.K. exclusion from ANZUS has occasioned them, would probably lead them to acquiesce in expansion of ANZUS to include both the U.K. and mainland countries of Southeast Asia. They would support military operations by such a regional organization in Indochina, always provided the U.S. bore the major military burden.
3. U.K.
The U.K. is already irked by its exclusion from ANZUS. The U.K. has direct interests in Malaya and the stability of Southeast Asia. The U.K. is disposed to be benevolent towards the idea of local U.S. armed intervention in Indochina, if absolutely necessary. In return for a U.S. guarantee of Malaya, the U.K. would probably be more than willing to participate in a regional grouping of Southeast Asia, and to give token support to U.S. military action in Indochina under the aegis of such an organization.
4. France
The French would far prefer a solution in Indochina which did not involve U.S. military intervention under any aegis. If U.S. intervention were indispensable they would probably prefer to have the U.S. alone. If the French were assured, however, that there were no way out of their Indochina difficulty except through participation in a regional organization, they would prefer such a way out to a U.N. sponsorship of the Associated States. The French would probably reluctantly go along with participation in a regional organization, but would expect, in due course to slough off their Indochinese responsibilities on such an organization.
5. Associated States
The Associated States, although fearful of the possibilities of Chinese Communist intervention, would on balance welcome U.S. military participation in Indochina under any auspices. They would expect such participation to bring victory over the Vietminh and to strengthen their own position against the French. They would probably prefer U.N. sponsorship of U.S. military participation, but would be more than willing to participate with the U.S. and the other [Page 1197] “white” and mainland countries in a Southeast Asia organization which would bring them U.S. military support.
6. Philippines
The Philippines are reluctant to assume the responsibility for leadership in organizing Southeast Asia, but would readily go along with a U.S. effort in that direction in the light of a U.S. decision to commit its own military resources to the Southeast Asian mainland. The Philippines would probably give at least token military support to action in Indochina.
7. Thailand
If a Southeast Asia grouping were constructed, Thailand would seek lasting guarantees from the U.S. In return for such guarantees the Thais would participate in a regional organization, would make available bases and facilities for U.S. military operations in Indochina, and would possibly provide token military forces.
8. Neutralists
Burma, Indonesia, Ceylon and India would for the foreseeable future abstain from any U.S. sponsored regional organization which had military implications.
9. Formosa and Korea
The Chinese Government on Formosa would seek admission to a regional organization in the hope that military action in Indochina would lead to a general war with Communist China and the possibility of Nationalist restoration to the mainland. Similarly the ROK would favor an organization which would undertake military action in Indochina, in the hope that such action would lead to the reopening of hostilities in Korea. President Rhee would undoubtedly feel that his possibilities of involving the U.S. in renewed Korean hostilities would be materially enhanced by U.S. military operations in Indochina, and would look with favor on anything which seemed to lead to this end. Both the Chinese Nationalists and the Koreans would, therefore, attempt to stimulate the extension of any operations which the U.S. initiated in Indochina, whereas the other potential members of a Southeast Asian organization would strongly favor localization of hostilities.
10. Japan
The Japanese would not feel that they could materially contribute to or benefit from a Southeast Asian organization. They would probably not actively seek admission, but would give unenthusiastic support to such an organization.
[Page 1198]Conclusion: A U.S. decision to commit forces into Indochina if necessary would make possible construction of a Southeast Asia Organization (SEATO?). Such a decision would have to be accompanied by U.S. willingness to undertake long term commitments for defense of Thailand and Malaya, which would, however, be implicit in the first U.S. decision. In such circumstances it would be possible to secure the adherence of Australia, New Zealand, the U.K., France, the Associated States, Thailand, and the Philippines in an organization devoted to local defense of Southeast Asia. Formosa and Korea would want to join, but with the hope of expanding any hostilities that might occur. Japan would give unenthusiastic support. The neutralist countries would abstain. ANZUS might be expanded to encompass the larger group, although there would be no material obstacles to creation of a new organization.
- For documentation on the formation of a regional grouping in Southeast Asia, see volume xii.↩