Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Memorandum of Discussion at the 191st Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, April 1, 1954¹

top secret
eyes only

April 1, 1954.

[Extracts]

The following were present at the 191st meeting of the Council: The President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Acting Secretary of Agriculture (for Item 1); Mr. Anderson for the Secretary of Commerce (for Items 1 and 6); the Acting Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers (for Item 1); the Deputy Secretary of Defense; Mr. Davis, Assistant Secretary of Agriculture (for Items 1 and 6); Mr. Clarence Francis, Special Consultant to the President (for Item 1); Lieut. Everhart, USNR, Department of Defense (for Item 4); the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Acting Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President; Mr. Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President; the Acting White House Staff Secretary; Mr. Harlow, Administrative Assistant to the President; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting, together with the chief points taken.

. . . . . . .

4. Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security

Admiral Radford announced that he had invited Lieutenant Everhart, USNR, of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to provide the Council with a briefing on the military situation at Dien Bien Phu.

At the conclusion of his presentation, Lieutenant Everhart answered various questions, and Admiral Radford pointed out that in the last two days many airdrops of French supplies had fallen into the hands of the Vietminh, which presented a serious problem for the garrison at Dien Bien Phu. Unless this garrison were reinforced, Admiral Radford saw no way to save the situation.

The President said that he understood that the reserves available to General Cogny consisted of three parachute battalions. Admiral Radford replied that this was the case, and the President went on to say that he still couldn’t understand this military action. Why had the French ever committed forces to a remote area where these forces could not be reinforced? Nevertheless, the plight of the French certainly raised the question whether the United States ought now to consider any kind of intervention to help save Dien Bien Phu. He understood, said the President, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, except for the Chairman, were opposed to an airstrike using U.S. planes and pilots.² This was certainly a question for “statesmen”, and while the President said he could see a thousand variants in the equation and very terrible risks, there was no reason for the Council to avoid considering the intervention issue.

The Secretary of State asked whether there was anything we could do in time to save the French at Dien Bien Phu. Admiral Radford replied that some help could be got to them by U.S. forces as early as tomorrow morning if the decision were made. The President, however, said that he would let the subject drop for the moment but would meet with certain of the members of the National Security Council in his own office at the conclusion of the Council meeting. (Copy of Mr. Cutler’s notes on this meeting filed with the Minutes.)³

The National Security Council:

a. Noted and discussed oral briefings by a representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by the Acting Director of Central Intelligence on the military situation in Indochina.

. . . . . . .

1. Prepared by S. Everett Gleason, Deputy Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, on Apr. 2.
2. See memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense, Mar. 31, p. 1198.
3. No record of the meeting under reference has been found in Department of State files or at the Eisenhower Library. (The “minutes” have also not been identified.) The records of the Secretary of State’s phone calls on the afternoon of Apr. 1 provide the following information: At 2: 27 p.m., Dulles informed Attorney General Brownell that something fairly serious had come up after the morning NSC meeting. Dulles was working on it with Legal Adviser Phleger. Dulles indicated that if there was to be a meeting with Congressional leaders the following day, he would like to have something to show them. At 2:54 p.m., Dulles informed the President that he was going ahead with arrangements for a Congressional meeting on the following day. He would have a draft to show the President in the morning. At 3:01 p.m., Dulles told Admiral Radford that he was going ahead with the meeting and had confirmed the matter with the President. Radford pointed out that time was a factor, that the President might be criticized for not doing something in advance should a disaster occur. It was agreed that a meeting would be held on Apr. 2 if feasible, otherwise on Apr. 3. Secretary Dulles said that it was necessary to consider methods for restraining the Chinese Communists by means of air and sea power. Dulles and Radford agreed that Congress must be convinced that the job which the Administration wanted to do could be done without sending manpower to Asia. Admiral Radford said that he didn’t know whether the President wanted him to explain what steps had been already taken. FOA Director Stassen called Secretary Dulles at 5: 55 p.m. to discuss forthcoming Congressional testimony by the Secretary regarding the Mutual Security Program. Stassen suggested that Dulles point out that in 1953 and 1954, for the first time in seven years, no territory had gone under Communist domination. The Secretary said to watch out, that Indochina might go under. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, “Telephone Conversations”)