396.1 GE/4–154: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Australia1
158. For the Ambassador. I have talked to Spender and to Munro on importance of stiffening French resistance to any negotiated settlement on Indochina in immediate future and will probably see them again next week.
Deptel 3353 of March 27 to Paris2 outlines our concern over trend in France. As to UK we were disturbed at Berlin by Eden’s position on Indochina which was in effect that this was problem between US and France, with the UK standing on the sidelines as an uninterested party, situation which actually encouraged French seek negotiated settlement. This was not only unhelpful but unrealistic, since if Indochina goes, Malaya, Australia and New Zealand will be directly threatened, [Page 1205] as will be Burma, Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia, and over period of time Japan and whole off-shore island chain.
It seems to us one of best ways keep French from taking any steps which might prove disastrous re Indochina is for US and UK have solid alignment and let French know we will not only not be party to but will actively oppose any solution of any kind which directly or indirectly in near future or over period of time could lead to loss Indochina to Communists.
On position of Communist China at Geneva, we have told UK and French Embassies firmly and categorically we will not agree to any procedural arrangement which gives Communist China, directly or by implication, special position different from that of participants other than US, UK, France and USSR. In particular we would not agree to any proposal that Communist China would be consulted by US, UK, France or USSR re composition of Indochina phase of Geneva Conference. As practical matter we would expect that Soviets would in fact consult China but tripartite agreement at Berlin clearly would preclude any consultation with China by Western Big Three since in fact such consultation would give China a special status. We would reject any proposal, precedural or otherwise, which would give Communist China a special place or imply a “Five Power” concept.
Spender gave us paper on Australian participation in Indochina phase of Geneva Conference.3 We are studying this, but do not expect decisions to be made on this and other procedural questions until after there has been further discussion with British and French. Decisions on Indochina phase may not be made until after Conference starts.
Guided by background in this telegram and others being repeated to you, as well as by my speech March 29, I hope you will take appropriate occasion to spell out our views in discussions with top officials (including Prime Minister) with view to their governments taking similar line with British. You should not, however, go so far as to request them formally to do so.
- Drafted by Outerbridge Horsey, Officer in Charge of Commonwealth Affairs. Also sent to Wellington as telegram 128.↩
- For text of telegram 3353 to Paris, Mar. 27, see vol. xvi, p. 485.↩
- The Australian paper, an aide-mémoire of Mar. 24, is not printed. (396.1 GE/3–2454) For text of the memorandum of Ambassador Spender’s conversation with Deputy Under Secretary Murphy of that date, see vol. xvi, p. 480.↩