Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

751G.00/4–254

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Drumright)¹

top secret
eyes only

[Washington,] April 2, 1954.

Subject:

• Indochina

Participants:

• Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador
• The Secretary of State
• Mr. R. H. Scott, British Minister
• The Under Secretary of State
• C—Mr. MacArthur, Counselor
• EUR—Mr. Merchant, Assistant Secretary
• FE—Everett F. Drumright

Sir Roger Makins, accompanied by Mr. Scott, called at the Secretary’s request. The Secretary said that he wished to discuss the Indochina situation. The situation in Indochina had reached a serious stage. There was a threat of a French collapse or of a French desire to reach a settlement on terms which would result in the loss of Indochina and the rest of Southeast Asia to the Communists. There was a need, therefore, to encourage the French and to keep them from reaching a settlement at Geneva or elsewhere which would be disastrous to the French and the free world. His speech of March 29, the Secretary said, was designed to meet this situation. It had been carefully considered and had received the approval of the President. The Secretary then called particular attention to that portion of the speech which said that the imposition on Southeast Asia of the political system of Soviet Russia and Communist China would be a grave threat to the whole free community and which said that that possibility should be met by united action. The Secretary indicated that this passage was directed not only to the French but to the Chinese Communists on whom he hoped it would have a deterrent effect.

The Secretary said that the situation in Indochina had been considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff who had expressed doubt whether the two-year Navarre Plan could be accomplished, even with our very substantial military and financial assistance. Even now the situation in Dien Bien Phu was critical and the possibility existed that the French defenders would be overwhelmed, bringing in its train possibly serious repercussions in France, including a public demand to withdraw from the war. Even if Dien Bien Phu could be held and the French were able to maintain the present military situation until the monsoon rains came, when there would be an abatement of military operations, the possibility existed that the French would go to Geneva to seek a settlement either through the Conference or directly, which would lead to the loss of Southeast Asia. The U.S. Government had of late been giving serious consideration to this matter and had come to the conclusion that we could not stand by passively and let Southeast Asia go by default to the Communists.

The Secretary then said that Britain, with her interests in Malaya and her ties with Australia and New Zealand, had a big stake in Southeast Asia. The French, the Australians, the New Zealanders, the Thai, the Filipinos, the Associated States, the Burmese and others, also had important interests at stake. The Secretary said he believed that the interested states should consider together what they should do to checkmate Communist efforts to take over Southeast Asia. If this were not done now, the situation would be much worse in three or four years and might lead to a world conflict. The Secretary had therefore thought it desirable to call in the British Ambassador, discuss our thinking with him and ask him to report to his Government. The Secretary said that in particular he believed that the U.S. and the U.K. should attempt to arrive at a common position which would be designed to encourage the French not to engage in a sell-out of Indochina, and also consider some broader collective security arrangement which could be utilized to keep Southeast Asia out of the hands of the Communists irrespective of what position the French might finally adopt. The Secretary would welcome Her Majesty’s Government’s views.

The British Ambassador said that his Government recognized the serious state into which the situation in Indochina had deteriorated and apparently even regarded it in more pessimistic terms than the U.S. Government. Sir Roger then said that the British position thus far had not gone beyond seeking some formula which would stop the war and yet keep Indochina out of Communist hands. He said that the British Government had considered such solutions as a cease-fire, coalition, free elections and even partition. The British Government recognized that none of these solutions is satisfactory. Indeed, in the present state of affairs in Indochina, all are disadvantageous and might prove disastrous. Of the four solutions mentioned, Sir Roger believed that partition was the least undesirable. It would at least afford a breathing spell and perhaps a chance to consolidate in a part of Indochina and the remainder of Southeast Asia. Sir Roger indicated that the British Government, although it recognized the dangers inherent in a French withdrawal, had given no consideration to active military participation either in company with the French or in some broader grouping. Sir Roger said that he shared the Secretary’s view that the Indochina problem merited further consideration and that he would be glad to put the Secretary’s views to his Government.

Sir Roger inquired just what the Secretary had in mind in regard to united action. The Secretary replied that this question, along with other aspects of the Indochina situation, was under active study at this time and that he could not discuss it in detail. But what he had in mind, however, apart from a strong united front at Geneva, was some kind of a collective organization of free world countries which shared common interests in Southeast Asia. These would include the United States, Great Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, (these last three with which we have security pacts), the Associated States, and Thailand. The general idea would be for these states to band together in some kind of common defense of Southeast Asia. In reply to a further inquiry from the British Ambassador, the Secretary said that the question of United Nations intervention had been considered in a preliminary way and, although he did not want to rule it out entirely, there were a good many difficulties in this course of action. These included not only the veto in the Security Council but the question of whether a two-thirds majority could be obtained in the General Assembly. In reply to a further query, the Secretary said that there was no intention of bringing the ROK or the Chinese National Government into any Southeast Asia collective political grouping, short of a general conflict in the area.

In the course of the conversation, the Secretary discussed the concept of the deterrent action directed toward Communist China. If the Chinese Communists could be made to see that stepped-up activities on their part in Southeast Asia could lead to disastrous retaliation on our part by sea and air, perhaps they could be persuaded to refrain from adventures in that area. If so, Southeast Asia could be saved from communism and probably a world wide conflict avoided. In any case, the Secretary said, we felt the risk is justified. The alternative of sitting passively by and letting the Communists overrun Southeast Asia was, in the Secretary’s view, likely to lead to greater risks and disaster in the long run. Furthermore, the Secretary explained, the atomic balance, which is now advantageous to us, might decline over the next four years. The British Ambassador indicated that this point of view had merit and said that he would convey it to his Government. At this point, the British Ambassador suggested that it would be useful if the British military liaison officers in Washington could exchange views with our JCS in this regard. The Under Secretary said, after some discussion, that arrangements would be made with Admiral Radford for a meeting some time in the latter part of next week.

In response to a further inquiry from the British Ambassador, the Secretary said he hoped that some action on the subjects under discussion could be taken prior to the Geneva Conference. He had already seen the Australian and New Zealand Ambassadors and he would be seeing the French Ambassador on April 3 and would be discussing the subject in general terms with him, but not in as full detail as the foregoing. The British Ambassador said that he would report the substance of the conversation to his Government and hoped to be able to transmit the views of his Government at some later date.

1. The log of the Secretary’s daily appointments indicates that this conversation occurred at 3 p.m. (Princeton University, Dulles papers, “Daily Appointments”) A brief summary of this conversation was transmitted to London in telegram 5177 of Apr. 4, repeated for information to Paris as telegram 3478. For text, see United States–Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967, Book 9, p. 295.