Office of the Historian

751G.00/4–554: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State

top secret
niact
Paris, April 5, 1954—1 a.m.
[Received April 4—9:43 p.m.]

3710. Limit distribution.1 Urgent. I was called at 11 o’clock Sunday night2 and asked to come immediately to Matignon where a restricted Cabinet meeting was in progress.

On arrival Bidault received me in Laniel’s office and was joined in a few minutes by Laniel. They said that immediate armed intervention [Page 1237] of US carrier aircraft at Dien Bien Phu is now necessary to save the situation.

Navarre reports situation there now in state of precarious equilibrium and that both sides are doing best to reinforce—Viet Minh are bringing up last available reinforcements which will way outnumber any reinforcing French can do by parachute drops. Renewal of assault by reinforced Viet Minh probable by middle or end of week. Without help by then fate of Dien Bien Phu will probably be sealed.

Ely brought back report from Washington that Radford gave him his personal assurance that if situation at Dien Bien Phu required US naval air support he would do his best to obtain such help from US Government.3 Because of this information from Radford as reported by Ely, French Government now asking for US carrier aircraft support at Dien Bien Phu. Navarre feels that a relatively minor US effort could turn the tide but naturally hopes for as much help as possible.

French report Chinese intervention in Indochina already fully established as follows:

  • First. Fourteen technical advisors at Giap headquarters plus numerous others at division level. All under command of Chinese Communist General Ly Chen-hou who is stationed at Giap headquarters.
  • Second. Special telephone lines installed, maintained and operated by Chinese personnel.
  • Third. Forty 37 mm. anti-aircraft guns radar-controlled at Dien Bien Phu. These guns operated by Chinese and evidently are from Korea. These AA guns are now shooting through clouds to bring down French aircraft.
  • Fourth. One thousand supply trucks of which 500 have arrived since 1 March, all driven by Chinese army personnel.
  • Fifth. Substantial material help in guns, shells, etc., as is well known.

Bidault said that French Chief of Air Staff wished US be informed that US air intervention at Dien Bien Phu could lead to Chinese Communist air attack on delta airfields. Nevertheless, government was making request for aid.

Bidault closed by saying that for good or evil the fate of Southeast Asia now rested on Dien Bien Phu. He said that Geneva would be won or lost depending on outcome at Dien Bien Phu. This was reason for French request for this very serious action on our part.

He then emphasized necessity for speed in view of renewed attack which is expected before end of week. He thanked US for prompt action on airlift for French paratroops. He then said that he had received [Page 1238] Dulles’ proposal for Southeast Asian coalition, and that he would answer as soon as possible later in week as restricted Cabinet session not competent to make this decision.

New Subject. I passed on Norstad’s concern that news of airlift (Deptel 3470, April 3)4 might leak as planes assembled, Pleven was called into room. He expressed extreme concern as any leak would lead to earlier Viet Minh attack. He said at all costs operation must be camouflaged as training exercise until troops have arrived. He is preparing them as rapidly as possible and they will be ready to leave in a week. Bidault and Laniel pressed him to hurry up departure date of troops and he said he would do his utmost.

Dillon
  1. The source text included the following note with regard to distribution: “This message was read by Mr. MacArthur (C) at 10:15 p.m. and he informed the Secretary, Under Secretary Smith, Mr. Merchant (EUR) and Admiral Radford at 10:30 p.m. 4/4/54.”↩
  2. Apr. 4.↩
  3. The pledge by Admiral Radford is cited by General Ely in his memoirs (Paul Ely, Mémoires: L’Indochine dans la tourmente, pp. 76–77, 82–83). U.S. records of the meetings between General Ely and United States officials at Washington, Mar. 20–26, 1954, contain no reference to such an undertaking by Admiral Radford. Regarding the Ely visit, see pp. 1137–1160 passim. See also memorandum of Eisenhower–Dulles telephone conversation of Apr. 5, p. 1241.↩
  4. For text, see footnote 1, p. 1219.↩