751G.00/4–654: Telegram
The Ambassador in India (Allen) to the Department of State
1515. Repeated information Bonn 1, Karachi 218, Colombo 58, Bangkok 20, Saigon 13, Rangoon 36, Wiesbaden unnumbered. Wiesbaden for CINCUSAFE. Reference Embassy telegram 1514, April 6.1 [Page 1267] In presenting request to Prime Minister Nehru for airlift of French troops across India to Indochina, I said that judging from limited number of aircraft to be employed, number of French troops involved in transit operation was very small in comparison with masses of Vietminh forces hurled at Dien Bien Phu during last six weeks. I pointed out that Vietminh had launched heavy attacks almost immediately after his (Nehru’s) call for cease-fire on February 22. In other words, at very time Nehru himself was endeavoring to obtain relaxation of fighting to create more propitious atmosphere for Geneva Conference, Vietminh had taken offensive, throwing in troops, regardless of casualties. I said we could not accept this lying down and were determined to prevent break-through which would threaten all India’s eastern neighbors. I hoped he would cooperate in this effort.
Nehru acknowledged that Vietminh had taken initiative in recent fighting and indicated understanding of our reaction. At same time, he said question of transit of French troops and war materials across India had come before House several times during past three years and he had repeatedly assured House that no permission for such transit would be given. He said he could not violate this commitment. Only difference he perceived in present request was that it came from United States instead of France, but principle involved was entirely same.
I asked whether planes could overfly India without landing. He said his commitments had extended to overflights, as well as landings, and that he could not agree to either.2
I repeated that India would not wish to leave her eastern neighbors open to floodgates of Communist aggression and that our present effort was to restore situation to position it was when he made his cease-fire appeal. Nehru asked if I was trying to get him to change his policy. I said I was trying to consider what was in India’s over-all national interests, as well as that of free world.
At this point, Nehru asked me what I thought Secretary Dulles had meant in his statement which appeared in the press today that Communist China had come very near to creating situation which would invoke all-out American response. (Indian press carried statement in box frame, headed “Mr. Dulles Talks of Invasion of China.”) I pointed out that Mr. Dulles had referred to manning of anti-aircraft guns by Chinese and said I thought Mr. Dulles was giving a further warning that if Chinese fighting men, whether regular troops or so-called volunteers, entered Indochina war, widespread hostilities might result. I emphasized that responsibility rested squarely with them [Page 1268] whether hostilities would be extended and that we could not be blamed for not having warned them in advance.
Comment: Conversation was serious, but courteous throughout and there was no tendency on Nehru’s part to engage in polemics.3
- In telegram 1145 to New Delhi, Apr. 4, the Department of State instructed the Embassy to seek approval for landings or overflights in connection with the proposed airlift by the U.S. Air Force of French troops from France and North Africa to Indochina. The same message was sent to seven other posts in countries on the projected flight route. (751G.00/4–454) In telegram 1510 from New Delhi, Apr. 5, Ambassador Allen reported having requested an urgent appointment with Prime Minister Nehru. N. R. Pillai, the Secretary General of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, had stated that the request could not fail to worsen U.S.-Indian relations and would certainly be refused by the Prime Minister. (751G.00/4–554) Telegram 1514 from New Delhi, Apr. 6, read as follows: “Permission to land or overfly India denied by Prime Minister Nehru. Details of conversation follow.” (751G.00/4–654)↩
- The airlift as conducted later in April avoided Indian territory. For additional information on the operation, see editorial note, p. 1357.↩
- Telegram 1162 to New Delhi, Apr. T, read as follows: “Department most pleased at points made by you in your talk with Nehru.” (751G.00/4–654)↩