751G.00/4–754: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in New Zealand1

top secret
niact

134. For Ambassador. Limited distribution. Following is summary of memo of conversation not cleared yet by Secretary of Munro’s call on him yesterday.2 Munro began discussion with expression his surprise over strong feeling in New Zealand for action by UN.

Secretary replied we had no intention bypass UN which would be taken fully into account. He thought coalition should take initiative in bringing matter to attention UN. But we should not allow expression our joint determination to oppose expansion Communist power Southeast Asia to depend on prior resolution of UN as UN action would be long drawnout with probable Soviet Security Council veto and lengthy debates in Assembly. In Assembly following such debates might be possible obtain two-third vote of support provided we can persuade that body coalition engaged on “crusade” and not a colonial operation. Secretary thought first phase should be formation coalition after which question of reference to UN would be part of an operating second phase on which we should all consult with respect to timing, etc.

Munro then inquired as to attitude of French stating his Government felt appropriate that French should request formation of coalition.

Secretary indicated we do not yet have definite views of French but that among sporadic requests for assistance received from French, at least one was of character which would involve our belligerency. We are not prepared to be sucked into war gradually in such a manner and we would not enter such an operation if others with vital interests in the area were not committed.

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Munro stated he personally did not view arrangement as attractive if French were to control all resources of coalition and doubted if that would appeal to his Government.

Secretary expressed concurrence this view.

Munro then stressed importance fullest possible agreement between US and UK as basic to policy his Government. Secretary expressed appreciation this point and understood matter will be discussed within next forty-eight hours by British Cabinet.

Munro then indicated his Government encouraged by Radford’s statement Sunday that we anticipated military participation would be limited to Naval and Air support but raised question whether as in case of Korea this might not be followed speedily by introduction land forces. Secretary indicated he could not add to or subtract from Radford’s statement. It is not possible this type of case to impose absolute limitations but our basic policy is that it would not be profitable to wage war in Asia by use of land forces. He doubted if any one could give categoric assurances this matter.

Munro then observed he understood coalition would not include South Korea and Nationalist China. Secretary confirmed this understanding but stressed importance of inclusion to Philippines and Thailand.

The Secretary closed the conversation by stating that if the soundings we are taking indicate that neither the UK nor France is in a position to make hard decisions and will only let nature take its course, this would lead to distress and worry for all of us. He felt that both New Zealand and Australia could assist greatly with the UK if they were so disposed.

For Embassy Canberra. Assume your 213, April 7 crossed Deptel 163, April 6 repeated to Wellington as Deptel 133.3 Please repeat your 163 to Wellington.

Dulles
  1. Drafted by Raynor of BNA. Repeated for information to Canberra as telegram 169.
  2. A memorandum of the conversation between Dulles and Munro of Apr. 6, by Bonbright of EUR, is in PPS files, lot 65 D101, “Indochina”.
  3. Telegram 213 from Canberra, Apr. 7, concerning the question of united action, is not printed. (396.1 GE/4–754) Regarding telegram 163 to Canberra, see footnote 1, p. 1231.